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Summary 
 
This thesis investigates the effects of the introduction of new financial derivative products on 
exchange volatility, efficiency and liquidity. The derivatives under primary investigation are 
Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) and Contracts for Difference (CFDs). These products offer a 
cheap, tax-efficient and speedy method for increasing or decreasing market exposure to price 
changes in the related primary asset. By facilitating faster and shorter-term trading, these 
products may increase market liquidity and/or increase market volatility for the related 
primary asset. The thesis builds a cross-country database of new-derivative-markets opening 
dates, and investigates the key features of prices and returns for related primary assets before 
and after the opening of these derivative markets. The database covers 16 countries in the 
CFD investigation, 21 commodity markets in the ETF investigation, and related data as 
available (daily closing prices, trading volumes, bid-ask quotes) in each of them. The key 
price and return features investigated include bid-ask spreads, trading volumes (both of 
derivatives and related primary assets), and daily return autocorrelation, variance, skewness 
and kurtosis.   
This thesis also considers a separate, but related, research problem. It extends and empirically 
applies a liquidity-indicator model for the Eurozone created by the Bank of England (BOE) 
and developed further by the European Central Bank (ECB) by including commodity 
liquidity, and uses this extended model to investigate shifting investor behaviour based on 
changing market dynamics. Similar to the investigation of the CDF and EFT markets, this 
investigation is concerned with market stability and liquidity in a changed environment (in 
this case, the key change is the introduction of the euro currency). 
Chapter one contains an introduction to the main hypotheses regarding the effects of the 
introduction of new derivatives on securities markets, and the empirical methods used to test 
these hypotheses. This chapter also describes the two investment products which are the main 
focus, CFDs and ETFs, and their particular potential impacts on market-specific 
characteristics such as volatility, efficiency and liquidity.  
Chapter two empirically investigates the impact of CFDs on market liquidity and volatility. 
CFDs have existed for less than twenty years and the CFD market grew rapidly prior to the 
recent international financial crisis. This chapter empirically examines the roles that CFDs 
have played, either as an accelerant for mispricing in international equity markets away from 
fundamental values, or as a source of increased market efficiency through the addition of new 
liquidity. This chapter uses GARCH and EGARCH models to test for the impact of CFDs on 
the return volatility and autocorrelation of the underlying security. In the case of Australia, 
the analysis is applied to individual securities. In the other 15 countries investigated in this 
chapter, the analysis is applied at the level of the market index. The chapter also investigates 
whether the stylised characteristics of CFDs are more or less pronounced in low liquidity 
exchanges. This chapter finds that CFDs appear to have influenced asset-specific variance 
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and return autocorrelation. Some tentative explanations for these findings are offered. The 
presence of bid and ask-price ‘overhangs’ associated with CFD trading cannot be rejected 
and may be associated with observed volatility reductions in some jurisdictions.  
Following the analysis based on CFDs in chapter two, ETFs are the primary focus of chapter 
three. ETFs have existed since the late 1980s, but were first traded on commodity markets in 
the early 2000s. Their inception has been linked by some market analysts with the large 
growth in commodity market volatility seen in recent years. This chapter directly tests this 
link. The chapter also investigates whether the stylised characteristics of ETFs are more or 
less pronounced in larger commodity markets than in smaller markets. The results indicate 
that larger ETFs in terms of their assets under management at their dates of inception, are 
associated with higher volatility. Smaller commodity markets are found to have increased 
efficiency after the introduction of ETFs, indicating that there are some benefits from new 
ETF investment in markets below $4 to $5 billion in size, but the associated caveat is that of 
increased volatility, indicative of potential pitfalls in the ETF portfolio rebalancing process. It 
appears that ETFs have made commodity markets more efficient through a new influx of 
trading counterparties, but they appear to be associated with a cost. The need for regulation of 
investment size and market ownership limits therefore cannot be rejected. 
Chapters two and three look at two particular new instruments and their effects on liquidity 
and volatility. Another major innovation in market structure was the advent of the euro 
currency in January 1999. The power and presence of a financially-combined Europe 
attracted new international investment, therefore influencing liquidity. The combination of 
this influx of investors and new products (including CFDs and ETFs) can potentially have 
wide market impacts. Understanding the structural changes of liquidity in Europe in recent 
years is important for macroprudential risk assessment, as sudden changes in conditions may 
be indicative of current stress and a signal of future stress. Chapter four presents a European-
specific liquidity measure used by several central banks, and provides some new 
modifications to this measure. The measure is constructed by combining several facets of 
liquidity and depth measurement across several asset markets. It attempts to incorporate 
aspects such as market tightness, depth and resiliency. The flows and the direction of 
causality can also be inferred using vector autoregression, Granger causality techniques and 
impulse response functions. The measure uses a combination of liquidity determinants 
including the bid-ask spread, the return to volume ratio and numerous measures of liquidity 
premia. In the chapter, the modified liquidity measure is applied empirically to European-area 
data.   
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Chapter 1: The effects of new derivatives on market dynamics 
 
 
Abstract: This thesis investigates the effects of the introduction of new financial derivative 
products on exchange volatility, efficiency and liquidity. The derivatives under primary 
investigation are Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) and Contracts for Difference (CFDs). 
ETFs have existed since the late 1980s, but have only been traded on commodity markets 
since the early 2000s. CFDs made their first appearance in equity markets in the late 1990s 
and have since grown significantly to become one of the most frequently traded products 
across numerous financial markets. This chapter introduces and explains the dynamics and 
characteristics of these new investment products and their relationship with market-specific 
characteristics such as volatility, efficiency and liquidity.  
 
1.1. Introduction 
New investment products, such as CFDs and ETFs, are created to enable investors to take 
advantage of new investment approaches and strategies or to avoid costly regulations. These 
products create new leveraged strategies for the investors who use them and have been linked 
to increased market efficiency through the quicker and more effective transfer of information 
across financial markets (Gastineau, 2010, Kosev and Williams, 2011). In recent decades we 
have witnessed a comprehensive growth in the use of leveraged1 products designed to enable 
trading strategies exploiting the spread between investment products. This has potential 
benefits, such as diversification in the form of that discussed by French and Poterba (1991) 
and Goetzmann and Kumar (2008), through the use of ETFs and leveraged spread-betting2 
through CFDs. Investing in international ETFs helps to reduce home bias (excessive 
investment in the investor’s home territory) thereby providing more substantial 
diversification. CFDs have also increased the availability of foreign investment opportunities 
for domestic investors. This thesis attempts to investigate the effects that tradable products 
such as CFDs and ETFs have had on volatility and liquidity.  
This thesis focuses specifically on the role that these products have had in influencing 
volatility in the cash and futures markets for equities and commodities. Derivatives such as 
CFDs and ETFs are developed by a primary broker or sponsor and are then offered to 
investors who seek additional risk in their portfolios through leverage, to which they gain 
                                                             
1 Leverage is the term to describe any technique used to increase the potential return of an investment using borrowed 
margin. Common methods of obtaining leverage include borrowing money, buying fixed assets and using derivatives. 
2 Spread betting is based on wagering on the outcome of an event, where the pay-off is based on the accuracy of the wager, 
rather than a simple ‘win or lose’ outcome such as those offered when betting. A spread is a range of potential outcomes and 
the bet is based on whether the outcome will be above or below the spread. 
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access to when the broker provides margin3. CFDs offer cheap access to investment credit. 
When an investor selects CFDs as their method of investment, they are partaking in a contract 
where they are borrowing funds from the CFD provider on which overnight interest is 
charged. This interest cost is potentially cheap for short-term investment, but may be 
expensive for investors with longer-term investment horizons. The standard margin provision 
internationally for CFDs is 10%, with the remaining 90% of the investment borrowed by the 
investor from their broker. CFDs are investigated in detail in section 1.2.  
ETFs are structured differently. The ETF sponsor purchases large amounts of the asset on 
which the fund is based and then sub-divides and re-allocates elements of the same pooled 
funds to investors seeking to invest. This provides the investor with easy access to markets 
which they may have being unable to access otherwise due to, for example, trading 
restrictions such as large entrance-capital requirements and trading commissions (Blitz et al., 
2010). ETFs have raised significant issues in some markets since the size of the fund has in 
some cases exceeded 40-50% of the total market. This dominant position could hinder the 
dynamics of the market. ETFs have also been viewed as a source of ignition and potential 
accelerant of commodity price increases and volatility (Cheng and Madhavan, 2009). Also, 
the ease of access and reduced trading commissions have created a product that has been 
found to appeal directly to ‘noise traders’ (Cherry, 2004, Ackert and Tian, 2008), thus 
appealing to a group of investors that have been found to increase volatility in exchanges that 
they enter (Mendel and Shleifer, 2011). ETFs are discussed in detail in section 1.3 while the 
nature of the effects of both CFDs and ETFs on international market liquidity is investigated 
in section 1.4.  
 
1.2. Contracts for Difference (CFDs) 
The characteristics of CFDs are structured towards those investors seeking additional levels 
of risk in their portfolios. CFDs are usually structured to allow an investor to invest at a 
standard rate (based on jurisdictional regulatory differences) of 10%. This CFD borrowing 
mechanism is effectively an alternative method of gaining access to investable funds and is 
available to all investors contingent on the margin that they initially provide. This same 
margin provision grants the investor an opportunity to leverage themselves tenfold, since this 
investment offers the capability of purchasing ten times the amount of equity than they could 
previously afford (assuming the standard rate of 10% margin is used). If the investor has 
purchased the equity and if the price increased 10%, the investor has made 100% returns. But 
if the share price falls 10%, the investor has now lost his/her entire position and must meet 
margin calls4 to maintain the position’s active status. 
                                                             
3 Margin buying is buying securities with cash borrowed from a broker, using other securities as collateral. This has the 
effect of magnifying any profit or loss made on the securities. The securities themselves serve as collateral for the loan. The 
net value is initially equal to the amount of one’s available capital and this must stay above a minimum margin requirement 
which is present to protect the broker against a fall in the value of the securities to the point where the investor can no longer 
cover the loan. 
4 A margin call is a broker’s demand on an investor using margin to deposit additional money or securities so that the margin 
account is brought up by the minimum maintenance margin.  
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To investigate the profits CFDs can generate, we can use a hypothetical example of the 
company ABC plc. An investor uses CFDs to invest €10,000 at a price of €1.20 per share. If 
the investor had bought the shares through traditional stockbroker channels at 100% margin, 
he would receive 8,333 shares. Using CFDs at a standard 10% margin he can now afford 
83,333 shares, though he would hold none of the voting rights on the shares. In industry 
terminology, the investor is now ‘long €833.33 per point’ indicating a gain or loss of €833.33 
for every cent move above or below €1.20. To open the same position using a stockbroker, 
the investor would require €100,000 in initial capital. The speculative nature of the position is 
evident if the investor does not have the €100,000 necessary to fully protect their portfolio 
should the price of ABC plc. equity fall to €0.00. The investor in fact would lose all initial 
capital should the share price fall to €1.08 and would gain €10,000 if the share price increases 
to €1.32. If for example, the share price increased to €2.40 and if the investor had invested 
with a stockbroker, he/she would now possess €20,000. Using CFDs, he/she would receive 
€110,000. 
From the example above, it is clear that CFD can increase both trading volumes and market 
volatility as traders enter and exit their leveraged positions.  Brunnermeier, (2008) finds that 
trading of volumes of leveraged financial instruments thrives in periods of short-term extreme 
volatility, such as that seen in the 2007 to 2011 financial crises, as investors maximise the 
amount of a particular equity that they can afford. Evidence of this phenomenon was also 
uncovered in the build-up to the subprime crisis (Smith and Pulliam, 2007). Due to overnight 
interest charges and trading commissions, long-term investors would shy away from using 
CFD. Specifically, more high-frequency, speculative traders would find CFDs more attractive 
as an investment product. This group have been associated with increased market volatility 
(Avramov, Chordia and Goyal, 2006). 
Along with large CFD trading volumes, there have been instances of trading irregularities 
associated with CFD investment. The report of the Irish Banking Commission which 
investigated the systemic banking crisis in Ireland found that an ‘overhang’ existed from 
large CFD trades that was capable of leading to confusion and differing interpretations of 
what was driving the share price collapse of Anglo Irish Bank (Report of the Commission of 
Investigation into the banking sector in Ireland, 2011)). In Germany, a report by the ESME5 
in 2009 found that a large unwinding by Porsche of options relating to CFDs in Volkswagen 
(VW) combined with take-over rumours, had fuelled a 500% price increase in less than seven 
days in October 2008 (European Securities Market Expert Group, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
5 The European Securities Market Expert Group (ESME) was established by the European Commission in March 2006 to 
provide legal and economic advice on the application of the EU Securities Directives. The ESME suspended its activities in 
December 2009. 
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Figure 1.1: CFD investment capability in Ireland   
 
Note: Figure 1.1 shows the amount of CFD providers that offer shares on the ISEQ index as an investment product to their 
clients. A large proportion of the companies were established during the ‘dot-com’ era. Data is taken from a combination of 
the numerous company websites.  
 
Figure 1.2: ISEQ transactions and growth in CFD companies 
 
Note: The data on the number of total transactions is taken from the Irish Stock Exchange website (www.ise.ie). Figure 1.2 
investigates the relationship between the number of transactions on the Irish Stock Exchange (ISEQ) and the number of CFD 
companies located in Ireland and the United Kingdom with investment capability on the ISEQ. We can see a clear positive 
correlation between the two variables. 
CFD companies benefit significantly from the increased CFD volumes traded in periods of 
increased volatility. In figure 1.1, we can see the growth in CFD companies that offer equities 
on the ISEQ Index to their clients as a trading option. These companies advertise generally 
both as CFD and spread-betting companies. The major difference between the two is tax 
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regulation. In some countries, such as Ireland and the United Kingdom, betting markets are 
free from all taxation. Alternatively, CFD investment may be subject to taxation on profits6. 
Apart from this CFDs and spread-betting are effectively the same. 
Again, investigating the trend in the growth of CFD and spread-betting companies, evidence 
of their increasing importance can be measured in terms of the total growth in transactions. 
The ISEQ is a special case as there is no option or futures market available for leveraged 
trading. Growth in trading volumes on the ISEQ were the result of significant flows of funds 
coming from large investment firms (for example, hedge funds) and also from the growth of 
CFDs in Ireland and the United Kingdom. From figure 1.2, we can see the trends from 1997 
until 2008 (due to data restrictions). We can clearly visualise the rapid growth in the number 
of spread-betting companies from 2000 onwards, whereas in 1997 there were only five 
established. The growth in the spread-betting and CFD industry is clearly in tandem with the 
growth in the level of total transactions on the ISEQ. Due to the leveraged nature of CFDs, 
the potential number of shares that could have been traded relative to fully margined 
investment is ten times greater. Also, as the Irish Stock Exchange (ISEQ) grew, more 
investors began to gain exposure to these new financial instruments, which may have led to 
an increase in the number of CFD companies. Dual causality, between transactions on the 
ISEQ and the growth of the CFD trading companies is the most likely explanation as the 
growth of the ISEQ would have increased awareness of CFDs as a trading mechanism and 
the growth of CFD companies may have increased the number of transactions through the 
provision of leverage. However, CFDs are not a common feature of all financial markets.  
Specifically, the United States has not allowed CFDs to be traded as a result of restrictions on 
over the counter7 (OTC) financial instruments by the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission8. Thus CFDs on US equities are available to non-US residents only.  
 
1.3. Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) 
Exchange-Traded Funds are typically registered investment funds that track an investment 
product or particular index. The components of these funds are traded in a similar manner to 
equities. For example, a financial ETF could potentially comprise a fund which has invested 
in the main financial elements of a particular exchange. The investment strategy of the ETF is 
decided by the provider and can be based, for example, on market capitalisation9 or share 
price of the individual elements of the ETF. Investors can short10 their chosen ETF and, in 
                                                             
6 In Ireland, this is known as capital gains tax, charged on profits and has been around 20% in recent years. 
7 Over the counter (OTC) is to trade financial instruments directly between two parties, as opposed to exchange trading 
which occurs in exchanges such as cash, futures, options, etc. 
8 The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is an agency that has the primary role of enforcing the federal 
securities laws and regulating the securities industry (including stock, options, futures, etc.). The SEC was established by 
section 4 of the Securities Exchange Act (1934). 
9 Market capitalisation is a measure of size of a business enterprise equal to the share price times the number of shares 
outstanding (shares that have been authorized, issued, and purchased by investors) of a public company. As owning stock 
represents ownership of the company, including all its equity, capitalisation could represent the public opinion of a 
company's net worth and is a determining factor in stock valuation. 
10 Short selling is the practice of selling assets, usually securities that have been borrowed from a third party with the 
intention of buying identical assets back at a later date to return to the lender. 
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some cases, they can use leveraged products such as CFDs to increase their exposure. The 
price of the ETF varies based on supply and demand of investment and this price is visible 
throughout the trading day. ETFs attempt to replicate the return of an index, although it is not 
unusual to see significant differences in the returns of an index and the associated ETF 
(Svetina and Wahal, 2008, Agapova, 2010, Charupath and Miu, 2010). 
The ETF creation process for funds domiciled in the United States begins when a prospective 
ETF manager (or ‘sponsor’) files a plan with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) to 
create an ETF. If the plan is approved, the sponsor forms an agreement with an ‘authorised 
participant’, usually a market maker, specialist or a large institutional investor, who is 
empowered to create or redeem ETF shares. In the case of equity ETFs, the creators often 
borrow equity from a pension fund or other large fund to form the creation unit. This can be 
the case for commodity ETFs, but given the large size of the positions being opened and the 
use of commodity futures markets, the positions are mostly built from direct purchases of the 
asset, rather than borrowing from a third party. Other international ETFs are formed in a 
similar manner, but they must satisfy the regulations of the jurisdiction in which they are 
domiciled. 
ETF investors receive additional investment benefits from tax-efficiency in comparison with 
mutual funds11 and, as ETFs track many of the indexes that they are synchronised with, there 
is a reduction in operating and transaction costs due to the passively-managed styles12 of most 
ETFs (Anderson et al. 2010). The variety of ETFs available to investors cover nearly all 
sectors of international financial markets. Alternatively, ETF investors do have to pay 
commissions to their brokers that vary depending on the liquidity of the market in which they 
are investing. 
ETFs have evolved in recent years becoming more complex (Kosev and Williams, 2011). It is 
now possible to buy shares of an ETF investing in the underlying index using additional 
leverage. Some funds are established already shorting the market, thus buying into the ETF 
creates a short position for the investor. This style of ETF is also known as an ‘inverse ETF’ 
and the product has become popular in the recent financial crises as many investors attempt 
to profit from falling market prices. Some funds offer positions based on market spreads13. 
The most common funds are based on the difference between the current market price of a 
product and the associated futures price14. There are an incredibly large number of variations 
possible for ETF creation.  
                                                             
11 A mutual fund is a professionally managed type of collective investment scheme that pools money from many investors 
and invests typically in investment securities (stocks, bonds, commodities etc.). The mutual fund will have a fund manager 
that trades (buys and sells) the fund's investments in accordance with the fund's investment objective.  
12 Passive investing is a financial strategy in which a fund manager makes as few portfolio decisions as possible, in order to 
minimize transaction costs 
13 The market spread for securities is the difference between the prices quoted for an immediate sale (ask) and an immediate 
purchase (bid). The size of the bid-offer spread in a security is one measure of the liquidity of the market and of the size of 
the transaction cost. 
14 A futures contract is a standardized contract between two parties to buy or sell a specified asset of standardized quantity 
and quality at a specified future date at a price agreed today (the futures price). The contracts are traded on a futures 
exchange. Futures contracts are not "direct" securities like stocks, bonds, rights or warrants. They are still securities, 
however, though they are a type of derivative contract. 
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Many market analysts view ETFs as a tool offering an opportunity for smaller investors to 
enter markets they otherwise could not (Wang et al. 2010, Roll et al. 2011). In some financial 
markets, the costs of entry are simply too high for the average investor. The creators of ETFs 
are able to pool the investment funds of numerous investors, thus allowing direct market 
entry. The ETF then divides the portfolio into shares and sells these in a secondary market. 
There are many issues associated with this style of investment that have created some cause 
for concern. One concern is the ease of access for some investors who would otherwise have 
been unable to enter the market who can now enter and exit the market, as frequently and 
easily as they desire (Gutierrez et al. 2009). These investors are found to contribute to a facet 
of investment known as ‘noise trading’. This same style of investment has the potential to 
increase the volatility of the exchanges in which an ETF is invested in (FSA, 2010). This 
effect can also be amplified through the use of leveraged ETFs.  
ETFs based on leverage are generally beneficial to those investors wishing to maximize their 
purchasing capability with a minimal nominal investment. FINRA15 in 2009 reminded 
brokers of their fiduciary responsibilities when providing ETFs that offer leverage. In an 
official statement on their website16, they reminded brokers and advisors that these 
instruments are ‘complex’ and that they are ‘unsuitable for investors who plan to hold them 
for more than one trading session’ (US Securities and Exchange Commission, 2011).  
Other significant problems with ETFs include investor trading habits. It has been found that 
ETF investor trading habits are associated with more frequent trading, which has been found 
to reduce overall market returns (Madhavan, 2009). John Bogle, the founder of the Vanguard 
Group17, has also argued that ETFs are the source of short-term speculative trading strategies. 
Though offering the view that an ETF held for a prolonged period of time can be a good 
investment, the trading commissions significantly reduce the returns to the investor and that 
the investor may not receive the diversification initially offered by the ETF provider. Another 
problem cited by Bogle (2010) with ETFs is the significant lack of investor and market 
knowledge about the product.  
It has also been argued that indices that are offered as an ETF may be misrepresented (Haskin 
et al. 2009). Though it may be based on a particular sector of the economy or market, it is at 
the discretion of the ETF creator which individual components are in the fund. Higher market 
volatility is also associated as a leading cause of tracking error18 between the returns of the 
ETF and the returns of the market. In most cases, ETFs have a low tracking error. But in 
markets with low market liquidity, there are significant issues for traders attempting to 
immediately execute orders on behalf of clients or investment funds, thus they may have to 
pay more for this immediate order execution. 
                                                             
15 Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) is the largest independent regulator for all securities firms doing 
business in the United States. They oversee nearly 4,700 brokerage firms, 167,000 branch offices and 635,000 registered 
securities representatives. 
16 The FINRA website can be found at http://www.finra.org.  
17 The Vanguard Group is an American investment management company that manages approximately $1.4 trillion in assets, 
based in Malvern, Pennsylvania. It offers mutual funds and other financial products and services to individual and 
institutional investors in the United States and abroad. 
18 Tracking error is a measure of how closely a portfolio follows the index to which it is benchmarked. 
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The main benefits of ETF investment is the ease of diversification, low expense ratios and tax 
efficiency (Gastineau, 2010). This comes with all the standard structure of a normal equity 
with options19, short selling, stop-losses20 and limit orders21 available. ETFs have lower 
operational costs as most are passively managed, thus ETF managers do not actively buy and 
sell the individual elements of the ETF, but rather hold the components for long term growth 
opportunities. ETFs can be bought and sold at any time during the trading day in comparison 
to mutual funds that can only be sold at the end of each trading day when their net asset value 
(NAV) is calculated. As an ETF investor, it is also possible to see the components of the ETF 
at regular intervals during the trading day, thus making ETFs more transparent than mutual 
funds. Other benefits include tax efficiency due to economies of scale and ease of exposure to 
markets that otherwise would not have been possible for the individual investor. 
One of the major volatility linked issues associated with ETFs is the rebalancing trades that 
occur at the end of the trading day. For ETFs to meet their investment mandates, it is 
necessary for them to rebalance their portfolio as market movements require. Many analysts 
have thought for some time that it is this rebalancing process that is causing or even abetting 
excess volatility as seen in the work of Gardner and Welsh (2005), Rompotis (2008), Carver 
(2009) and Humphries (2010). Many market experts believe that ETF rebalancing due to the 
unwillingness and reticence to hold positions overnight is boosting late-day volume, with 
some estimates in the range of 20-30% of last hour trading being accredited to ETFs 
(Avellaneda and Zhang, 2009,  Knain-Little, 2010). In 2010, a Morgan Stanley report 
estimated that ETFs accounted for about 30% of daily listed market volume, which is three 
times more than in 2005. The Investment Company Institute in 2010 believed that more than 
$780 billion is invested in ETFs (Milonas and Rompotis, 2006). Leveraged ETFs have drawn 
their own concerns due to the amplified volumes purchased and sold that are associated with 
fund rebalancing. If one was to investigate broad funds like index trackers, the rebalancing 
process of one large ETF investment could be as large as a buy or sell on every selected stock 
on the ETF index in question. Hundreds of billions of United States dollars of ETF funds 
capital is now invested in contracts that were once dominated by commodity producers and 
consumers who sought to hedge specifically against commodity-market volatility for day-to-
day company risk reduction. 
Another effect associated with increased ETF trading is a rise in market correlations (Roll, 
2011). A ‘herd effect’22 has been seen by analysts as ETF trading mirrors falls in individual 
shares (Stoll and Whaley, 2010). This has been amplified by current global uncertainties, as 
investors are now less willing to hold overnight positions due to the increased risk of out-of-
                                                             
19 An option is a derivative financial instrument that establishes a contract between two parties concerning the buying or 
selling of an asset at a reference price during a specified time frame. The buyer of the option gains the right, but not the 
obligation, to engage in some specific transaction on the asset, while the seller incurs the obligation to fulfill the transaction 
if so requested by the buyer. 
20 A stop order (also stop loss order) is an order to buy (or sell) a security once the price of the security has climbed above 
(or dropped below) a specified stop price. 
21 A limit order is an order to buy a security at not more, or sell at not less, than a specific price. 
22 The ‘herd effect’ is defined as the widespread tendency to copy the actions of what a group or the crowd is completing or 
in other word to behave instinctively like most other people. In finance it is attached to the mentality of a large group of 
investors to follow a leader (i.e.: a large mutual fund or ETF) and invest when the price of a stock moves drastically in one 
direction.  
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market-hours price fluctuations. This phenomenon is clearly more pronounced since early 
2008, signalling the change in risk preferences of investors as markets started to fall 
drastically. But to investigate this topic in depth, one would need to know the investment and 
rebalancing criteria of every fund in a particular sector. The best academics can do in this 
situation is work with total ETF volumes traded in equities and commodities as a proportion 
of total market volume and estimate rebalancing processes. Commodities may be slightly less 
complex as the investment pool is generally based solely on the main investment asset of the 
ETF. 
ETFs are available on nearly every international financial exchange including  commodity 
markets.  Commodity prices such as those of oil and gold have reached unprecedented highs 
in recent years and questions have been asked as to the true source of this upward pressure. 
The same commodities are associated with a ‘flight to safety’ in volatile periods in equity 
markets. But ETFs now offer every investor an opportunity to gain from the rise in 
commodity prices associated with the same flight to safety. Some analysts believe that the 
amplified increase in the price of some commodities is directly-associated with the new-
found mass investment from ETFs (Irwin and Sanders, 2009, Hailu and Weersink, 2010, 
Tilton et al. 2011). It was noted that even though some oil and gold ETFs invest in the futures 
markets of these same products, the funds possess the same market moving capability even 
though the futures price movements may be disassociated from the spot market price.  
In July 2010, Bloomberg BusinessWeek introduced their magazine with the heading ‘Amber 
Waves of Pain, Do Not Buy Commodity ETFs!’ with commodity ETFs been brandished as 
‘America’s worst investment’. Bloomberg stated before that many ETFs are ‘stuffed with 
exotic derivatives’ at risk of becoming ‘the next financial time-bomb’. This time-bomb is 
believed to have the capability of recreating the market panics of the early 2000’s and 2008 
periods, simply due to the sheer scale of the investment involved. Much of the problem 
associated with commodity ETFs is the lack of understanding by investors as to the 
underlying mechanisms of how the funds work. One of the major issues as explained earlier 
was that of futures market ‘contango’ (Kosev and Williams, 2011). Instead of taking delivery 
on the futures contracts of the commodities ETF funds are primarily investing in, they sell the 
futures contracts prior to expiry and buy into more futures contracts with a long-term expiry. 
If for example, crude oil is currently $75, and the next month’s futures contract is $77 and the 
month after is $79, an ETF wishing to move from the near future contract to the next would 
take an immediate loss of $2 to replace the same asset. This represents an immediate loss to 
the investors in the ETF. Futures traders on the other side of the transaction are finding 
themselves profiting from far month contracts that are trading at enormous premiums to the 
front month due to the investment strategies of the ETF brokers. There in fact has been the 
recent creation of a sub industry of hedge funds to take advantage of this spread. Overall, 
commodity ETFs tend to own the nearest futures contract of the commodity they are 
investing in, while paying huge premiums leading to a large under-performance relative to 
the underlying investment product. Investors consider ETFs to be effective vehicles for 
gaining exposure to commodities in their portfolios.  
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Commodity ETFs have to buy more underlying commodity futures contracts in order to be 
able to issue additional shares—and there is growing concern at the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC) that the deluge of money pouring into these ETFs from retail 
investors may be distorting market prices. That is not the only difficulty faced by the asset 
class. On August 12th 2009, the United States Natural Gas Fund (UNG) was the first ETF to 
stop issuing new shares out of concern that it might already be exceeding strict position 
limits—the number of futures contracts it is allowed to hold—that the CFTC may impose in 
the near future. This move was echoed by ETF providers such as Deutsche Bank and 
Barclays Global Investors, who suspended further issuance of some of their shares without in 
depth explanation. It has been much anticipated that the funds also acted in anticipation of the 
CTFC ruling that would shut down very aggressive commodity products that were believed 
to be distorting market prices.  
The Bank of England has also highlighted ETF market risks. They stated that the benefits of 
ETFs may be outweighed by “complexity, opacity and contingent risks” - and it is worried 
that the transparency of the risks arising from securities lending as many funds lend out the 
securities bought with retail investors’ money (Bank of England Financial Stability Report, 
June 2010). The Bank of England also believes that the auditing processes that should ensure 
the shares in ETFs are backed by an equivalent value of the underlying commodity or index 
may not be up to the task. The structure of the ETF market itself makes fraud easy. “Often, 
for tax and stamp duty reasons, as well as cost and finding the right legal framework, many 
ETFs are listed in one country, the management resides in a second, and the commodity or 
securities are held in a third,” Bedlam Asset Management warned in October last year 
(Hussain, 2010). It has unearthed ‘beverage’ ETFs where the manager, trustee, custodian and 
listing are in the Indian sub-continent, the Gulf, Africa and Europe which convinces them 
there are ETF frauds out there just waiting to be discovered as why would they not keep all 
elements of the ETF in a single jurisdiction if fraud were not allowed? 
Whatever triggers a panic to exit the ETF market – fraud, the regulatory crack down, or 
simply general market panic – global equity prices are likely to be hit by a chain reaction. 
“Wall Street has created a dangerous new kind of global weapon of mass destruction – a 
bomb primed to detonate like the 2000 dot-coms, the 2008 sub-primes – and detonation is 
dead ahead,” Paul Farrell recently wrote in Dow Jones’ Market Watch (Farrell, 2010). If ETF 
funds become forced sellers to meet redemptions, it could create a downward spiral as a wave 
of physical gold and other commodities are sold into thin markets, in turn triggering falls in 
the share prices of companies that produce these commodities. As investors sell shares in the 
more concentrated ETFs, the very act of selling the underlying investments is likely to put 
pressure on commodity values, negatively effecting the ETF’s net asset value and 
precipitating additional sales. 
CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler stated in an August 19th 2009 news release that "position 
limits should be consistently applied and vigorously enforced" and that "position limits 
promote market integrity by guarding against concentrated positions" (CFTC press release, 
August 19th 2009). This would have a negative impact on ETFs as investors would be less 
attracted if their positions were limited. ETF providers are of course opposed to any 
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regulation limiting their products, but some markets that ETFs invest in are simply too small 
to efficiently absorb the large inflow of investors’ funds. In a reversal of findings and 
decisions made in the United States by the Bush administration, the CFTC under the control 
of Gary Gensler concluded that speculators may have played a significant role in driving wild 
price swings in oil prices that caused oil to spike at $147 in mid-2008 (CFTC, 2008). Also, on 
May 6th 2010, the ‘Flash Crash’ of US equities saw more than 70% of the trades cancelled 
due to excessive declines involving ETFs, reinforcing the view on the impact of the massive 
influx of capital into commodities. The financial reform bill23 that Barack Obama signed on 
the 21st of July 2010 included provisions that will allow for new rules to limit the amount of 
investments in commodities by big institutions betting on their direction purely for financial 
gain (or without any need for company specific hedging purposes) while it will impose 
regulatory caps on energy trading in the near future and limit the size of funds. 
 
1.4. The impact of new investment tools such as CFDs and ETFs on market liquidity 
Both ETFs and CFDs have the potential to increase market liquidity. CFDs, through the 
process of investor leverage based on the availability of trading margin, can increase liquidity 
in terms of trading volumes – directly as a result of the margin and hedging practices of CFD 
brokers. Whereas, investors who are fully margined can utilise x shares, CFD traders can 
potentially utilise ௫%	௠௔௥௚௜௡ shares. Alternatively, when CFD brokers hedge the counterparty 
risk of their clients, they implement orders to buy and sell their holdings through limit orders 
and stop losses, the direction of which depends on whether it is a trade to buy or sell. Market 
depth24, another significant barometer of liquidity, also increases based on the hedging 
actions of the broker. Both CFDs and ETFs, through their ease of use, margin capabilities, tax 
benefits and low trading commissions, both offer a useful platform for short-term day-
traders25 to enter the markets in which they choose to invest.  
It is this same increase in trading frequency and volumes traded that have increased the 
liquidity and depth of some markets. In countries such as Ireland, there has been a correlated 
increase in liquidity of equity markets with that of the growth of the CFD industry. There 
have also been questions about the capability of smaller equity exchanges to absorb the 
volumes of margined trading products such as CFDs. ETFs alternatively are created baskets 
of numerous underlying assets. The major liquidity increasing effect is associated with the 
fact that small investors can rarely afford the significant charges, commissions and minimum 
purchasing values necessary to invest in commodity markets, yet ETFs offer an opportunity 
for all investors of all wealth categories to enter and exit their chosen markets with benefits 
such as added diversification from increased products in their portfolio (Booth and Fama, 
1970). The significant growth of ETFs has been linked to the life-time high prices seen in oil 
                                                             
23 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 111th Congress, 2009-2010 
24 Market depth refers to the size of an order needed to move the market a given amount. If the market is deep, a large order 
is needed to change the price. Market depth closely relates to the notion of liquidity, the ease to find a trading partner for a 
given order. A deep market is also known as a liquid market.  
25 Day trading refers to the practice of buying and selling financial instruments within the same trading day such that all 
positions are usually closed before the market closes for the trading day. Another name for this style is active trading.  
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and gold markets in recent years and in December 2010 it was reported that the Blackrock 
ETF market was worth over $1.48 trillion (Techchandani, 2011). 
 
1.5. Conclusion 
This chapter offers a concise overview of the investigated products and hypotheses contained 
in this thesis. This thesis investigates the effects of these relatively new investment products 
and their associated link with recent crises and market panics.  
The market influence of new investment products such as CFDs and ETFs are the main focus 
of chapter 2 and chapter 3 respectively. These products have the power to add significant 
liquidity to numerous international exchanges and the effect of this must be investigated in 
terms of numerous market metrics of dynamics and efficiency. Chapter 4 develops an 
effective metric of European liquidity and its benefits towards macroprudential risk 
assessment. This chapter also contains analysis of the shifts in liquidity in the lead up to the 
international subprime crisis and European sovereign debt problems.  
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Chapter 2: Contracts for Difference: Added liquidity or excess volatility? 
 
 
Abstract: Contracts for Difference (CFDs) have existed for less than twenty years. Prior to 
the international crisis, the market grew rapidly. These new derivatives are lightly regulated 
and a source of speculative trading strategies. This chapter examines the roles that CFDs 
have played, either as an accelerant for mispricing was from fundamental values in 
international equity markets, or as a source of increased market efficiency through the 
addition of new liquidity. This chapter uses GARCH-based models to test for the impact of 
CFDs on the return volatility and autocorrelation of the underlying security. In the case of 
Australia, the same analysis is applied to the individual securities and in the other fifteen 
countries investigated the analysis is applied at the level of the market index (due to data 
limitations). The chapter also investigates whether the stylised characteristics of CFDs are 
more or less pronounced in low liquidity exchanges. This chapter finds that CFDs appear to 
have lowered asset-specific variance and increased return autocorrelation. Some tentative 
explanations for these findings are offered in conclusion. The presence of bid and ask price 
‘overhangs’ associated with CFD trading cannot be rejected and may be associated with 
EGARCH-volatility reductions found in some jurisdictions.  
 
 
2.1. Introduction  
The CFD industry grew significantly from the product’s creation in the mid-1990s until the 
onset of financial crisis in 2007. Due to the role of these products as a method of quickly 
entering and exiting markets, they are attractive to risk loving investors seeking to maximize 
leverage. Investors can open positions, either long or short26, using CFDs, with leverage 
sometimes as low as 1%, but the standard rate is 10% throughout the industry. This means 
that the position can theoretically be one hundred times larger than the amount of capital the 
investor initially possesses. The nature of these leveraged investors could potentially affect 
the behaviour of the exchange as a whole. Alternatively, CFDs may have a beneficial impact 
on exchanges worldwide due to the added liquidity the products’ leverage provides. It must 
be noted that some exchanges, such as the Irish Stock Exchange (ISEQ Index), would have 
had minimal exposure to leveraged products prior to the arrival of CFDs. The CFD industry 
remains understudied, un-transparent and lightly regulated in comparison to other derivatives 
                                                             
26 Buying a product ‘long’ is the process of buying a financial product or the intention of an investor to profit from the price 
of the product increasing. Alternatively, buying a product ‘short’ is the process of selling a financial product or the intention 
of an investor to profit from the price of the product decreasing 
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exchanges such as the options and futures markets. This chapter intends to answer some of 
the outstanding questions that have been asked about the CFD industry. 
The main question is whether CFDs have increased excess volatility in international 
exchanges. Alternatively or in addition, has this same leveraged investment increased 
exchange efficiency through liquidity improvements? Also, are these effects, either positive 
or negative, amplified on low liquidity exchanges? Due to low volumes traded on some 
smaller exchanges the added volumes from leveraged trading may amplify any effect that 
CFDs have on international exchanges. Additionally, what are the true levels of CFD 
volumes traded internationally? Finally, did the ASX CFD decision to segregate CFDs on a 
separate exchange increase or reduce the volatility of the main ASX exchange? 
As a solution to the problem of CFD-specific trading volumes being unavailable for sixteen 
of the jurisdictions investigated, the daily returns of the main domestic indices are used in the 
international GARCH and EGARCH models. In contrast, the Australian Securities Exchange 
(ASX) provides a dataset explicitly offering daily and weekly flows of CFD volumes which 
allows for a more in-depth analysis of the secondary hypotheses based on the arrival and 
withdrawal of CFDs. This will be discussed in section 2.4.2. The ASX individual equity 
database allows for a specific investigation of the CFD investor’s holdings after the creation 
of the ASX CFD exchange. 
Smith New Court plc. who specialised in the research, origination and trading of equity, 
developed CFDs in the early 1990s as a method of shorting financial markets. These 
derivatives were characterised by high leverage, low margins and tax-free profit. They were 
bought by Merrill Lynch in July 1995 for £526 million. CFDs were institutionally traded 
from the early 1990’s until mid-1998 when they became generally available. A period of 
regulation reduction and United Kingdom government incentives to regain tax receipts from 
tax-haven economies such as Gibraltar and Liechtenstein increased interest in CFDs and their 
trading volumes increased. In 2002, the product became available in Ireland and Australia 
and subsequently grew until 2007, by which time CFDs were available on most international 
exchanges. Estimates of CFD volumes across numerous exchanges vary considerably. In 
Ireland it has been estimated that volumes were as high as 50% of all ISEQ27 transactions28. 
Estimates in the United Kingdom in 2007 were produced by the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) who found that ‘The CFD market in the UK has grown significantly in the last five 
years. Current estimates suggest that about 30 percent of equity trades are in some way 
driven by CFD transactions referenced to the underlying shares’ (FSA – CP07|20, 2007).  
There have been instances of trading irregularities associated with CFD investment. The 
report of the Irish Banking Commission to investigate the systemic banking crisis in Ireland 
found that an ‘overhang’ existed from large CFD trades that was capable of leading to 
confusion and differing interpretations of what was driving the share price collapse of Anglo 
                                                             
27 The main trading basket of shares on the Irish Stock Exchange is also referred to as the ISEQ 20.  
28 The Sunday Business Post (Ireland) on the 21st of October stated: ‘Confidential briefing documents seen by The Sunday 
Business Post disclosed that the Irish Stock Exchange estimated that CFD trading accounted for up to 50 percent of all its 
share trading activity’, (Clerkin, 2007) 
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Irish Bank. In Germany, a report by the ESME29 in 2009 found that a large unwinding by 
Porsche of options relating to CFDs in Volkswagen (VW), combined with take-over rumours, 
had triggered a 500% price increase in less than seven days in late October 2008. These 
irregularities have attracted increased investigation into CFDs as a tradable product. To 
counteract these trading anomalies it may be necessary to implement margin-enhancement 
regulations, or increased taxation on the CFD industry in exchanges where CFDs have been 
found to have significant negative effects. More drastic action is also a possibility, such as 
that taken by the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) in 2007 to ring-fence CFDs within 
their own separate exchange. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 describes the relevant previous literature. 
Section 2.3 discusses the development of the CFD market, associated international margin 
levels and the hedging practices of CFD brokers. Section 2.4 provides a detailed account of 
the data, methodology and structure of the GARCH and EGARCH models. In section 2.5, the 
results from the GARCH and EGARCH analysis is provided. Section 2.6 offers some 
explanation regarding the trading techniques used and compares the results. Section 2.7 
concludes. 
 
2.2. Previous literature 
CFDs alone have received little attention in previous research. There are some papers based 
on CFDs in the commodity and currency markets, but they only explain the regulatory events 
imposed by the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) to mitigate the effects of CFDs. There 
are no papers currently available that directly investigate the effects that CFDs have had on 
the individual exchange volatility. 
Brown et al. (2009) investigate the ASX’s decision to create exchange-traded CFDs. The 
authors focus specifically on the contract design and the pricing relationship between CFDs 
and the underlying equity. The authors find that there are other market factors such as 
competition and close substitutes that will result in the CFD trading at a price close to that of 
the underlying asset. Bates et al. (2009) examined the regulatory effects of the new disclosure 
requirements introduced in the United Kingdom in relation to the holding of CFDs. There are 
numerous papers explaining the dynamics and structure of CFDs, but none of the available 
literature tests the dynamics of market structure change in the post-CFD introduction era. 
CFDs, like other derivative products, allow traders to increase their exposure to an asset, thus 
amplifying their risk. Some authors believe that destabilising effects are evident in the market 
as this speculative trading originates from uninformed investors (Cathrath et al., 1995). Some 
advocates of this view are Figlewski (1981) and Stein (1987). Stein claimed that futures 
markets attracted uninformed traders because of their high degree of leverage, which can 
reduce the information content of prices and can cause destabilising market volatility.  
                                                             
29 The European Securities Markets Expert Group (ESME) was established by the European Commission in March 2006 to 
provide legal and economic advice on the application of the EU Securities Directives. The ESME suspended its activities in 
December 2009. 
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Other papers that support the view that derivative introduction increased spot market 
volatility include Jeanneau and Micu (2003), Gulen and Mayhew (2000) investigating the 
United States and Japan, Antoniou and Holmes (2003), Bessembinder and Seguin (1992) and 
Lee and Ohk (1992). Pok and Poshakwale (2004) and Ryoo and Smith (2004) found similar 
volatility increases, but also noted greater sensitivity of spot market prices to new information 
and efficiency improvements through faster information transfers.  
Others argue that the introduction of derivatives reduces spot market volatility and in fact 
stabilises the market. Derivatives can be an efficient medium of price discovery. Other noted 
benefits include improved market depth, a reduction in market asymmetries, and less cash 
market volatility as found by Kumar et al. (1995) and Antoniou et al. (1998). Other papers 
that found volatility reductions after the inclusion of their investigated derivative products 
include Drimbetas et al. (2007), Bologna and Cavallo (2002), Pilar and Rafael (2002), and 
Damodaran and Lim (1991). 
Another branch of research based on the link between derivative introduction and volatility 
change found either no correlation whatsoever or a lack of significant results. This included 
the work of Shenbagaraman (2003) who also found changes in the nature of volatility itself, 
Mayhew (2000), Darrat and Rahman (1995), Choi and Subrahmanyam (1994), Kamara, 
Miller and Siegel (1992), Chatrath et al. (2003) and Kan (1997). 
Other aspects of previous research based on the introduction of new derivatives are based 
specifically on the areas of changes in market structure, efficiency and market regulation. 
Powers (1970) and Danthine (1978) show that futures markets improve overall market depth 
and the availability of information. Schwartz and Laatsche (1991) and Stoll and Whaley 
(1988) also found evidence of structural improvements in markets after the introduction of 
futures. Watt, Yadav and Draper (1992) found no change in volatility post-futures, but did 
find evidence of efficiency benefits. Santoni (1987), Becketti and Roberts (1990) and Darrat, 
Rahman and Zhong (2002) all find no volatility changes in the period post-derivatives and in 
a regulatory response and state that any action to counter non-existent changes would be 
unwarranted or misguided. Regulatory changes are judged only as necessary where there is a 
clear causation between the source and the problem. 
 
2.3. CFD markets, margin levels and CFD provider hedging practices 
There are many different rules and regulations governing international margin requirements. 
The United States has implemented a minimum requirement of 50% on all margin levels 
since the 1970’s. Table 2.1 below shows the differing margin requirements across 
international exchanges. Table 2.2 represents the sources of the data used in this analysis, 
along with the sources of estimation date used for the dummy variables in the GARCH 
models used at the index level. This was completed using a combination of methodologies 
that include identifying the introduction of the first CFD company offering a tradable product 
on the investigated exchange, to profit and loss investigations of the primary CFD brokers 
within a region. The data source for each investigated jurisdiction is also listed.  
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Table 2.1: Minimum initial margin requirements by country  
   Country   Minimum Initial Margin Requirement (%)30 by Exchange 
   United States   50% (Defined in Regulation T31) CFDs not allowed due to exchange rules.  
  Though CFD investment on US stocks is available to non-US citizens, who reside 
  outside the US. 10% available to non-residents. 
   Canada   30% (if allowed by the IDA32) 100% otherwise. 10% available to non-residents. 
   United Kingdom   10% (Possible to get 5% in some brokers) 
   Australia    5% for high cap33 on Exchange Traded CFDs, 10% for all others 
   Others   10% is normal level, but possible to get any chosen level between 1% and 50% 
 
Notes: The data in table 2.1 is taken from the individual trading brochures of each of the exchanges investigated. It 
represents the required minimum proportionate investment that must be provided in each jurisdiction. Only the major 
financial centres are quoted here, but the other nations in this investigation are simply denoted as ‘others’ and  generally 10% 
leverage is commonplace. 
 
Table 2.2: International exchanges under investigation and methodology to calculate dummy variable 
Country Exchange  Month of inception of 
CFDs 
Dummy variable identification 
methodology*** 
Data source* 
Japan Nikkei 225  December 2004 International broker advertisement Bloomberg 
United States  S&P500  March 2001** International broker advertisement Bloomberg 
China** SSE 50  December 2004 International broker brochure Datastream 
Thailand** SET 50  October 2007 International broker advertisement Datastream 
South Africa JSE 40  January 2001 International broker brochure Datastream 
United States  Dow Jones 30  March 2001** International broker advertisement Bloomberg 
Canada TSX 60  January 2005 International broker advertisement Bloomberg  
United Kingdom   FTSE 100  June 1998 P&L**** of domestic broker Bloomberg 
Norway OBX 25  July 2005 International broker advertisement Datastream 
Australia ASX 200  July 2002 International broker advertisement Datastream / ASX website 
Korea** KOSPI 50  April 2006 International broker brochure Datastream 
Germany Dax 30  August 2006 P&L**** of domestic broker Bloomberg 
Spain** IBEX 35  April 2006 International broker advertisement Bloomberg 
Italy FTSE MIB 40  April 2006 International broker brochure Datastream 
New Zealand NZ 15  June 2005 International broker advertisement Datastream 
Ireland ISEQ 20  October 2002 P&L**** of domestic broker Bloomberg 
 
Notes: *Data sources differ based on attempts to maximise the period under observation – differing providers had different 
historic availability. **The listed broker advertisements were located online or through historic newspaper article research.. 
***Due to Regulation T, CFDs are unable to be traded internally by US citizens. The best estimate of the introduction of 
CFDs is when they started to trade with the leading international brokers. ****Profit and loss investigation completed using 
FAME database. 
 
 
 
                                                             
30 This is measured by a survey of the largest CFD providers worldwide. The names of these companies will remain 
anonymous throughout this paper as we do not wish to compare spreads between companies in a competitive nature. 
Company specific data has been collected and held by the author and will not be published.  
31 Regulation T (12 CFR §220 - Code of Federal Regulations) governs the extension of credit by securities brokers and 
dealers in the United States. It is best known as a control function of margin requirements for stocks bought through 
leveraged products. The initial margin requirement for stocks in the US is 50% and has been so since 1974. Regulation T 
gives the Federal Reserve the right to change the initial margin requirement at any time it chooses to do so.  
32 IDA: Investment Dealers Association of Canada. The IDA is connected to the IIROC, which is the Investment Industry 
Organisation of Canada 
33 Capitalisation rate (or "cap rate") is the ratio between the net operating income produced by an asset and its capital cost 
(the original price paid to buy the asset) or alternatively its current market value. It is calculated as the ratio of the net 
operating income of the asset, divided by the cost or present value of the same asset. 
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Table 2.3 shows the markets investigated in terms of their size, defined as the market 
capitalisation of the exchange on which they were available. It must also be noted that even 
with different margin requirements, the companies who provide margined products such as 
CFDs also have different internal rules to protect themselves. Some of the larger companies 
provide margin levels of 10% on most European Exchanges, currency and commodity 
markets such as oil and gold. Some exchange rules are also in place, such as implementing 
100% margin requirements on stocks that have a market capitalisation less than a certain 
threshold, or if their price drops below a certain level. These rules were implemented with 
great speed in the financial collapse of 2008-2010, where the market capitalisation and share 
prices of financial institutions plummeted. Brokers placed the margin levels on some of these 
companies back to 100% in an effort to stem the tide of margined purchasing.  
Table 2.3: International exchanges under investigation 
Country Exchange and state of 
capitalisation 
International volatility 
measures** 
Market 
capitalisation. 
(Billions $)*** 
Japan Nikkei 225 – High SSE, SET 12,880.00 
United States  S&P500 –High FTSE 12,480.00 
China* SSE 50 – High Nikkei, SET 12,160.00 
Thailand* SET 50 – High KOSPI, ASX 8,397.15 
South Africa JSE 40 – High ASX, Nikkei 4,407.24 
United States  Dow Jones 30 – High DAX 3,799.58 
Canada TSX 60 – High Dow Jones 1,729.39 
United Kingdom   FTSE 100 – High Dax 1,698.13 
Norway OBX 25 – Low DAX, FTSE 1,511.45 
Australia ASX 200 – Low Nikkei, NZ 1,224.96 
Korea* KOSPI 50 – Low SSE, Nikkei 1,171.31 
Germany Dax 30 – Low FTSE 781.70 
Spain* IBEX 35 – Low Dax, FTSE  498.36 
Italy FTSE MIB 40 – Low Dax 382.93 
New Zealand NZ 15 – Low ASX 276.43 
Ireland ISEQ 20 – Low FTSE, DAX 50.61 
 
Notes: *No Over-The-Counter Exchange or internal CFD provider. CFD investment is arriving from abroad. It is possible 
for domestic customers to invest through companies in foreign countries.  **The Measure of International Volatility is 
chosen as the exchange that offers the explanatory significance to the GARCH and EGARCH analysis. ***Market 
capitalisation rates correct as of June 2011. This is representative of the values at this time of the individual exchange 
components investigated. Though frequently adjusted, the current value is taken as a best estimate of the division between 
the high and low market capitalisation exchanges in this investigation. The market capitalisation values are sourced from 
Bloomberg.  
 
By placing a 100% margin, the brokers also restricted bad debts from clients, who would not 
be able to quickly respond to margin calls, thus creating the hazard of becoming debtors to 
the broker with one sharp negative (or positive if the investor is short) market move. Similar 
rules have been implemented in other periods of great volatility, such as the 12.15pm to 
12.45pm time period when the European Central Bank and the Bank of England interest rates 
are being announced. It is in this time period where equity and currency volatility can change 
quickly. Also, the time of 2.30pm (East Coast US time) on Fridays is very volatile in the oil 
market34, as ‘pits close35’ on the CBOT36 prior to the weekend. It is not unusual to see the bid 
                                                             
34 The two biggest world oil markets are the markets for West Texas Intermediate Oil and Brent Crude. 
35 ‘Pit Close’ is referred to as the close of the trading pit in ‘open-cry’ markets. 
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price or the ask price37  completely disappearing as traders fight to increase or decrease their 
positions for the weekend.  
The most common margin level offered by brokers is 10%, as found on nearly all liquid 
European markets. Even though some exchanges have laws governing the amount of margin 
that can be used on their exchange, such as Regulation T38 in the United States, it is common 
practice to see US and Canadian equities being offered in Europe and Asia/Pacific with 10% 
margin by spread-betting and CFD providers because they fall outside the US jurisdiction.  
Regulations differ worldwide based on the industry norms that vary across jurisdictions. 
Brokers sometimes take a trade as a ‘bet’ and also create a situation where there is no market 
volatility whatsoever when they accept the trade from their clients but do not buy the physical 
asset. In this situation, the broker is simply becoming a secondary market maker39, simply 
betting against clients and returning a profit. The company also locks in profits by creating an 
artificial spread between the buying and selling prices of its clients. This secondary market is 
private, very opaque and also appears to only lightly and locally regulated and documented. 
In November 2007 a new phenomenon occurred when CFDs became exchange traded40 in 
Australia for the first time. The investor could now see a CFD market on its own and still 
trade CFDs with the same benefits of leverage from low margin requirements. Because the 
CFD in Ireland is not exchange traded, it is capable of more directly impacting the primary 
market as CFD volumes traded are not differentiated from normal exchange activity. In 
Australia, counterparty risk is also minimized as the settlements of all obligations are 
guaranteed by the SFECC41. The Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) is responsible for 
maintaining that this new market remains transparent, fair and orderly. They also maintain 
consistency in the exchange by providing only one standardized contract. The transparency of 
the market as a whole is fully recorded and documented.  
Some alternative, more cost efficient methods to mitigate the potential effects CFDs have 
include increasing the margin levels that some brokers offer. This means that investors will 
have to produce more cash as a proportion of their investment, thus reducing the volume of 
shares that they can purchase. This may result in a situation where investors’ assume less 
risk, thus making the market itself less risky. Another method is to impose a tax or charge on 
the profits that CFD traders make. This can also be imposed on the broker. Another simple 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
36 The Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), established in 1848, is the world's oldest futures and options exchange. More than 
50 different options and futures contracts are traded by over 3,600 CBOT members through open outcry and electronic 
trading. Volumes at the exchange in 2003 were a record breaking 454 million contracts. On 12 July 2007, the CBOT merged 
with the CME under the CME Group holding company and ceased to exist as an independent entity. 
37 The bid price is the price at which a trader buys any asset and the ask price is the price at which a trader sells any asset. 
38 Regulation T governs the extension of credit by securities brokers and dealers in the United States. Its best-known 
function is the control of margin requirements for stocks bought on margin. The initial margin requirement for such margin 
stock purchases is 50%, and has been since 1974, but Regulation T gives the Federal Reserve the authority to change that 
percentage. Raising the margin requirement ostensibly reduces risk in the financial system by reducing the potential leverage 
and total buying power of investors. 
39 A market maker is a company, or an individual, that quotes both a buy and a sell price in a financial instrument or 
commodity held in inventory, hoping to make a profit on the bid/offer spread. 
40 Exchange traded refers to any financial product that is traded through an exchange. This can be through many different 
methods such as physical trading or electronic trading. 
41 SFE Clearing Corporation is an organization associated with an exchange to handle the confirmation; settlement and 
delivery of transactions, fulfilling the main obligation of ensuring transactions are made in a prompt and efficient manner. 
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method is to place a limit on the maximum amount of CFDs one particular client can buy on 
one particular day. This would stop investors amassing large positions on volatile days in an 
attempt to quickly profit by offloading the position. This would also suit longer term 
investors who use CFDs, who would then build their positions over a period of time rather 
than buying all their position in one purchase. Any of these options, or even a combination of 
the stated option would reduce short-term volatility, while simultaneously keeping most of 
the longer term reduced volatility benefits. 
 
2.4. Data, methodology and structure of the models 
2.4.1. An estimate of CFD volumes traded 
To test the impact of CFDs on individual markets, one would need to have all available CFD 
volume data, but unfortunately this is unavailable for the countries being tested42. The 
establishment of the ASX CFD43 exchange offered a fully transparent dataset, capable of 
shedding light on the dynamics of CFD markets. With this data, one can investigate the 
proportion of total volume traded by CFD companies hedging their positions after making 
trades for clients. Though this may not be representative of country specific characteristics, it 
may offer insight into volume growth and changes in the moments of price and volume 
changes. Using the data available from the ASX we can calculate exactly how much of the 
total volume on the normal spot market is inclusive of CFDs. The results of this analysis are 
seen in section 2.5.1. The ASX CFD volumes are simply divided by the individual equity 
volumes per day. The quarterly results are displayed in tables 2.4 and 2.5.  
 
2.4.2. Models of the ASX prior and post ASX CFD division and international indices 
investigation 
The aim of the GARCH and EGARCH investigation is to study the behaviour of volatility in 
the ASX after the decision to ring-fence CFDs into a separate exchange (the ASX CFD 
exchange). Two arguments have been forwarded by both advocates and antagonists of the 
decision alike. Supporters of the decision argue that ring-fencing CFDs has withdrawn most 
pure speculative trading from the exchange, which may reduce the volatility of the market as 
a whole (FSA, 2007). We must remember that CFDs are not appropriate as a long-term 
investment mechanism due to the commissions and overnight interest charges attached. If 
being used as a long term investment method, these charges would significantly diminish 
returns, or force the trader to seek higher returns. Therefore, CFDs are suited to more short 
term speculative investment. This style of investment has been associated with ‘noise trading’ 
also viewed as high frequency trading which has been found to increase market volatility 
(Brown, 1999). 
                                                             
42 All other data in this research is provided by Thompson Reuters Datastream, Bloomberg and finance.yahoo.com and the 
main econometric software programme used is Stata 11.0. the daily return data for the international exchanges investigated is 
adjusted for stock splits. All data for our investigation of the ASX is taken from the Australian Securities Exchange website. 
43 Australian Securities Exchange Contracts for Difference 
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The alternative argument is that ring-fencing the exchange has increased volatility due to a 
reduction of market liquidity. This can simply be explained by the absence of leverage, which 
can lead to less shares being traded on an exchange. This reduction of trading volume can 
cause the speed of transfer of information on the market to fall, thus amplifying natural 
market movements based on news and investor sentiment (Hendershott and Moulton, 2011). 
Individual equity movements become more volatile on a daily basis, thus increasing the 
volatility of the overall exchange. It must also be noted that there is a volatility reducing 
factor associated with the segregation of CFDs known as the bid and ask price ‘overhang’ 
(Report of the Commission of Investigation into the Irish Banking Collapse, 2011). This 
phenomenon occurs when a significantly larger volume (than that of the average) is placed on 
either the bid or ask price. The traded price of equity is now dominated by this position and 
can sometimes freeze until action is taken by the position’s owner. The market can therefore 
show reduced volatility, simply because of a reduction in trading and price movement.     
If CFD trading is found to have a volatility increasing effect on exchanges, two of the 
common methods to help reduce the impact will be to, first, increase margin requirements on 
CFD trading, thus reducing the amount of volume that CFD traders’ trade and, second, to 
complete a similar operation to the Australian Securities Exchange and ring-fence CFD 
trading into a separate transparent exchange. 
The daily return is calculated as	ܴ௧ = ቀ௉೟ି௉೟షభ௉೟షభ ቁ. The dataset is based on the ASX50, which 
comprises of the 50 largest equities on the ASX exchange. Dividends in this model are 
ignored for simplicity, but the daily returns are adjusted for stock splits. In a similar manner 
to Pilar and Rafael (2002), two models of the ARCH family will be used, the GARCH(1,1) 
model and the EGARCH (1,1). These models will include a dummy variable to signal the 
division of the ASX CFD exchange, denoted as zero prior, and one thereafter. Results will be 
inferred from the coefficient of the dummy term, and from the error terms. To mitigate the 
effects of the subprime crisis which occurred just after the division, the model also includes 
excess returns of the ASX 200 indices. The most significant indices mitigating international 
crises effects are used in the international investigation in section 2.5.4. As a proxy of 
international market volatility, we have chosen to use the Standard & Poor 50044. Similarly 
Bologna and Cavallo (2002) used a GARCH model to test the introduction of futures on the 
volatility in the Italian Stock Exchange. GARCH models are used to segregate the explicit 
volatility changes based on the data or theory being tested. To mitigate the effects of 
international markets, they included the returns of major international exchanges as 
independent variables. International exchanges that proved to be of no benefit or of no 
significance to the regression were dropped. One can use similar models to investigate 
structural changes in all exchanges in this paper.  
The main CFD providers entered the Australian market in July 2002. The ASX CFD 
exchange began trading in November 2007. In a similar manner to Bologna and Cavallo, a 
                                                             
44 The S&P 500 is a free-float capitalisation-weighted index published since 1957 of the prices of 500 large-cap common 
stocks actively traded in the United States. The stocks included in the S&P 500 are those of large publicly held companies 
that trade on either of the two largest American stock market companies; the NYSE Euronext and the NASDAQ OMX. 
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dummy variable has been included to denote the addition of CFDs in the ASX. There will be 
three time periods of investigation, with three separate regressions denoting the different 
states of the exchange. The first is prior to the arrival of CFDs, the second is when CFDs are 
present and the third is after the ASX CFD exchange is established. Some issues were 
considered when determining the date of the dummy variable. The possibility that the market 
reaction occurred when the news first broke that CFDs would be available was considered. 
But gauging an adequate representation of this data was scientifically implausible despite 
numerous attempts. The date of CFD origination was found to be the most adequate 
assumption to be used when determining the dummy variable switching date. 
The GARCH model was developed by Bollerslev (1986) from the ARCH45 model previously 
introduced by Engle (1982). The GARCH (p,q) model suggested by Bollerslev is represented 
as: 
ܴ௧ = ܾݔ௧ + ߝ௧ , where	ߝ௧|ߗ௧ିଵ~ܰ(0,ℎ௧), 
ℎ௧ = ݔ଴ + ෍ߙ௜௣
௜ୀଵ
ߝ௧ି௜
ଶ + ෍ߚ௝ℎ௧ି௝௤
௝ୀଵ
, 
where ߝ௧	 is asset-specific returns and ݔ௧ are other explanatory variables included in the 
GARCH equation. If q=0, the process reduces to an ARCH(p) process and for p=q=0, ߝ௧ 	is 
just white noise. The GARCH(1,1) framework has been extensively found to be a 
parsimonious representation of asset-specific variance that fits well and therefore is adequate 
to use with many financial time series (Bollerslev, 1987). One of the appealing characteristics 
of GARCH is the capturing of volatility clustering46. The model used in this paper to 
investigate volatility changes after CFD introduction is: 
ܴ௧ = ܾ଴ + ܾଵܴ௧ିଵ + ܾଶܴேூ௄௄ாூ೟ + ܾଷܴி்ௌா೟ + ߝ௧ , where	ߝ௧|ߗ௧ିଵ~ܰ(0,ℎ௧)	and	ߙ௜,ߚ௝ 	≥ 0, 
ℎ௧ = ߙ଴ + ߙଵߝ௧ିଵଶ + ߚଵℎ௧ିଵ + ߛܦ஼ி஽೟ , 
where ߛ ≥ 0 in addition to the other non-negativity restrictions above. Thus the value of the 
variance scaling parameter ℎ௧, now depends on past values of the shocks, which are captured 
in the lagged squared residual terms, and on past values of itself, which are captured in the 
lagged ℎ௧ିଵ	term. ℎ௧	is known at the beginning of time t. ߗ௧ିଵ is the information set at the 
end of time period t-1. ܴேூ௄௄ாூ೟  represents the daily return on the NIKKEI and ܴி்ௌா೟  
represents the daily return on the FTSE. These variables are included in the mean equation to 
                                                             
45 AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) models are used to characterize and model observed time series. 
They are used whenever there is reason to believe that, at any point in a series, the terms will have a characteristic size, or 
variance. In particular ARCH models assume the variance of the current error term or innovation to be a function of the 
actual sizes of the previous time periods' error terms: often the variance is related to the squares of the previous innovations. 
46 Volatility clustering refers to the observation, as noted by Mandelbrot (1963), that ‘large changes tend to be followed by 
large changes, of either sign, and small changes tend to be followed by small changes’.  
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mitigate the GARCH model against international effects. 	ܦ஼ி஽೟  is included in the variance 
equation as a representation of the dummy variable included in the GARCH model denoting 
the arrival of CFDs. This variable takes a value of zero prior to the arrival of CFDs and one 
thereafter. With GARCH the conditional variance is modelled as a linear function of the 
lagged conditional variance in addition to the past error variances contained in the ARCH 
representations. Individual regressions have also been completed for each equity in the CFD 
exchange and for an evenly weighted basket representative of exchange wide returns. There 
are 50 equities with CFD counterparts on the ASX CFD. One can use GARCH to test for 
changes in volatility after the inclusion of CFDs in the exchanges investigated and also use 
EGARCH regressions on the international exchanges. Similar EGARCH models were also 
applied to the individual equities on the ASX to investigate micro-market structural changes. 
Adding a dummy variable to investigate CFD inclusion created issues for some of the 
GARCH models used earlier, but using EGARCH offered a solution to this problem. In these 
cases, due to problems with low liquidity in the exchange being investigated, the output from 
the GARCH models contained negative constants and explosive GARCH coefficients. This 
problem did not occur when EGARCH was used.  
The Exponential GARCH model (EGARCH) was first developed by Nelson (1991). The 
ARCH(p) and GARCH (p,q) models impose symmetry on the conditional variance structure 
which may not be appropriate for modelling and forecasting stock return volatility. EGARCH 
models capture the most important stylised features of equity return volatility, namely time-
series clustering, negative correlations with returns, log-normality and with other certain 
specifications, long memory (Brandt and Jones, 2006). Nelson (1991) proposed the 
exponential GARCH or EGARCH model as a method of dealing with the problem. Under the 
EGARCH(1,1) framework, the conditional log variance is calculated as: 
ܴ௧ = ܾݔ௧ + ߝ௧ , where	ߝ௧|ߗ௧ିଵ~ܰ(0,ℎ௧), 
log(ℎ௧) = ߱ + ߙ ቎ |ߝ௧ିଵ|
ඥℎ௧ିଵ
−ඨ
2
ߨ
቏ + ߚ log(ℎ௧ିଵ) + ߜ ߝ௧ିଵ
ඥℎ௧ିଵ
. 
The parameters ߱,ߙ,ߚ	and	ߜ are constant. The EGARCH model has two distinct advantages 
over the GARCH model. First, the logarithm construction of the conditional variance 
equation ensures that the estimated conditional variance is strictly positive, thus the non-
negativity constraints used in the estimation of the ARCH and GARCH models are not 
necessary. Also, the parameter δ typically enters the conditional variance equation with a 
negative sign, thus bad news, ߝ௧ < 0 generates more volatility than good news. One can test 
numerous international exchanges to add clarity to the results and for the ASX EGARCH, but 
only the Nikkei and FTSE added explanatory significance.  
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In the EGARCH model used, the dependent and independent variables remain similar to 
those used in the GARCH analysis: 
ܴ௧ = ܾ଴ + ܾଵܴ௧ିଵ + ܾଶܴேூ௄௄ாூ೟ + ܾଷܴி்ௌா೟ + ߝ௧, where	ߝ௧|ߗ௧ିଵ~ܰ(0,ℎ௧). 
But the specification of the conditional variance equation now becomes: 
log(ℎ௧) = ߱ + ߙ ቎ቮ ߝ௧ି௝
ඥℎ௧ିଵ
−ඨ
2
ߨ
ቮ቏ + ߚ log(ℎ௧ିଵ) + ߜ ߝ௧ିଵ
ඥℎ௧ିଵ
+ ߛܦ஼ி஽೟ , 
where ℎ௧ is known at the beginning of time t. ߗ௧ିଵ is the information set at the end of time 
period t-1. This makes the leverage effect exponential instead of quadratic and therefore, 
estimates of the conditional variance are guaranteed to be non-negative. The EGARCH 
model allows for the testing of asymmetries, which is picked up in the ߚ term. Similarly to 
the GARCH model, ܴேூ௄௄ாூ೟  represents the daily return on the NIKKEI and ܴி்ௌா೟  
represents the daily return on the FTSE. These variables are included in the mean equation to 
mitigate the EGARCH model against international effects. 	ܦ஼ி஽೟  is included in the variance 
equation as a representation of the dummy variable included in the EGARCH model denoting 
the arrival of CFDs. This variable takes a value of zero prior to the arrival of CFDs and one 
thereafter. When ߚ = 0, the model is symmetric, but when ߚ <0, then positive shocks 
generate less volatility than negative shocks. The model captures the asymmetric features of 
the dataset, which occurs when an unexpected drop in price due to bad news increases 
volatility more than an unexpected increase in price because of good news of a similar 
magnitude. The model expresses the conditional variance of the variables as a non-linear 
function of its own past variance. When investigating stock indices, Hentschel (1995) found 
in-sample evidence showing a slight superiority of EGARCH’s specification over GARCH 
due to this asymmetric volatility effect, also known as the leverage effect.  
 
2.5. Results 
2.5.1. CFD volumes in the ASX CFD exchange 
Even though the ASX CFD exchange is in its relative youth, it offers insight into how much 
extra volume would be created if CFDs were hedged on the ASX exchange. The results of the 
firm by firm analysis can be found in tables 2.4 and 2.5 below. The volumes of CFD traded 
were calculated by breaking the time periods into quarters from February 2008 until March 
2010. The CFD traded volumes used are from the Australian Securities Exchange website 
and are simply segregated by quarter and then by the specific company. The CFDs are then 
de-leveraged to their fully margined spot market equivalent position holdings, representative 
of the amount of spot market activity that would have had to have been fully-hedged if a 
broker was completely mitigating their risk as a CFD provider. Table 2.4 represents the total 
amount of CFDs traded as a proportion of spot market activity by trading quarters from Q1 
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2008 until Q1 2010. Table 2.5 replicates the same analysis, but segregates the data by 
company. 
Table 2.4: Percentage CFD volume as a proportion of total volume (as a percentage (%)) 
Percentage CFD volume as a proportion of Total Volume 
Quarter Percentage (%) 
Q1 2008 5.08 
Q2 2008 7.13 
Q3 2008 5.92 
Q4 2008 3.61 
Q1 2009 8.66 
Q2 2009 9.52 
Q3 2009 12.39 
Q4 2009 14.21 
Q1 2010 12.40 
 
Note: The above statistics are associated with the calculations of section 2.5.1, where the CFD volume traded, for each 
equity on the ASX exchange are divided by the alternative non-CFD volumes. We can clearly see a growing trend in the 
usage of CFDs in recent times. 
We can see from table 2.4 that since the birth of the ASX CFD exchange, 8.83% of the total 
exchange volume has been traded in CFDs. This also shows a notable increasing trend with a 
peak of 14.2% in Q4 2009. Looking at individual companies, we find that there are 
companies that experience over 50% of CFD to exchange volumes. Numerous international 
estimates place the level of CFD trading at 20-50% (FSA 2007, Clerkin 2007) of total 
exchange activity (table 2.5), though current ASX market wide levels are between 12-14%. 
Some reasons for this lower than expected estimate would be the relative youth of the ASX 
CFD exchange, as spreads are still relatively wide and liquidity is noted as lower than that 
expected.  
 
2.5.2. EGARCH investigation of the ASX 
Segregating CFDs to a separate exchange can justifyably either increase or decrease the 
volatility of the main equity exchange. Once segregated, one would expect volatility to 
simply decrease as most of the reputably CFD influenced volatility is now absent. But this is 
not simply the case, Volatility reductions can also be explained by the presence of an 
‘overhang’ on the bid and ask prices of the market. This phenomenon occurs when a 
significantly larger volume (than that of the average) is placed on either the bid or ask price. 
The traded price of equity is now dominated by this position and can sometimes freeze until 
action is taken by the position’s owner. The market can therefore show reduced volatility, 
simply because of a reduction in trading and price movement. Alternatively, the segregation 
of CFDs may cause volatility to increase based on the reduction of liquidity. This can be 
justified by the absence of leverage, therefore reducing the size of the average position. A 
reduction in liquidity reduces the speed of transfer of information in a market, thus 
amplifying natural movements based on news and sentiment.  
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Table 2.5: ASX CFD volumes as a percentage of total market volumes 
 
Note: The data was collected from the Australian Securities exchange at www.asx.au. The results are calculated as the de-
leveraged representation of a full margined trading position specific to the company in the stated time period. The result is 
then divided by the associated spot market trading volumes to offer a representation of approximate CFD exposures on the 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX).  
The ASX merits further investigation due to it being a special case involving CFDs. CFDs 
began trading on the ASX in July 2002 through new and improved trading platforms offered 
by the largest spread-betting and CFD providers. Then, in October 2007, the ASX took the 
decision to separate CFD trading onto its own separate exchange. This offers three distinct 
time periods to test differences in the structure of the market. The first period is prior to CFD 
exposure, between January 1998 and November 2007. This investigates the arrival of CFDs 
Percentage CFD volume as a proportion of Total Volume (As a Percentage (%)) 
Equity Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 Q4 2008 Q1 2009 Q2 2009 Q3 2009 Q4 2009 Q1 2010 Average 
Amcor 5.14 4.11 1.57 0.14 14.89 11.67 7.55 7.87 4.22 6.35 
Alumina 3.58 2.59 1.67 1.40 1.24 1.00 5.07 3.23 7.20 2.99 
AMP 1.62 1.56 2.52 1.22 6.01 9.26 6.80 7.05 6.50 4.72 
ANZ 6.76 10.02 5.56 2.54 5.67 6.91 9.96 10.06 7.73 7.24 
AXA 7.66 14.69 8.35 3.11 2.45 2.49 3.15 4.16 4.81 56.5 
BHP Billiton 8.71 12.86 9.13 5.64 7.28 9.11 12.96 11.74 9.75 9.68 
Boral 3.54 3.67 1.45 2.38 5.17 11.33 20.31 29.09 42.21 13.23 
Coca Cola 3.46 4.07 6.61 5.17 7.51 7.63 7.62 10.17 16.25 7.61 
CSR 5.75 5.01 3.48 0.89 2.37 7.50 22.96 16.40 2.47 7.42 
CBA 1.23 2.19 0.60 0.72 15.04 5.66 9.36 4.59 4.11 4.83 
CSL 1.10 2.65 15.04 1.58 16.36 5.27 11.79 15.23 27.06 10.67 
Fosters 17.58 8.88 6.65 8.21 6.85 19.25 20.30 27.96 11.05 14.08 
IAG 0.63 0.65 1.07 0.95 2.64 2.61 4.02 3.44 4.11 2.23 
Fairfax 1.20 4.55 1.72 1.56 0.70 11.38 2.68 4.66 2.43 3.43 
Lihir Gold 0.80 0.51 1.82 0.16 2.09 15.00 0.86 199 2.36 2.84 
MAB 3.07 0.99 0.66 0.64 1.09 1.20 3.81 13.22 4.56 3.24 
Newcrest 0.70 3.28 2.29 2.92 12.58 12.40 7.19 7.77 18.27 7.48 
News Corp 7.39 27.47 9.63 14.38 13.30 12.22 44.17 72.85 55.36 28.53 
Origin 2.21 1.39 10.80 9.92 6.75 14.23 19.01 38.30 22.76 13.93 
Oil Search 4.20 1.34 1.44 1.35 11.96 43.64 22.97 23.27 3.93 12.67 
Orica 7.68 13.01 22.78 5.79 72.55 19.18 67.49 28.59 37.16 30.47 
Onesteel 7.19 17.40 22.36 6.16 7.25 12.03 16.44 20.87 10.51 13.35 
Paladin 3.58 4.08 3.10 1.57 6.15 3.17 6.29 11.67 6.52 5.12 
QBE Insur. 1.40 3.49 2.56 3.88 0.94 0.86 0.87 2.14 2.23 2.04 
Quantas 3.63 3.38 3.90 1.37 0.86 1.80 4.97 2.98 1.20 2.67 
Rio Tinto 3.89 39.30 20.46 4.27 3.93 8.31 12.46 19.67 15.87 14.24 
Santos 0.90 1.93 2.18 0.81 3.19 3.65 5.22 4.80 3.93 2.95 
Suncorp 17.67 10.38 2.76 0.78 3.86 17.47 7.69 13.07 16.31 9.99 
Tabcorp 9.12 17.43 19.75 28.08 3.64 11.64 22.86 24.60 38.16 19.47 
Toll Holdings 6.09 5.65 8.54 2.37 13.43 28.57 30.44 14.61 8.26 13.10 
Transurban 0.99 2.57 3.60 6.44 11.30 19.57 22.30 14.07 23.12 11.55 
Telecom Corp. 1.84 1.77 1.68 5.31 8.05 3.79 11.78 20.88 15.09 7.79 
Westpac 2.24 4.03 3.17 0.69 2.35 1.65 4.73 9.76 7.60 4.02 
Westfield 2.46 3.39 3.05 1.77 1.47 1.09 2.21 4.47 2.93 2.53 
Woolworth 2.34 8.53 2.44 1.14 11.61 0.58 10.62 2.18 3.57 4.77 
Woodside 30.71 14.58 8.49 1.27 34.73 16.17 13.56 7.17 15.48 15.79 
Wesfarmers 3.82 6.95 1.62 0.38 1.60 0.47 7.24 23.51 5.52 5.67 
Total 5.08 7.13 5.92 3.61 8.66 9.52 12.93 14.21 12.40 8.83 
37 
 
using a dummy variable in the variance equation to test volatility. The dummy variable is 
zero prior to CFDs and one after CFD-implementation. The second scenario is when CFDs 
exited the primary market. The period under investigation is from July 2002 until July 2010, 
again using a dummy variable to test market volatility when CFDs left the market. The third 
sample selection is the total period, from January 1998 to June 2010, again using a dummy 
variable taking the form of zero when the market had no CFD exposure and one otherwise. 
Investigating these regression results offers interesting evidence supporting the view that 
CFDs in fact reduced long term market volatility from added liquidity benefits. The highest 
correlated exchanges that offer significance are the Nikkei 225 in Japan and the New Zealand 
Stock Exchange (NZ15). The pairs are used to mitigate international factors in the EGARCH 
regressions.  
In the total period, it is found that volatility decreased 1.09% after the introduction of CFDs. 
Investigating the shortened time period around the set introduction date of July 2002 finds 
that the change in volatility falls slightly to 0.78%. Of further interest is the change in 
volatility after the ring-fencing of CFDs into their own separate exchange. In the period after 
the division of the ASX and ASX CFD exchange, volatility increased 3.55% (results for all 
exchanges investigated are found in table 2.8). This result holds even after mitigating the 
effects of the fallout of the recent international crisis using the NIKKEI 225 and NZ 15. The 
results for the inclusion of CFDs are significant at the 10% level, while the withdrawal of 
CFDs is significant at the 1% level. The results of this analysis can be found in table 2.6 in 
relation to the individual ASX equities. These findings offer significant evidence that CFDs 
actually benefitted the ASX by decreasing volatility. CFDs appear to be associated with 
significant volume increases. For every trade that occurs at a particular price, there must be a 
counterparty willing to accept the opposing trade. CFDs appear to have increased the 
probability of finding this counterparty. 
Table 2.6: EGARCH(1,1) results for individual ASX CFD equities 
Company γ coefficient Company γ coefficient 
Alumina 0.121** Oil Search 1.223* 
Amcor 0.157*** Orica 0.196*** 
AMP -0.017** One Steel 0.056 
ANZ 0.919* QBE 2.285* 
AXA 2.447* Qantas 2.022* 
BHP Billiton 0.011 Rio Tinto 0.018 
Boral 0.071** Santos 0.400** 
Coca Cola -0.016*** Suncorp 1.346* 
CSR -0.039* Tabcorp 1.324* 
CBA 0.416** Toll Holdings 0.592* 
CSL 0.042 Transurban 0.183* 
Fosters 0.932* Telecom NZ -0.009*** 
IAG 0.719* Westpac 1.328* 
Fairfax 2.583* Westfield 0.106*** 
Lihir Gold 0.035 Woolworth 1.197* 
Newcrest 0.199 Woodside 0.158*** 
News Corp 1.396* Wesfarmers 0.128** 
Origin 0.487*** 
 
Note: The above table represents the estimated γ coefficients for each investigated Australian company traded on the ASX 
CFD exchange using the discussed EGARCH(1,1) methodology to investigate changes in volatility dynamics after CFD 
introduction. The robust standard errors for each of the γ coefficients are marked in parentheses, where ***p<0.01, **p<0.05 
and *p<0.10. The complete results of all the individual EGARCH models can be found in table AI in the Appendices. 
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2.5.3. EGARCH investigation of the ASX CFD exchanges components 
The ASX exchange consists of over two hundred components, yet the ASX CFD exchange 
only includes the most liquid equities to be traded. On the ASX CFD exchange, there are 
more than 50 equities included. The ASX CFD exchange also offers commodity and 
currencies as CFD traded products, but they are outside the scope of this paper. This section 
investigates the trends of the individual equities traded on the ASX CFD. Only 36 of the 50 
available ASX CFD equities possessed a complete dataset. EGARCH models were applied to 
all of the 50 equities, but due to differing problems such as no liquidity in some periods and 
companies falling in and out of the sample, only 36 equities are included in the final results, 
which are displayed above in table 2.5. The company under investigation and the associated 
gamma coefficients from the EGARCH individual investigations are presented. The dataset is 
based on the weekly market prices of the individual equities investigated and begins in 
January 2003, and ends in April 2010. Again this analysis used a dummy variable to signal 
the withdrawal of CFDs from the normal exchange in October 2007 after the establishment of 
the ASX CFD exchange. To mitigate internal volatility in Australia, the models have used the 
ASX200 index as a proxy. To mitigate external effects the S&P500 was used. There was also 
significant explanatory power found in using the first lag of the individual equity prices. In 
figure 2.1a, we show a simple linear fit of the estimated ߛ௜ coefficient against the percentage 
of equity volumes that are CFD traded and the average total nominal volumes traded by 
specific equity is located in figure 2.1b. The estimated CFD trading volumes as a proportion 
of total spot market activity is located on a monthly level in table 2.4 and by company in 
table 2.5. The daily levels are used in the calculation of these simple linear models. 
Figure 2.1: The relationship between volatility, percentage CFD volumes traded (a) and    
  average volume traded (b) 
 
Note: Figure 2.1 above shows the relationship between the volatility increases in the combined large and small scale samples 
investigated. The samples are compared to their linked findings of the percentage CFD traded calculations and the average 
daily traded volumes. The grey regions around the line of best fit represents the 95% confidence intervals associated with the 
data. We can see a clear positive relationship associated between the two, indicating that the more of the total volumes 
traded on a particular equity that is CFD traded, then more volatility is associated with this particular days trading. In the 
second figure we can see a similar, but not as large-scale a relationship between volatility and the more of a particular equity 
traded on one particular day. The fact that figure 2a is more positive than figure 2b indicates increased volatility stemming 
from increased CFD trading.  
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These simple models can be denoted as: 
ߛ௜ = ܽ଴ + ܾ(%	ܥܨܦ	ݐݎܽ݀݁݀௜) + ߝ௜ 
where i = 1, ........, 36 
 
ߛ௜ = ܽ଴ + ܾ(ܽݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁	ݒ݋݈ݑ݉݁	ݐݎܽ݀݁݀௜) + ߝ௜ 
where i = 1, ........, 36 
 
In 32 of the 36 equities investigated, the volatility of individual equity increased after the 
segregation of CFDs to the ASX CFD exchange. This again is indicative of reduced liquidity 
as CFDs were being withdrawn from the exchange. Using the data collected in these 
regressions, we can further investigate where this added volatility originates. Based on the 
percentage of volume that is CFD traded in the ASX exchange, we can match the volatility 
levels found in the EGARCH analysis with the corresponding levels of CFD trading. In 
figure 2.1a, we see the volatility increases found from the EGARCH investigation. Each 
observation is then matched with the corresponding percentage of CFD trading volume in the 
period before the division of the ASX CFD exchange. From this we find a clear positive 
correlation between the two, indicating that equities with a higher proportion of CFD trading 
are more susceptible to increased volatility after the withdrawal of CFD investment. In figure 
2.1b, we can see the positive correlation between volatility increases after the withdrawal of 
CFD investment and the average volumes traded. We again see a positive correlation 
indicating that equities with higher volumes traded are connected with increased volatility 
when CFD investment was withdrawn.    
Figure 2.2: The relationship between volatility, log market capitalisation (a) and nominal price (b) 
 
Note: Figure 2.2 investigates the link between the pricing dynamics of CFD traded equities to test for the standard traits of 
speculative traders. Those who use CFDs are most likely to focus on penny shares due to the minimal cost of purchase, high 
exposure and relative opportunities for massive payoffs. We can see that smaller market capitalisation companies subjected 
to CFD investment are subject to more volatility on average than that of their higher capitalisation counterparts. In terms of 
price, it is found that in Australia, lower nominally priced equities are subject to more volatility stemming from CFD 
investment. This is because the nominal change of price in larger priced equities is much higher than that of their lower 
counterparts. In this scenario, a one cent change in a low priced equity can lead to more significant payoffs than a similar 
nominal move of a higher priced equity. Overall, lower priced shares are more appealing to the traits and characteristics of 
risk loving investors for which CFDs are a prime investment vehicle.  
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In figure 2.2a, we show a simple linear fit of the estimated ߛ௜ coefficient against the market 
capitalisation of the equity being invested in and the nominal price of each equity 
investigated in figure 2.2b. These simple models can be denoted as: 
ߛ௜ = ܽ଴ + ܾ(݈݋݃	݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ܿܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ݅ݏܽݐ݅݋݊	݋݂	݁ݍݑ݅ݐݕ௜) + ߝ௜ 
where i = 1, ........, 36  
 
ߛூ = ܽ଴ + ܾ(݊݋݈݉݅݊ܽ	݌ݎ݅ܿ݁	݋݂	݁ݍݑ݅ݐݕ௜) + ߝ௜ 
where i = 1, ........, 36 
 
Figures 2.2a and 2.2b above investigate some of the particular trading characteristics of CFD 
investment. Both phenomena are connected as market capitalisation tends to be positively 
associated with price. Those who use CFDs tend to be risk tolerant. Of course equities with 
high market capitalisation tend to be seen as value investment due to the dividends offered. 
Alternatively, low market capitalisation equities offer more growth opportunity. There may 
be a greater tendency for CFD traders to purchase CFDs in low capitalisation equities due to 
these growth opportunities. CFDs are denominated in cents, thus share X trading for example 
at €4.56, is denominated as 456 cents. This allows CFD traders and spread-betters alike to 
make their trades as ‘bets’. If the investor is making the bet at 10% margin, and has €1,000 
he/she will therefore be long or short €21.90 per-cent price move. Therefore, after a 46 cent 
share price reduction, the bet will have lost all of the starting investment.  
There is an observed tendency for CFD investors to purchase equities with a low nominal 
share price. Take for example share Y, trading at €0.65 and an investor with €1,000 to invest. 
The investor is capable of going long or short €153.84 per point move. The brokers must also 
hedge themselves from the risk of this trade, and to become 100% hedged, they must buy 220 
units of share X or 1539 units of share Y. If the share prices of both X and Y fall, brokers 
wishing to minimise their own hedging risk will increase the margins available on the stocks 
that they offer to clients. It must also be noted that higher volatility will of course be found in 
higher percentage price changes from lower equity prices, but this effect is constant 
throughout both periods, as low share prices continue to be low and high prices have fallen to 
lower levels in the midst of the fallout from the current international crisis. 
 
2.5.4. EGARCH investigation of international volatility effects stemming from CFDs 
Now we extend the analysis to other international markets, and indices rather than the 
individual equities. We use the same GARCH and EGARCH models denoted earlier, but now 
ܥܨܦ௫ is indicative of when CFDs were introduced in each specific international exchange. 
Table 2.2 denotes the estimated starting points of CFD trading in numerous international 
exchanges. This provides a date for which a dummy variable could be used in the 
international EGARCH investigation. As explained in section 2.4.2, this date was chosen as 
the dummy switching date despite numerous other hypotheses being investigated. 
Deciphering the associated switching date for the dummy variable used was completed 
through a thorough investigation of the relevant company-specific documents (such as 
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advertisement campaigns, regulation applications, etc.). Also, where available, the first profit 
and loss accounts are used as a representation of the provision of CFDs by these companies to 
clients based on the underlying international indices investigated. Using a combination of 
these techniques provided an estimated date for the first signs of CFD provision. The result of 
this analysis was displayed in table 2.2 earlier in the chapter.  
In table 2.7 (with a more descriptive analysis of the results in table AII of the Appendices), an 
EGARCH model based on volatility changes was completed across numerous international 
exchanges with the estimated starting point of CFD trading used as the dummy variable 
change-over point. Using these dummy variables to signal the reported commencement of 
CFD trading in each exchange investigated we estimate values of γ and explain the results. 
Unlike the ASX scenario in Australia (investigated separately in table 2.8), no other exchange 
investigated has gone through the process of withdrawing CFD investment. Instead, all have 
only added CFDs as a new form of investment. The dummy variable therefore takes the value 
of zero for the period prior to the introduction of CFDs and one thereafter. A non-zero 
coefficient on the variance equation is again indicative of a rise in volatility, while a negative 
value indicates a decrease in volatility. The results indicate that 13 of the 16 exchanges 
investigated show reduced volatility in the period after the introduction of CFDs. Similarly 
eight of these thirteen exchanges are significant at the 1% level with two of the three 
exchanges in which increased volatility being similarly significant at the 1% level. The 
average volatility reduction across all exchanges investigated is 1.76%.  
 
2.5.5. GARCH volatility investigation of the exchanges under investigation 
Including dummy variables in the EGARCH analysis increases the risk of modelling failure. 
This may arrive in the form of negative constants, explosive GARCH coefficients, or simply, 
insignificant results. One of the best methods to counteract this problem was to simply divide 
the investigation into two sections and investigate changes in the GARCH coefficients which 
can be found in table AIII of the appendices. Using two GARCH (1,1) models, one for the 
time period before the introduction of CFDs and one for the period after, dynamic changes in 
the coefficients of the GARCH analysis can be investigated. From this we can obtain more 
information about the introduction of CFDs in the exchanges investigated. We can then 
estimate ߙ௜and	ߚ௜ for the pre-CFD period and ߙ௜∗	and	ߚ௜∗ for the post-CFD period to 
investigate changes. 
 
Stata 11.0 is used as the primary econometric package. Investigating the coefficients offers 
interesting results. The GARCH methodology is applied to each of the investigated indices, 
with the values of ߚଶܴݔ௧ and ߚଷܴݕ௧ (The variables included in the mean equation to 
represent international effects on the GARCH model, with ݔ௧ and ݕ௧ representing the 
included exchanges) changing by exchange based on explanatory significance of the 
associated alternative indices used in the GARCH analysis. These statistics were chosen to 
mitigate the effects of international crises as used by Bologna and Cavallo (2002). 
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We begin by investigating the change in the persistence of shocks from the pre-CFD and 
post-CFD periods which is simply measured as ((ߙଵ + ߚଵ) − (ߙଵ∗ + ߚଵ∗)). A negative value 
for this statistic might be interpreted as an increase in market efficiency or market resilience, 
since the persistence of volatility shocks declines. The persistence change is negative in nine 
of the fifteen exchanges investigated. The second factor investigated is the difference 
between	ܾଵand ܾଵ∗, where a negative value indicates a decrease in the autoregressive effect of 
returns, indicating that the market has increased its efficiency in the weak sense as proposed 
by Booth and Fama (1970). Twelve of the fifteen exchanges show a decrease in the 
autoregressive effect of returns. The final metric investigated is based on asset-specific 
variance. We know that when the sum of ߙଵ	and ߚଵ is less than one, the model has finite 
asset-specific variance h which can be found by setting E[ߝ௧ିଵଶ ] = 	 ℎ௧ = ℎ௧ିଵ = ℎ଴. We can 
solve for ℎ଴ = ఈబଵିఈభିఉభ. To find the change in asset-specific variance between the pre and 
post-CFD introduction period, we simply calculate ℎ଴-ℎ଴∗ , with ℎ଴∗ = ఈబ∗ଵିఈభ∗ିఉభ∗ . In twelve of 
the exchanges investigated between January 1998 and December 2010 in table 2.9, we can 
see a weak-form of improvement in market efficiency. The DAX (Germany), MIB (Italy) and 
Nikkei (Japan) showed a combined efficiency decrease as found by the three measures. 
Alternatively, seven of the exchanges showed significant efficiency improvement after CFD 
introduction. 
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Table 2.7: EGARCH (1, 1) results for international exchanges 
Exchange ࢈૙ ࢈૚ ࢈૛ ࢈૜ ࣓ ࢻ ࢾ ࢼ ࢽ (t-stat) Log-L 
Dow Jones 0.009076 -0.125785 0.3338351  0.000474 -0.0831642 0.1402135 0.9819005 -0.0059511 -6327.740 
(DJIA) (0.90) (-9.81)* (46.85)*  (0.94) (-13.67)* (17.73)* (474.99)* (-2.71)**  
           
S&P 500 0.005394 -0.133584 0.427768  0.000137 -0.087054 0.12869 0.9838123 -0.0032459 -6428.531 
 (1.24) (-10.10)* (45.56)*  (1.56) (-14.52)* (14.11)* (579.20)* (-1.63)  
           
FTSE 100 0.0056275 -0.041872 0.5341776  0.0003572 -0.0479366 0.1506751 0.9900448 -0.0046357 -5404.856 
 (0.69) (-4.91)* (94.90)*  (0.94) (-8.58)* (16.12)* (559.22)* (-2.21)***  
           
Germany 0.0196417 0.0058772 0.9842521  0.0023139 -0.032744 0.1686686 0.9913479 -0.0031227 -3993.507 
(DAX) (1.70) (0.64) (108.56)*  (1.22) (-4.44)* (16.90)* (459.12)* (-0.91)  
           
Canada 0.0207312 0.0124458 0.6224235  0.0025697 -0.0370676 0.1477299 0.9914062 -0.0001979 -4064.86 
(TSX) (1.61) (0.92) (52.04)*  (1.56) (-5.12)* (17.82)* (622.65)* (-1.41)  
           
Spain 0.0041875 0.0192806 0.4493877 0.4371921 0.0021347 -0.0148918 0.1723977 0.9929173 +0.0019182 -3456.841 
(IBEX) (0.40) (2.47)*** (38.33)* (28.71)* (1.15) (-2.79)** (21.33)* (590.41)* (0.63)  
           
China 0.0098584 0.0144379 0.0676526 0.0575277 0.0227771 -0.0329696 0.1496995 0.9749913 +0.0179002 -5810.724 
(SSE) (0.74) (0.87) (4.09)* (5.00)* (8.74)* (-6.17)* (22.86)* (347.35)* (6.37)*  
           
Japan 0.0343495 -0.029504 0.0589045 0.3581273 0.0150057 -0.062914 0.1500313 0.9796215 -0.008329 -5200.813 
(Nikkei) (1.87) (-1.83) (5.46)* (38.99)* (4.75)* (-8.31)* (11.17)* (300.10)* (-2.19)***  
           
Australia 0.02046 -0.07567 0.2425 0.33842 0.008487 -0.07711 0.11819 0.97986 -0.010955 -3395.23 
(ASX) (1.88) (-5.28)* (30.25)* (22.01)* (2.96)** (-8.96)* (8.62)* (255.54)* (-2.71)**  
           
Ireland 0.007338 0.0750703 0.5869988 0.1166594 0.012622 -0.0355419 0.1270174 0.9867728 -0.0059113 -4776.872 
(ISEQ) (0.45) (5.53)* (26.19)* (6.46)* (6.89)* (-5.27)* (13.91)* (646.50)* (-2.90)**  
           
South Africa 0.0420208 -0.017971 0.1260832 0.4065182 0.0132082 -0.0561115 0.1409091 0.9805461 -0.0080162 -4888.518 
(JSE) (2.44)*** (-1.09) (8.56)* (18.79)* (3.88)* (-8.78)* (12.01)* (278.35)* (-2.30)***  
           
Italy 0.0130309 -0.007421 0.7046277  0.0006968 -0.029181 0.2346792 0.9835783 -0.0022985 -3415.462 
(FTSE MIB) (1.38) (0.89) (111.39)*  (1.41) (-3.78)* (15.70)* (15.70)* (-1.90)  
           
 
Note: The above tables constitute the EGARCH (1,1) model selected based in the inclusion of the of CFD investment. T-statistics are in parentheses where *p<0.01, **p<0.05 and ***p<0.1. 
44 
 
Table 2.7: EGARCH (1, 1) results for international exchanges (continued) 
Exchange ࢈૙ ࢈૚ ࢈૛ ࢈૜ ࣓ ࢻ ࢾ ࢼ ࢽ (t-stat) Log-L 
Thailand 0.0476108 0.0294668 0.2369079 0.3411082 0.0942332 -0.0509477 0.294543 0.9220227 -0.0123245 -6132.744 
(SET) (1.84) (1.80) (18.22)* (12.07)* (18.57)* (-5.41)* (18.16)* (199.87)* (-1.78)  
           
Korea 0.0644508 -0.002693 0.0574305 0.637162 0.0129892 -0.0128527 0.143761 0.9937363 -0.0098821 -5852.682 
(KOSPI) (3.13)* (-0.19) (6.01)* (49.71)* (5.07)* (-2.11)*** (14.55)* (619.83)* (-2.85)**  
           
Norway 0.0343918 0.0267813 0.230738 0.5140405 0.0052922 -0.0338077 0.1690835 0.9777189 +0.0095013 -4889.706 
(BORS) (2.00)*** (2.06)*** (13.20)* (24.67)* (2.31)*** (-3.79)* (15.13)* (278.01)* (2.48)*  
           
New Zealand 0.0060928 0.0793763 0.3203228  0.0067965 -0.0357309 0.10835731 0.986933 -0.002945 -3179.332 
(NZ15) (0.60) (5.28)* (30.76)*  (2.86)** (-5.19)* (10.08)* (435.99)* (1.82)  
           
 
Note: The above tables constitute the EGARCH (1,1) model selected based in the inclusion of the of CFD investment. T-statistics are in parentheses where *p<0.01, **p<0.05 and ***p<0.1. 
 
Table 2.8: EGARCH (1, 1) results for the ASX exchange 
Timeframe ࢈૙ ࢈૚ ࢈૛ ࢈૜ ࣓ ࢻ ࢾ ࢼ ࢽ (t-stat) Log-L 
           
CFDs Intro 0.0251 -0.07713 0.2073 0.30907 0.1612 -0.0747 0.11351 0.97499 -0.00783 -2459.755 
Obs:2156 (2.19)*** (-4.61)* (24.36)* (19.52)* (3.42)* (-6.94)* (7.66)* (7.66)* (-1.85)  
           
           
CFDs With 0.02258 -0.1082 0.29381 0.3860 0.000481 -0.09498 0.12803 0.96566 +0.035583 -2154.262 
Obs:2079 (1.68) (-6.20)* (27.38)* (17.22)* (0.10) (-7.18)* (7.18)* (143.25)* (3.97)*  
           
           
Total Period 0.02046 -0.07567 0.2425 0.33842 0.008487 -0.07711 0.11819 0.97986 -0.010955 -3395.23 
Obs:3249 (1.88) (-5.28)* (30.25)* (22.01)* (2.96)** (-8.96)* (8.62)* (255.54)* (-2.71)**  
           
 
Note: The above table shows the associated EGARCH(1,1) coefficients in the period before CFD segregation to the ASX CFD exchange. T-statistics are in parentheses where *p<0.01, **p<0.05 and ***p<0.1. 
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Table 2.9: Changes in GARCH coefficients under investigation after the introduction of CFDs 
Exchange Persistence Autoregressive effect of returns 
Asset-specific 
variance 
Efficiency 
indicator 
improvements 
Efficiency 
indicator dis-
improvements 
DJI -0.0027415 -0.0849611 -0.287839 2 1 
S&P500 0.003501 -0.123891 -0.1437854 1 2 
FTSE100 -0.0300151 -0.016439 0.08374652 3 0 
TSX -0.0071038 -0.0277667 0.5159199 3 0 
BME 0.0180705 -0.0129184 0.2626819 2 1 
DAX 0.0163129 0.0426795 0.5254974 0 3 
SSE -0.0501976 -0.0254923 0.0328976 3 0 
NIKKEI 0.0165427 0.0251353 0.4742397 0 3 
ISEQ -0.0681647 -0.0700652 0.0762007 3 0 
JSE -0.0142878 -0.1712406 4.4041996 3 0 
MIB 0.001738 0.0104627 0.1658664 0 3 
KOSPI -0.0038475 -0.0640878 -0.9113792 2 1 
SET -0.0182689 -0.0130586 0.9876472 3 0 
BORS -0.0211461 -0.0820884 -0.9719398 2 1 
NZ15 0.0132494 -0.0270306 0.0703533 3 0 
 
Note: The first efficiency metric investigated is the ߙଵ + ߚଵ	coefficient which indicates the persistence of shocks from the 
pre-CFD to post-CFD introduction periods. A reduction in this persistence indicates the increase in market efficiency. In the 
15 exchanges investigated 9 exchanges show a decrease. Investigating the second coefficient	ߚଵ, where a decrease indicates 
a decrease in the autoregressive effect, thus indicating a weak form improvement in market efficiency. Given that the two 
periods investigated for each exchange signify the introduction of CFDs as tradable products in the market, 	 ଵܾ becomes an 
important statistic. This, of course, is only indicative of the time period of the introduction and cannot include other factors 
that effected market efficiency. The final test is based on the asset-specific variance of the exchanges pre-CFD introduction 
and post-CFD introduction. 
Applying the same statistics to the Australian CFD introduction and subsequent withdrawal 
with the creation of the ASX exchange offers interesting results as seen in table 2.10. In terms 
of market efficiency, we can see that the introduction of CFDs was accompanied by an 
increase in the persistence of shocks, but also saw a decrease in the autoregressive effect and 
a decrease in variance. This would signify that the introduction of CFDs increased market 
efficiency. In the period of CFD withdrawal, we can see that there was an increase in the 
persistence of shocks, an increase in the autoregressive effect and also an increase in the 
variance. This signifies that there was a decrease in market efficiency in the ASX after the 
creation of the segregated ASX CFD exchange. Overall, these results indicate that the 
inclusion of CFDs benefitted exchange dynamics through efficiency improvements, whereas 
their withdrawal is linked with a period of efficiency deterioration. 
 
Table 2.10: Changes in GARCH coefficients for the ASX before and after regulatory changes 
             GARCH Persistence
   GARCH Autoregressive Effect        GARCH Asset-specific Variance 
Exchange Pre-CFD With-CFD Pre-CFD With-CFD Pre-CFD With-CFD 
ASX 0.946132 0.9867741 0.2210988 -0.1231376 0.4746955 0.3536470 
 With-CFD Post-CFD With-CFD Post-CFD With-CFD Post-CFD 
ASX 0.9867741 0.974623 -0.1231376 -0.0858967 0.3536470 1.1358219 
 
Note: We have to look at the ASX in two distinct time periods. The first being the introduction of CFDs and the second 
being the withdrawal. In terms of market efficiency, we can see that the introduction of CFDs was accompanied by an 
increase in the persistence of shocks, but also saw a decrease in the autoregressive effect and a decrease in variance. This 
would signify that the introduction of CFDs increased market efficiency. In the second period, we can see that there was an 
increase in the persistence of shocks, an increase in the autoregressive effect and also an increase in the variance. This 
signifies that there was a decrease in market efficiency in the ASX after the creation of the segregated ASX CFD exchange. 
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This higher link between poorly capitalised exchanges and the persistence of shocks indicates 
that the inflow of CFDs has a larger effect on market efficiency in poorly capitalised 
exchanges. This may be attributed to the fact that the leverage in CFDs may not have been 
previously available in some of these exchanges. After investigating the specific changes in 
the persistence of shocks, the autoregressive effect and the asset-specific variance between 
the pre-CFD and post-CFD introduction period, further analysis finds that highly capitalised 
exchanges show more beneficial market efficiency effects than that of poorly capitalised 
exchanges. After further examination, it is found that this effect can be explained simply 
through added liquidity effects, when larger exchanges have higher estimated liquidity 
inflows from CFDs, thus enhancing efficiency. The efficiency benefits stemming from 
increased market liquidity are associated with the increased speed of the transfer of 
information throughout the market. 
The GARCH analysis was also conducted in a short and long term viewpoint. The sample 
periods were broken down into two and ten year windows around CFD introduction. Though 
significantly more sensitive, volatility was uniformly greater in international exchanges in the 
short-term at the time of CFD introduction. This indicates a larger short-term shock at the 
point of CFD arrival, with the effect diluted in the following period – generally in the 
following two years after introduction. The most obvious volatility changes are found in 
Norway, Italy and Spain and can be found in figures 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5. Other exchanges show 
similar, yet not as substantial, effects as those seen in these countries. 
Figure 2.3: BORS - Norway GARCH variance 
 
Note: The Oslo BORS in Norway shows a clear increase in variance in the period after the introduction of CFDs. Spikes in 
variance also appear more pronounced adding further weight to the argument that CFD exposure increased the depth of 
volatility in low capitalisation exchanges. 
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Figure 2.4: MIB - Italy GARCH variance 
 
Note: The Italian Stock Exchange saw the introduction of derivatives in 2006. We can see a clear increase in variance 
immediately after their introduction followed by a period of sustained low volatility. This then trends upwards, indicating 
that CFDs may have in fact had a destabilizing effect. 
 
Figure 2.5: IBEX - Spain GARCH variance 
 
Note: The IBEX in Spain shows a clear increase in GARCH variance after the arrival of CFDs. It also appears to be upward 
trending in the two year period after their introduction in early 2006. The latter section of the graph is associated with the 
onset of the global recession and international market crash, but the increase in volatility is visible immediately. 
 
2.6. How have CFDs affected volatility? 
Quite simply, CFDs have the power to create net benefits to an exchange – due to the added 
liquidity from the margin that is used to open new positions for CFD investors. One major 
issue is based on the decision-making process of CFD traders and their investment horizons. 
If CFDs were to be used as long term investment vehicles, there would have to be additional 
returns sought due to the commissions and interest charges associated with holding the 
positions overnight. Thus buy and hold investors would not find this method sustainable. 
Thus, short term speculative investors are the most likely to use these products. But how can 
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the introduction of CFDs reduce volatility? Simply this can be explained by looking at some 
level 2 data prior and post to the introduction of CFDs. We will focus on ABCD plc. as an 
example. If the price of a share in ABCD plc. is €0.12 at 1pm, a trader will be left with a 
situation such as table 2.11. 
Table 2.11: Level 2 trading data example with no CFD transactions 
ABCD plc. 0.12 (-2.50%)   13.01    Vol: 2,400,575 
Buy Orders               (Volume)                      Price to buy             Price to sell              (Volume)                  Sell Orders               
13.01 (1) 80,000 0.115 0.125 90,000 13.01 (3) 
13.01 (3) 50,000 0.110 0.130 30,000 13.01 (5) 
13.00 (4) 150,000 0.100 0.140 40,000 13.01 (1) 
13.00 (2) 90,000 0.090 0.150 10,000 13.01 (2) 
13.00 (4) 250,000 0.080 0.160 5,000 13.01 (4) 
13.01 (1) 175,000 0.070 0.170 15,000 13.01 (4) 
 
Note: Table 2.11 represents an example of the level 2 data that a trader would view for ABCD plc. in a situation without 
CFD hedging through stop-losses and limit orders present in the market. The left and right hand columns represent the time 
and trader number that implemented the order to buy or sell the stock. 
We can see from the example level 2 data in table 2.11, that the current price of ABCD plc. 
stock is €0.12. If for example, a CFD trader has bought €2 million worth of ABCD at €0.12 
using 10% margin, and we assume his net wealth is €5 million (€2 million in CFDs, €3 
million cash with the broker), this means that a 25% fall in share price results in a total loss 
for the CFD trader.The CFD broker inputs a limit-order to sell shares at 1.03pm to protect 
against the price ‘gapping47’ their required minimum threshold. The scale of this position 
becomes evident in table 2.12. The €2 million CFD investment at €0.12 is the equivalent size 
of a €20 million fully margined investment (166,666,667 shares at €0.09). If the price falls to 
€0.09, the trader has lost his entire available margin, thus to protect the company, the broker 
will leave an order to sell the shares at €0.09. Other market agents, unaware of what is 
transpiring in this brokerage will now see the level 2 data48 change to: 
The other traders in the market can now see the extremely large volumes at €0.09 and view 
this as a large ‘sell signal’. But if the same scenario was to occur (ignoring the current 
shorting ban) and a trader was short at the same levels, the brokerage would have the same 
order to buy at €0.15. This would effectively trap the market between €0.09 and €0.15. The 
other non-leveraged traders would simply have to wait until the highly leveraged CFD 
trader’s exit the market before normal fully-margined trading resumed. Thus, the volatility of 
the exchange would fall as the normal mechanics of daily trading are affected.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
47  A gap is a break between prices on a chart that occurs when the price of a stock makes a sharp move up or down with no 
trading occurring in between. Gaps can be created by factors such as regular buying or selling pressure, earnings 
announcements, changes in an analyst's outlook or any other type of news release.  
48 Level 2 data is also known as the order book for trading a financial product and generally includes information such as: 
the highest bid prices, the lowest ask prices and the numbers of shares/contracts that are available at each ask and bid price.  
49 
 
Table 2.12: Level 2 trading data example with CFD broker hedging implemented 
ABCD plc. 0.12 (-2.50%)   13.05    Vol: 2,400,575 
Buy Orders               (Volume)                      Price to buy            Price to sell              (Volume)                  Sell Orders                
13.05 (1) 80,000 0.115 0.125 90,000 13.05 (3) 
13.05 (3) 50,000 0.110 0.130 30,000 13.05 (5) 
13.00 (4) 150,000 0.100 0.140 40,000 13.01 (1) 
13.05 (2) 166,756,667 0.090 0.150 10,000 13.01 (2) 
13.00 (4) 250,000 0.080 0.160 5,000 13.01 (4) 
13.01 (1) 175,000 0.070 0.170 15,000 13.01 (4) 
 
Note: Table 2.12 represents an example of the level 2 data that a trader would view for ABCD plc. after the implementation 
of a stop-loss order to hedge the CFD broker’s counterparty risk of an investor’s €2 million investment through CFDs. The 
order of 166,666,667 shares at €0.09 represents a full hedge against the €2 million position opened at €0.12 (The new value 
of 166.756,667 shares at €0.09 is the combination of the CFD position of 166,666,667 shares and the existing 90,000 shares 
present before the CFD order was implemented). This also creates a significant ‘overhang’ on the bid-side of the market 
which is clearly evident from the scale of the position in comparison to other traders in the market on both the bid and ask 
side of the market. The left and right hand columns represent the time and trader number that implemented the order to buy 
or sell the stock. 
 
Figure 2.6: The impact of CFD volumes on the bid and ask price 
 
Note: Figure 2.6 above shows the theoretical situation when CFD volumes are placed in an exchange to be bought or sold by 
the market 
Therefore, there appears to be a threshold of CFD trading that is beneficial to the market 
mechanics. If there is a high level, then CFD traders can trade amongst one another and 
frequently buy and sell. The alternative is a few small CFD traders that are not 
proportionately much larger than that of the largest fully margined traders. In figure 2.6, we 
can see that area D is the trading zone with no CFD trading and when investigating the 
volumes waiting to be traded at the current share price, there is on average higher volumes 
resting at the bid or ask price closest to that of the last traded price. But, when a CFD broker 
must hedge the risk of the company from the possibility of losing funds due to the proximity 
of a loss to a large client, the broker must place an order into the market to buy or sell the 
shares owned on the CFD trader’s behalf. In this situation, the action pushes the volumes 
sought or demanded closest to the current traded price, with the side of the market dependent 
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on whether it is a buy-side or sell-side action. Therefore, areas A and B in figure 2.6 are 
zones of inefficiency, or trading zones close to the current trading price that are influenced by 
CFD trading. Zone C, is the intersection of both the scenarios, and can be explained simply as 
an appropriate amount of CFD trading on both sides of the market that inevitably matches 
and promotes efficiency. 
 
Figure 2.7: CFD trading and associated levels of market efficiency 
 
Note: Figure 2.7 shows the relationship between the percentage of volumes on exchange that are CFD traded and market 
efficiency which is measured using persistence, asset-specific variance and the autocorrelation of returns for the equity for 
which the CFD is offered. At point X, there is not CFD trading available in the market, thus volumes traded are devised of 
fully margined trader. Point X also represents the initial measure of market efficiency which consists of no-CFD trading. To 
the left of A, there are a small number of CFD-traders in the market, whose overall market power cannot dominate that of 
fully margined traders. In fact, in zone 1, these CFD traders add liquidity to the market, thus efficiency increases to ଵܺ.Note 
that the highest efficiency occurs at ଵܺ, full efficiency cannot be achieved as the market would be operating solely in 
response to fundamentals. This is close to impossible given the presence of speculators. To the right of line B, CFD traders 
have a dominant impact on the decreasing number of fully-margined traders. In this situation, though the volumes traded are 
now larger, the majority CFD traders present in the market with just fully margined traders such as that found in zone 1. 
Zone 2 is deemed a zone of inefficiency as fully-margined traders are unable to absorb the increasing inundation of 
leveraged CFD traders. Efficiency falls from y to z as more leveraged traders enter the market.  
This scenario also holds true for exchange dynamics, where the liquidity of the exchange 
appear to be directly associated with the amount of CFD volumes that can be absorbed. There 
appears to be a threshold where liquidity is high enough to absorb the CFD volumes, or CFD 
volumes are not high enough to have an effect.  
In figure 2.7, there appears to be a trading zone (i.e.: zone 2) between lines A and B, where 
the fully-margined market is unable to efficiently absorb the amount of CFD volumes 
entering the market. To the left of line A in zone 1, the percentage of CFD trading is too 
small to have any effect, thus fully-margined traders dominate, and to the right of line B in 
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zone 3, there is a sufficient number of CFD traders trading with one another to endorse 
market efficiency, thus the trading practices of these agents cancel one another in a similar 
manner to the actions of numerous fully margined traders. With the availability of data of the 
exact percentages of CFD traders per day, it would be possible to calculate these zones and 
input thresholds of CFD trading to counter-act any efficiency reducing affects these products 
may have. 
Since it is found that CFDs have decreased exchange volatility after their introduction; one 
must ask how this has occurred. The most obvious explanation is based on the assumption 
that there are numerous irrational or risk-loving traders whose trading activity tends to 
increase volatility above the rational-equilibrium level. It must also be assumed that CFDs are 
their preferred investment product for quickly and cheaply entering and exiting their market 
of choice. Without CFDs available, the speculative traders submit their orders directly to the 
market using cash, thus increasing market volatility. But using CFDs, these same traders 
submit their orders using CFDs with a 10% cash margin and the rest of the order is offset by 
a broker using a stop-loss order for the remaining order size. This stop-loss protects the 
broker from potential ‘gaps’ in the market. This offsetting stop-loss order entered at the same 
time as the purchase order will lower the volatility increase caused by the purchase order. Its 
impact is diluted by the presence of the stop-loss. In this way, stop-loss orders can account 
for the lower volatility attributed to the results with CFDs. Note that if the trader is risk-
loving and tends to increase volatility, then a buy-plus 90% stop-loss has less impact on 
volatility than a buy order of the same magnitude without an offsetting stop-loss. 
 
2.7. Conclusions  
Options, futures and other derivatives have become widely accepted investment tools in 
many international markets in recent decades, and their advantages and disadvantages are 
known widely and understood. CFDs on the other hand, have become a commonplace 
investment tool in markets that until their inception had no leveraged exposure available. 
Have they affected market volatility and efficiency? 
In terms of liquidity effects, the EGARCH analysis indicates that the ASX was subjected to a 
decrease in long-term volatility after the introduction of CFDs and an increase in volatility 
after the creation of the separate ASX CFD exchange, when CFD investment fell. Also, 32 of 
the 36 individual equities investigated showed a similar decrease in volatility. A similar 
EGARCH model based on the international exchanges investigated show that 13 of the 16 
exchanges had reduced volatility in the period after the introduction of CFDs. 
Using GARCH models and investigating changes in market efficiency, after the introduction 
of CFDs, poorly capitalised exchanges are associated with a large reduction in the persistence 
of shocks and lower autoregressive return effects, but larger exchanges appear to benefit 
more from large reductions in asset-specific variance. Overall, 7 of the 16 exchanges showed 
a distinct improvement in all three aspects of market efficiency investigated after the 
inclusion of CFDs as a trading tool, with 11 showing an improvement in at least two of the 
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three. The DAX (Germany), MIB (Italy) and Nikkei (Japan) showed a dis-improvement in 
market efficiency based on the investigated GARCH measures. 
In terms of the dynamics of CFD investment, this paper finds that in the Australian case, 
equities with larger proportions of CFD investment are subjected to higher price volatility. 
This is similarly the case for equities with higher trading volume being associated with higher 
volatility. Alternatively, equities with higher market capitalisation and nominal prices are 
associated with lower price volatility. Higher priced equities are much more risky to buy as 
their nominal price moves more than cheaper stock, thus this may point out that lower priced 
equities are the prime focus of CFD traders seeking quick price moves. This is based on the 
affordability aspect for those traders with little initial starting capital, thus equity with low 
nominal values appear to be more attractive. This paper has also found that estimates of CFD 
volumes in Australia appear in line with many international analysts forecasts, and some 
equities in fact have more shares traded in CFD format than that of normal fully margined 
trading.  
What do these results mean? CFDs appear to have helped the markets they have been 
introduced in, but only from a long-term viewpoint. The products appear to have reduced 
market volatility, while simultaneously offering a new tradable product. This volatility 
reduction stems from CFD brokers implementing stop-loss and limit-orders in the market to 
protect themselves from client’s losses being transferred to the brokers accounts. This also 
gives rise to bid and ask price ‘overhangs’ which theoretically can reduce volatility simply 
through a reduction in trading liquidity. Unfortunately, CFDs also appear to be associated 
with more short-term volatility, which may be associated with the increased used of leverage 
through CFDs. Another feasible explanation for this larger volatility is based on the use of 
CFDs as a short-term trading tool. Ease of use, large levels of available margin, and large 
overnight holding interest costs offer evidence supporting the use of CFDs as a high 
frequency trading tool, a form of trading found to increase market volatility. It appears as if 
CFDs may in fact be playing a role in accelerating mass deviations from short-term price 
dynamics.  
To gain a role as a commonplace investment technique, CFDs have to become more 
transparent. This is vital to their long-term success. Sources of market data should be forced 
to show how many CFDs are traded as a proportion of total volumes traded and also the stop 
losses and limits in place for those trading. Options and futures have separate exchanges, and 
can be clearly seen so if there are large volumes of each purchased their effects can be 
viewed by informed traders. The creation of the ASX CFD exchange for the first time, 
enabled the public to see trade data based on CFD transactions. It was therefore possible to 
calculate the proportion of the market that was leveraged using this product. More 
importantly, it was possible to view CFD-specific stop-losses and limit-orders. These market 
orders are theoretically capable of creating market ‘overhangs’, thus directly influencing 
market efficiency.For CFDs to continue their existence in a transparent and fair market, 
market makers must be forced to invest in the technology transparency a priority.  
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Chapter 3: Have Exchange Traded Funds influenced commodity market volatility? 
 
 
Abstract: Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) have existed since the late 1980s but were first 
traded on commodity markets in the early 2000s. Their inception has been linked by some 
market analysts with the large growth in commodity market price increases and volatility 
evident between 2007 and 2009. This chapter investigates the role that ETFs have played, 
either as an accelerant for mispricing in international commodity markets, or alternatively as 
a mechanism to increase efficiency through added liquidity. In a secondary analysis, this 
chapter investigates whether the stylised characteristics of ETFs are more or less 
pronounced in larger sized commodity markets than in small markets. The results indicate 
that larger ETF investments are associated with higher EGARCH volatility. Smaller 
commodity markets are found to have increased efficiency after the introduction of ETFs 
indicating that there are some benefits from new ETF investment in markets below $4-$5 
billion size, but the associated caveat is that of increased volatility indicating potential 
pitfalls in the ETF rebalancing process. It appears that ETFs have made commodity markets 
more efficient through a new influx of trading counterparties, but they appear to be 
associated with a cost. The need for regulation of investment size and market ownership 
limits therefore cannot be rejected.  
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter investigates whether Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) have had a role in the 
amplification of volatility in international commodity prices or alternatively whether their 
introduction has benefited the same markets through increased liquidity. In this chapter we 
segregate commodity markets by size to investigate whether ETF investment affected 
markets differently. We examine whether smaller commodity markets have been able to cope 
with the increased flow of funds.  
ETFs are usually registered investment funds that track a particular index, but can be traded 
with the same properties as equities. The ETF itself is a bundle comprising the individual 
components of the chosen index or sought investment strategy (for example, based on price 
or sought level of risk). For example, a financial ETF could potentially be comprised of a 
fund which has invested in the main financial services stocks of a particular exchange. The 
investment strategy of the ETF is decided by the provider and can be based, for example, on 
the market capitalisation or share price of the individual elements of the ETF. ETF investors 
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have benefited from tax-efficiency in comparison with mutual funds as they simply track 
many of the indexes they invest in. This lends to a reduction in operating and transaction 
costs due to the passively-managed styles of ETFs. ETFs have evolved in recent years 
becoming more complex. It is now possible to buy shares of an ETF investing in the 
underlying index using additional leverage, choice of investment stances (long or short) or 
based on different trading strategies. Many market analysts view ETFs as a tool offering an 
opportunity for smaller investors to enter markets they otherwise could not. In some markets, 
the costs of direct entry are simply too high for the smaller investors. But the creators of 
ETFs are able to pool the investments of numerous investors. The ETF divides the product 
they have invested in into shares and sells them in a secondary market.  
It has been found that ETF investor trading habits are associated with more frequent trading, 
which has been found to reduce overall market returns (Jares & Lavin 2007, Gastineau 2008). 
John Bogle, the founder of the Vanguard Group49, has argued that ETFs are the source of 
short-term speculative strategies. Though offering the view that an ETF held for a prolonged 
period of time can be a good investment, the trading commissions significantly reduce the 
returns to the investor and that in some cases the investor is not receiving the diversification 
that is initially offered by the ETF provider. Some analysts argue that ETFs are capable of 
manipulating market prices, and particularly that of short ETFs50 (Jing 2006). In some cases, 
it has been argued that the index that has been offered as an ETF may be misrepresented. 
Though it may be based on a particular sector of the economy or market, it is at the discretion 
of the ETF creator to determine which individual components are in the fund. Higher market 
volatility is also associated with a tracking error51 between the returns of the ETF and the 
returns of the market. In most cases, ETFs have a low tracking error. But in markets with a 
substantial reduction in market liquidity, there are significant problems with traders 
completing their orders at the required price, thus they have to pay more for a significant 
proportion of their sought investment product (Robinson et al 2010, Kosev & Williams 
2011). The effects of contango52 and backwardation53 are substantial, particularly when an 
ETF is being created based on constituents formed from commodity futures.  
The main benefits of ETF investment is the ease of diversification, low expense ratios and tax 
efficiency. This comes with all the standard structure of a normal equity with options54, short 
                                                             
49 The Vanguard Group is an American investment management company that manages approximately $1.4 trillion in assets, 
based in Malvern, Pennsylvania. It offers mutual funds and other financial products and services to individual and 
institutional investors in the United States and abroad. 
50 A short ETF, or also known as an inverse ETF is constructed by using various derivatives for the purpose of profiting from 
a decline in the value of an underlying benchmark. Investing in these ETFs is similar to holding various short positions, or 
using a combination of advanced investment strategies to profit from falling prices.  
51 Tracking error is a measure of how closely a portfolio follows the index to which it is benchmarked. 
52 Contango refers to the market condition wherein the price of a forward or futures contract is trading above the expected 
spot price at contract maturity. The resulting futures or forward curve would typically be upward sloping (i.e. "normal"), 
since contracts for further dates would typically trade at even higher prices. 
53 Backwardation refers to the market condition wherein the price of a forward or futures contract is trading below the 
present spot price. The resulting futures or forward curve would typically be downward sloping (i.e. "inverted"), since 
contracts for farther dates would typically trade at even lower prices. 
54 An option is a derivative financial instrument that establishes a contract between two parties concerning the buying or 
selling of an asset at a reference price during a specified time frame. The buyer of the option gains the right, but not the 
obligation, to engage in some specific transaction on the asset, while the seller incurs the obligation to fulfill the transaction 
if so requested by the buyer. 
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selling, stop losses and limit orders available. ETFs generally have lower costs because most 
are passively managed, thus ETF managers do not regularly buy and sell the individual 
elements of the ETF, but rather hold the components for long term return. ETFs can be 
bought and sold at any time during the trading day in comparison to mutual funds that can 
only be sold at the end of each trading day when their net asset value (NAV) is calculated. 
One of the major volatility linked issues associated with ETFs is the rebalancing trades that 
occur at the end of the day. For ETFs to meet their investment mandates, it is necessary for 
them to rebalance their trading as market movements require. Many analysts have thought 
that this rebalancing process that is can cause excess volatility (Rompotis 2009, Humphries 
2010). Many market experts believe that ETF rebalancing due to the unwillingness and 
reticence to hold positions overnight is boosting late-day volume, with some estimates in the 
range of 20% to 30% of last hour trading being accredited to ETFs (Avellaneda & Zhang 
2009, Knain-Little 2010). In 2010, Morgan Stanley estimated that ETFs account for about 
30% of daily listed market volume, which is three times more than in 2005. The Investment 
Company Institute in 2010 believed that more than $780 billion is invested in ETFs (Milonas 
& Rompotis 2006). Leveraged ETFs have drawn their own concerns due to the amplified 
volumes purchased and sold associated with fund rebalancing. If one was to investigate broad 
funds like index trackers, the rebalancing process of one large ETF investment could be as 
large as a new position to buy or sell on every selected stock on the ETF index in question. 
Another effect associated with increased ETF trading is a rise in market correlations. A ‘herd 
effect’ has been seen by analysts as ETF trading mirrors falls in individual shares (Miffre 
2007). This has been amplified by current global uncertainties, as investors are now less 
willing to hold overnight positions due to the increased risk of off-market-hours price 
fluctuations. This phenomenon is clearly more pronounced since early 2008, signalling the 
change in risk preferences of investors as markets started to fall precipitously in late 2008. 
From 1986 to 2004, the return correlation between soybeans and oil was almost zero. Since 
ETFs were established and have become a popular trading product, this correlation has 
increased to 0.6. Similarly, from near zero correlation in the previous period of investigation, 
the arrival of ETFs has been linked to correlation increases between oil and cotton (0.5), oil 
and live cattle (0.4) and oil and copper (0.6) which have all increased dramatically from close 
to zero. Xiong and Tang (2011) believed that ETFs are associated with this increase in 
correlations because the same findings are not found in Chinese commodity markets, which 
are not available to foreign investment, so that ETFs cannot enter these markets to purchase 
the underlying commodity components to create their funds. 
The Financial Services Authority55 (FSA) in the United Kingdom, have also voiced strong 
concerns about the role of ETFs when investigating high volatility56. They claim that the 
                                                             
55 The Financial Services Authority (FSA) is a quasi-judicial body responsible for the regulation of the financial services 
industry in the United Kingdom. Its board is appointed by the Treasury and the organisation is structured as a company 
limited by guarantee and owned by the UK government. Its main office is based in Canary Wharf, London, with another 
office in Edinburgh. When acting as the competent authority for listing of shares on a stock exchange, it is referred to as the 
UK Listing Authority (UKLA), and maintains the Official list. The FSA's Chairman and CEO is Lord Turner of Ecchinswell 
and Hector Sants. On 16 June 2010, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, announced plans to abolish the FSA 
and separate its responsibilities between a number of new agencies and the Bank of England. 
56 Retail Conduct Risk Outlook – Financial Services Authority (FSA), United Kingdom, February 2011. 
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rapid growth of the ETF markets has led to a high level of innovation in this product area. 
They believe that this created the risk that consumers do not understand the difference 
between product types in terms of investment strategy, tax status and risk. The FSA found 
that ETFs have changed in complexity, thus causing a lag in terms of information and 
education for investors. The lack of familiarity of the market with ETFs has the potential to 
exacerbate the product’s risk. Counterparty and collateral risk are also important risks 
associated with ETFs. Also, conflicts of interest are found to arise based on the structure of 
the products. The laws governing ETFs are generally based in the country that domicile the 
product, rather than that of the country in which the product is being offered. The FSA voiced 
strong concerns about this point, along with concerns that the marketing and promotional 
material for complex ETFs directed at retail investors may not always adequately reflect all 
the various risks inherent in the products57. CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler said in an August, 
2009 news release that "position limits should be consistently applied and vigorously 
enforced" and that "position limits promote market integrity by guarding against concentrated 
positions." This would have a negative impact on ETFs as investors would be less attracted to 
opening these positions if limits were imposed. ETF providers are of course opposed to any 
regulation limiting their products, but some markets that ETFs invest in are simply too small 
to efficiently absorb the large inflow of investor’s funds. 
This chapter tests the effects that ETF introduction has had on commodity markets through 
the use of GARCH and EGARCH techniques. This analysis will help to test whether 
commodity ETFs have had a detrimental effect on commodity market volatility and 
efficiency as proposed by market analysts and commentators. This chapter is organised as 
follows. Section 3.2 describes the relevant previous literature associated with this chapter. 
Section 3.3 describes the data, methodology and structure of the models used in the analysis. 
Section 3.4 describes the results while section 3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2. Previous literature 
The literature on the volatility effects of ETF introduction in commodity markets remains 
sparse, though other facets of ETF design have been researched. One of the largest concerns 
associated with ETFs has been linked with their management, or the investment strategies 
they apply when constructing the underlying index. Two methods are generally used; the first 
based on active management, the second on passive management. Active management is 
based on the investment mandate of the fund and requires rebalancing of the underlying 
assets based on changes in the particular facets of the index. The rebalancing process may 
also have to be completed based on changing investment strategies of those investing in the 
ETF. Passive management involves creation of the ETF, but minimal rebalancing, as it is the 
reduction in transaction costs that help generate more profits for the ETF manager. Actively 
managed ETFs have been specifically identified as a responsible component for large spikes 
in market activity based on rebalancing activities.  
                                                             
57 ‘The HSA is concerned about ETFs’, The Financial Times, 28th of February 2011, Izabeela Kaminska 
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Rompotis (2009) investigated the dynamic effects from these differing styles to find that 
active ETFs underperform the corresponding passive ETFs and the market indexes. The 
results find that the percentage correlation between the trading price of the ETF and the 
underlying indices range between 0.2% and 39.1%. This sentiment is echoed by Gastineau 
(2004) and Lu and Wang (2009). Trainor (2010) investigated the link specifically between 
leveraged ETFs and equity market volatility. The author found that there were more than 150 
leveraged and inverse ETFs with assets of more than $30 billion in 2010. Intra-day volatility 
since 2000 was not found to be associated with the rebalancing process of ETF fund 
managers. This result was also found to hold during the extreme periods of intra-day 
volatility during the recent subprime crisis. Cheng and Madhavan (2009) find that leveraged 
ETFs may have a large effect on market-on-close volumes (MOC). Large moves in prices 
could be further exacerbated by the rebalancing that leveraged ETFs undertake towards the 
end of the day. Cherry (2004) found that ETFs are on average 17% more volatile than their 
underlying components and 70% of this volatility can be explained by transaction and 
holding costs. Madura and Richie (2004) similarly found substantial overreaction of ETFs 
during normal trading hours and after hours, presenting opportunities for feedback traders.  
In terms of underlying pricing reactions, Cheng and Cheng (2002) found significant 
premiums between three of the major Hong Kong ETFs and their underlying components. 
Hughen (2003) investigating the arbitrage mechanism on premiums and discounts showed 
how critical the arbitrage mechanism is in itself towards the pricing of ETFs. Kalaycioglu 
(2006) investigated the flow-return relationship in ETFs and fails to reject the hypothesis of 
no-price-pressure on market returns originating from ETF flows. Engle et al. (2002) found 
that the pricing of ETFs is highly efficient for domestic products but less so for international 
funds since they face more complex financial transactions and risks. Harper et al. (2006) 
found that between 1996 and 2001, their investigated ETFs showed higher mean returns and 
Sharpe ratios58 than foreign closed-end funds. Madura and Ngo (2008) found that in response 
to the inception of ETFs there are positive and significant valuation effects on the dominant 
component stocks of the ETF investigated. Deshpande et al. (2009) when investigating the 
link between leveraged ETFs and volatility found that the likely impact is still very small 
based on volume analysis. A Credit Suisse report (2009) found that leveraged ETFs account 
for 2% of end-of-day trading and is therefore unlikely to have any significant effects. 
Similarly, a report by Direxion (2009) found that leveraged ETFs do not exacerbate market 
volatility or compound directional moves from 3.00pm to market close.  
Though there is limited research on volatility effects stemming from ETF introduction, 
derivative introduction and associated volatility offers significant supporting evidence. There 
are two main branches of thought on the volatility effects of the introduction of derivatives. 
The first group are those who believe that derivatives trading increases volatility view these 
derivative products as a market for speculators. The main concern of proponents of this view 
                                                             
58 The Sharpe ratio tells us whether a portfolio’s asset returns are due to smart investment decisions or as a result of excess 
risk. This measurement is very useful because although one portfolio or fund can reap higher returns than its peers, it is only 
a good investment if those higher returns do not come with too much additional risk. The greater a portfolio’s Sharpe ratio, 
the better its risk adjusted performance has been. A negative Sharpe ratio indicates that risk-less asset would perform better 
than the security being analyzed. 
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is the low margin requirements available that makes the market high risk, as most agents 
maximise their available funds. This argument originates from the style of investment and 
mentality of derivatives traders. They use the products to increase their exposure to an asset, 
thus amplifying their risk. Some authors believe that destabilising effects are evident in the 
market as this speculative trading originates from uninformed investors (Chatrath et al., 
1995). Stein (1987) claimed that futures markets attracted uninformed traders because of their 
high degree of leverage, which can reduce the information content of prices and can cause 
destabilising market volatility. This is foundational to the central hypothesis of this paper.  
Other papers that support the view that derivative introduction increased spot market 
volatility include Jeanneau and Micu (2003), Gulen and Mayhew (2000) investigating the 
United States and Japan, Antoniou and Holmes (2003), Bessembinder and Seguin (1992) and 
Lee and Ohk (1992). Pok and Poshakwale (2004) and Ryoo and Smith (2004) found similar 
volatility increases, but also noted greater sensitivity of spot market prices to new information 
and efficiency improvements through faster information transfers.  
Others argue that the introduction of derivatives reduces spot market volatility and in fact 
stabilises the market. Derivatives are in fact viewed as an efficient medium of price 
discovery. Other noted benefits include improved market depth, a reduction in market 
asymmetries and less cash market volatility as found by Kumar et al. (1995) and Antoniou et 
al. (1998). Other papers that found volatility reductions after the inclusion of their 
investigated derivative products include Drimbetas et al (2007), Bologna and Cavallo (2002), 
Nath (2003), and Pilar and Rafael (2002).  
The majority of the research based on the link between derivative introduction and volatility 
change find no significant correlations. Research finding no significant changes includes 
Shenbagaraman (2003) who also found changes in the nature of volatility, Mayhew (2000), 
Darrat and Rahman (1995) and Antoniou and Holmes (1992).  
Other research based on the introduction of new derivatives looks at changes in market 
structure, efficiency and market regulation. Powers (1970) and Danthine (1978) show that 
futures markets improve overall market depth and the availability of information. Schwartz 
and Laatsche (1991) and Stoll and Whaley (1988) also found evidence of structural 
improvements in markets after the introduction of futures. Watt, Yadav and Draper (1992) 
found no change in volatility post-futures, but did find evidence of efficiency benefits. 
Santoni (1987), Becketti and Roberts (1990) and Darrat, Rahman and Zhong (2002) all find 
no volatility changes in the period post-derivatives. They argue that from a regulatory 
perspective that any action to counter non-existent changes would be unwarranted. 
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3.3. Data, methodology and structure of the models 
The primary research question is ‘have ETFs had a direct effect on the volatility of the 
commodity markets in which they have invested?’ This research question is investigated 
through the use of GARCH and EGARCH models testing dynamic changes in the structure of 
volatility in the pre and post-ETF introduction periods.  In table 3.1, we can see the scale of 
the market for international ETFs for all types of investment product. The United States, 
United Kingdom, Germany, France, Canada and Japan are among the largest jurisdictions 
where ETFs are based in terms of domestic assets under management (AUM in United States 
dollars) as of December 2010. The commodity markets under investigation in chapter 3 are 
listed in table 3.2. The main international commodity ETFs are included in the investigation, 
totalling 44 ETFs across 17 commodity markets listed in table 3.3. 
The daily return is calculated as ܴ௧ = ቀ௉೟ି௉೟షభ௉೟షభ ቁ. The dataset59 is based on the daily returns of 
commodity prices. The estimated dummy variable equals one on and after as the date on 
which the ETF started issuing as an investment product. To test the robustness of the 
conclusion of this paper in a similar manner to Pilar and Rafael (2002), two models of the 
ARCH family will be used, the GARCH(1,1) model and the EGARCH (1,1). The models 
include a dummy variable to signal inception of the commodity ETF, denoted as zero prior, 
and one thereafter. 
The model also includes the Dow Jones Industrial Average as a proxy for stock market 
performance. Also, commodity markets are substantially affected by developments from 
government interest rate decisions and exchange rate movements. The model includes a 
dollar-weighted basket comprised of the US dollar against numerous international exchange 
rates. This will serve as a proxy for exchange rate movements. It is theoretically plausible 
that any drastic interest rate movements that could affect commodity prices would have a 
similar effect on equity and foreign exchange values. This analysis as a whole will investigate 
whether ETF establishment had a statistically significant effect on volatility.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                             
59All other data in this research is provided by Thompson Reuters Datastream, Bloomberg and finance.yahoo.com and the 
main econometric software programme used is Stata 11.0. 
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Table 3.1: ETF estimated assets under management (AUM$) as of December 2010 
Country  AUM Billion$ Country  AUM Billion$ 
Australia 1.21 Malaysia 0.19 
Austria 0.08 Mexico 5.33 
Belgium 0.07 Netherlands 0.3 
Brazil 2.23 New Zealand 0.39 
Canada 18.36 Norway 0.27 
China 2.86 Singapore 1.35 
Finland 0.18 Slovenia 0.01 
France 47.28 South Africa 1.95 
Germany 65.64 South Korea 3.7 
Greece 0.18 Spain 5.45 
Hong Kong 15.56 Sweden 2.13 
Hungary 0.03 Switzerland 9.25 
Iceland 0.07 Taiwan 1.51 
India 1.86 Thailand 0.1 
Indonesia 0.01 Turkey 0.18 
Ireland 0.04 United Kingdom 27.68 
Italy 1.05 United States 539.06 
Japan 30.42   
 
Note: The above table represents the estimated assets under management (AUM) in billions of US Dollars ($) as of 
December 2010 for all styles of ETF investment (bond, equity, currency, commodity etc.). 
 
Table 3.2: Commodity markets under investigation after ETF introduction  
Sector Commodity Ticker Symbol Main Exchange Contract Size 
Energy  West Texas Intermediate Crude Oil CL / WTI NYMEX / ICE 1000 barrels 
Brent Crude B ICE 1000 barrels 
Natural Gas NG NYMEX 10,000 mmBTU 
RBOB Gasoline RB NYMEX 1000 barrels 
Precious Metals Gold GC CBOT troy ounce 
Platinum PL NYMEX troy ounce 
Palladium PA NYMEX troy ounce 
Silver SI CBOT troy ounce 
Industrial Metals 
 
Copper HG LME Metric Tonne 
Zinc Z LME Metric Tonne 
Aluminium AL LME Metric Tonne 
Livestock Lean Hogs LH CME 20 tonnes 
Live Cattle LC CME 20 tonnes 
Feeder Cattle FC CME 25 tonnes 
Agricultural Corn C / EMA CBOT / EURONEXT 5,000 bushels 
Oats O CBOT 5,000 bushels 
Soybeans S CBOT 5,000 bushels 
Wheat W CBOT 5,000 bushels 
Cocoa CC NYBOT 10 tonnes 
Coffee KC NYBOT 37,500lb 
Cotton CT NYBOT 50,000lb 
Sugar (No.11 / No.14) SB / SE NYBOT 112,000lb 
 
Note: The above table contains the spot and future commodity markets under investigation in this chapter for effects after the 
introduction of Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs).  
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Table 3.3: Commodity ETFs under investigation and their associated components 
Name Inception Date Ticker  Net Asset Value 
(NAV-$)60 
Assets under Control (Approximate) 
SPDR Gold Trust 18/11/2004 GLD 53,639,130,580 100% Spot Gold (Long) 
iShares Silver Trust 28/4/2006 SLV 6,391,704,000 100% Spot Silver (Long) 
iShares COMEX Gold Trust 28/1/2005 IAU 4,060,120,500 100% Spot Gold (Long) 
United States Oil Fund 10/4/2006 USO 1,798,284,000 100% Long West Texas Intermediate Oil (WTI) 
ETFS Physical Swiss Gold Shares 9/9/2009 SGOL 942,835,480 100% Spot Gold (Long) 
ETFS Physical Platinum Shares 8/1/2010 PPLT 482,764,500 100% Spot Platinum (Long) 
ETFS Physical Palladium Shares 8/1/2010 PALL 392,303,310 100% Spot Palladium (Long) 
ETFS Silver Trust 24/7/2009 SIVR 212,539,440 100% Spot Silver (Long) 
Proshares Ultra Gold 3/12/2008 UGL 201,204,816 100% Spot Gold (Long - Leveraged x2) 
Proshares Ultra Silver 3/12/2008 AGQ 185,041,079 100% Spot Silver (Long – Leveraged x2) 
Proshares Ultra-short Gold 3/12/2008 GLL 75,581,303 100% Spot Gold (Short – Leveraged x2) 
Proshares Ultra-short Silver) 3/12/2008 ZSL 68,330,286 100% Spot Silver (Short – Leveraged x2) 
United States Oil Fund 24/9/2009 DNO 19,344,000 100% Short West Texas Intermediate Oil (WTI) 
Powershares DB Base Metal Fund 5/1/2007 DBB 361,890,019 35% Copper Futures, 35% Aluminium Futures, 30% Zinc Futures (Long) 
RICI Agriculture ETN 18/10/2007 RJA 340,066,000 20% Wheat, 13.5% Corn, 11.5% Cotton, 8.5% Soybeans,  
6% Live Cattle, 6% Sugar, 6% Coffee, 6% Soybean Oil, 3% Lumber, 
3% Lean Hogs (All Long Futures) 
Powershares DB Precious Metals Fund 5/1/2007 DBP 307,793,517 80% Gold, 20% Silver (Long Futures) 
 
Powershares DB Gold Fund 5/1/2007 DGL 245,001,538 100% Gold Futures (Long) 
Powershares DB Energy Fund 5/1/2007 DBE 237,865,865 23% Gasoline RBOB, 22.5% Heating Oil, 22.5% Brent Crude Oil, 
22% West Texas Intermediate, 10% Natural Gas (Long Futures) 
United States 12 Month Oil Fund 6/12/2007 USL 149,560,000 100% West Texas Intermediate Oil (Long Futures) 
iPath Dow Jones – UBS Grain ETN 23/10/2007 JJG 147,658,868 45% Soybeans, 30% Wheat, 25% Corn (Long Futures) 
iPath Dow Jones – UBS Natural Gas ETN 23/10/2007 GAZ 126,964,200 100% Natural Gas (Long) 
iPath Dow Jones – UBS Copper ETN 23/10/2007 JJC 97,577,845 100% Copper (Long) 
Powershares DB Commodity Index Tracking 
Fund 
3/2/2006 DBC 4,312,530,024 12.5% WTI, 12.5% Brent Crude, 12.5% Heating Oil, 12.5% RBOB, 5.5% 
Natural Gas, 8% Gold, 2% Silver, 4% Aluminium, 4% Zinc, 4% Copper, 5.5% 
Corn, 5.5% Wheat, 5.5% Soybeans, 5.5% Sugar. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
60 Data correct as of September 2010 
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Table 3.3: Commodity ETFs under investigation and their associated components (continued) 
 
Name Inception Date Ticker  Net Asset Value 
(NAV-$)61 
Assets under Control (Approximate) 
iPath Dow Jones – UBS Commodity ETN 6/6/2006 DJP 2,194,570,508 20% Industrial Metals, 25% Energy, 13% Precious Metals, 6% Livestock, 30% 
Agriculture 
Powershares DB Agriculture Fund 5/1/2007 DBA 2,078,780,343 14% Live Cattle, 13% Coffee, 13% Soybeans, 12% Corn, 12% Wheat, 11% 
Cocoa, 10% Lean Hogs, 10% Sugar, 5% Feeder Cattle, 3% Cotton (Long 
Futures) 
iShares GSCI Commodity Index  21/7/2006 GSC 1,539,150,495 71% Energy, 13% Agriculture, 7% Industrial Metals, 4.5% Livestock, 3.5% 
Precious Metals 
iPath S&P GSCI Crude Oil Index ETN 15/8/2006 OIL 593,813,780 100% Futures West Texas Intermediate (Long)  
Powershares DB Oil Fund 5/1/2007 DBO 557,996,691 100% Futures West Texas Intermediate (Long) 
Powershares DB Gold Double Long ETN 28/2/2008 DGP 479,251,500 100% Gold Futures (Long) 
Proshares Ultra DJ-UBS Crude Oil 25/1//2008 UCO 421,349,629 100% Futures West Texas Intermediate (Long) 
E-TRACS UBS Bloomberg CMCI Gold ETN 1/4/2008 UCI 90,290,054 100% Gold Futures (Long) 
Powershares DB Silver Fund 5/1/2007 DBS 80,698,934 100% Silver Futures (Long) 
iPath Dow Jones – UBS Platinum ETN 25/6/2008 PGM 79,691,654 100% Platinum Futures (Long) 
United States Natural Gas Fund 18/4/2007 UNG 2,432,673,000 100% Natural Gas (Long Futures) 
Powershares DB Gold Double Short ETN 28/2/2008 DZZ 75,696,000 100% Gold Futures (Short) 
iPath Dow Jones – UBS Sugar ETN 25/6/2008 SGG 74,757,977 100% Sugar Futures (Long) 
iPath Dow Jones – UBS Livestock ETN 24/10/2007 COW 72,962,716 69% Live Cattle, 31% Lean Hogs (Long Futures) 
Powershares DB Crude Oil Double Short   17/6/2008 DTO 65,424,500 100% Crude Oil Futures (Short – Leveraged x2) 
E-TRACS UBS Bloomberg CMCITR Long 
Platinum ETN 
9/5/2008 PTM 65,557,449 100% Platinum Futures (Long) 
Powershares DB Base Metal Double Long 
ETN 
18/6/2008 BDD 24,890,000 33% Aluminium, 33% Zinc, 34% Copper (Grade A) 
iPath Dow Jones – UBS Coffee ETN 25/6/2008 JO 22,860,000 100% Coffee Futures (Long) 
Proshares Ultra-Short DJ-UBS Crude Oil 25/11/2008 SCO 45,170,707 100% West Texas Intermediate Oil (Short – leveraged x2) 
United States 12 Month Natural Gas Fund 18/11/2009 UNL 42,000,000 100% Natural Gas Futures (Long) 
 
Powershares DB Gold Short ETN 29/2/2008 DGZ 334,130,000 100% Gold Futures (Short) 
                                                             
61 Data correct as of September 2010 
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The GARCH model was developed by Bollerslev (1986) from the ARCH62 model previously 
introduced by Engle (1982). The GARCH (p,q) model suggested by Bollerslev is represented 
as: 
ܴ௧ = ܾݔ௧ + ߝ௧ , where	ߝ௧|ߗ௧ିଵ~ܰ(0,ℎ௧), 
ℎ௧ = ݔ଴ + ෍ߙ௜௣
௜ୀଵ
ߝ௧ି௜
ଶ + ෍ߚ௝ℎ௧ି௝ ,௤
௝ୀଵ
 
where ߝ௧	 is asset specific returns and ݔ௧ are other explanatory variables included in the 
GARCH equation. If q=0, the process reduces to an ARCH(p) process and for p=q=0, ߝ௧ 	is 
just white noise. The GARCH(1,1) framework has been extensively found to be the most 
parsimonious representation of asset-specific variance that best fits and therefore is most 
adequate to use with many financial time series (Bollerslev, 1987).  
The GARCH model used in this paper to investigate spot commodity market volatility 
changes after ETF introduction is denoted as: 
ܴ௧ = ܾ଴ + ܾଵܴ௧ିଵ + ܾଶܴ஽௃ூ஺೟ + ܾଷܴ௎ௌ஽೟ + ߝ௧, where	ߝ௧|ߗ௧ିଵ~ܰ(0,ℎ௧)	and	ߙ௜,ߚ௝ 	≥ 0, 
ℎ௧ = ߙ଴ + ߙଵߝ௧ିଵଶ + ߚଵℎ௧ିଵ + ߛܦா்ி೟ , 
where ߛ ≥ 0 in addition to the other non-negativity restrictions above. Thus the value of the 
variance scaling parameter, ℎ௧, now depends on past values of the shocks, which are captured 
in the lagged squared residual terms and on past values of itself, which are captured in the 
lagged ℎ௧ିଵ	term. ℎ௧	is known at the beginning of time t. ߗ௧ିଵ is the information set at the 
end of time period t-1. ܴ஽௃ூ஺೟  represents the daily return on the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
(DJIA) and ܴ௎ௌ஽೟  represents the daily return on the main benchmark Federal Reserve dollar-
weighted basket. These variables are included in the mean equation to mitigate the GARCH 
model against United States equity and currency volatility respectively. 	ܦா்ி೟  is included in 
the variance equation as a representation of the dummy variable included in the GARCH 
model denoting the arrival of ETFs. This variable takes a value of zero prior to the arrival of 
ETFs and one thereafter. With GARCH the conditional variance is modelled as a linear 
function of the lagged conditional variance in addition to the past squared errors contained in 
the ARCH representation. To offer more parsimonious results, the EGARCH model is used 
in conjunction with the GARCH analysis.  
                                                             
62 AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) models are used to characterize and model observed time series. 
They are used whenever there is reason to believe that, at any point in a series, the terms will have a characteristic size, or 
variance. In particular ARCH models assume the variance of the current error term or innovation to be a function of the 
actual sizes of the previous time periods' error terms: often the variance is related to the squares of the previous innovations. 
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The Exponential GARCH model (EGARCH) was first developed by Nelson (1991). The 
ARCH(p) and GARCH (p,q) models impose symmetry on the conditional variance structure 
which may not be appropriate for modelling and forecasting stock return volatility. EGARCH 
models capture the most important stylised features of equity return volatility, namely time-
series clustering, negative correlations with returns, log-normality and with other certain 
specifications, long memory. Nelson (1991) proposed the exponential GARCH or EGARCH 
model as a method of dealing with the problem.  
Under the EGARCH(1,1) framework, the conditional log variance is calculated as: 
ܴ௧ = ܾݔ௧ + ߝ௧ , where	ߝ௧|ߗ௧ିଵ~ܰ(0,ℎ௧), 
log(ℎ௧) = ߱ + ߙ ቎ |ߝ௧ିଵ|
ඥℎ௧ିଵ
−ඨ
2
ߨ
቏ + ߚ log(ℎ௧ିଵ) + ߜ ߝ௧ିଵ
ඥℎ௧ିଵ
, 
The parameters ߱,ߙ,ߚ	and	ߜ are constant. The EGARCH model has two advantages over the 
GARCH model. First, the logarithm construction of the conditional variance equation ensures 
that the estimated conditional variance is strictly positive, thus the non-negativity constraints 
used in the estimation of the ARCH and GARCH models are not necessary. Also, the 
parameter δ typically enters the conditional variance equation with a negative sign, thus bad 
news, ߝ௧ < 0 generates more volatility than good news. In the EGARCH model used, the 
dependent and independent variables remain similar to those used in the GARCH analysis: 
ܴ௧ = ܾ଴ + ܾଵܴ௧ିଵ + ܾଶܴ௎ௌ஽೟ + ܾଷܴ஽௃ூ஺೟ + ߝ௧, where	ߝ௧|ߗ௧ିଵ~ܰ(0,ℎ௧). 
But the specification of the conditional variance equation now becomes: 
log(ℎ௧) = ߱ + ߙ ቎ቮ ߝ௧ି௝
ඥℎ௧ିଵ
−ඨ
2
ߨ
ቮ቏ + ߚ log(ℎ௧ିଵ) + ߜ ߝ௧ିଵ
ඥℎ௧ିଵ
+ ߛܦா்ி೟ , 
ℎ௧ is known at the beginning of time t. ߗ௧ିଵ is the information set at the end of time period t-
1 which makes the leverage effect exponential instead of quadratic and therefore, estimates of 
the conditional variance are guaranteed to be non-negative. The EGARCH model allows for 
the testing of asymmetries, which are picked up in the ߚ term. Similarly to the GARCH 
methodology, ܴ஽௃ூ஺೟  represents the daily return on the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) 
and ܴ௎ௌ஽೟  represents the daily return on the main benchmark Federal Reserve dollar-
weighted basket. These variables are included in the mean equation to mitigate the EGARCH 
model against United States equity and currency volatility respectively. 	ܦா்ி೟  is included in 
the variance equation as a representation of the dummy variable included in the EGARCH 
model denoting the arrival of ETFs. This variable takes a value of zero prior to the arrival of 
ETFs and one thereafter. When ߚ = 0, the model is symmetric, but when ߚ <0, then positive 
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shocks generate less volatility than negative shocks. The model captures the asymmetric 
features of the dataset, which occur when an unexpected drop in price due to bad news 
increases volatility more than an unexpected increase in price of a similar magnitude because 
of good news. The model expresses the conditional variance of the variables as a non-linear 
function of its own past standard innovations. This is similar to the methodology used and 
explained in chapter two. 
 
 
3.4. Results 
3.4.1. EGARCH investigation of the period of ETF introduction 
This section conducts an EGARCH investigation of the period before and after the 
introduction of ETFs. The inclusion of a dummy variable in the volatility equation, equal to 
zero in the period before ETFs and one thereafter, provides a coefficient denoted as gamma 
(measuring the volatility change) between the periods before and after ETF introduction. 
External sources of volatility stemming from currency and equity markets are controlled by 
these variables’ inclusion in the mean equation of the EGARCH model; providing results as 
closely associated to commodity market dynamics as possible. To segregate the results by 
size, the market capitalisation of commodity markets is based on the associated size of the 
futures market of the commodity product. This method is used as ETFs have been found to be 
more likely to invest on futures exchanges as a method of product creation. The size of the 
spot commodity market was also deemed unreliable due to the large variation in estimates. 
Larger commodity markets are usually more liquid, thus being more capable of absorbing the 
new large-scale investment. These markets are deemed to remain relatively unaffected and 
perhaps may even benefit from the added liquidity. The alternative is that ETFs have given 
‘noise traders’ a useful platform to enter and exit commodity markets quickly and cheaply, 
with the transition of their risk-loving behaviour affecting commodity dynamics, thus adding 
to excess volatility. 
Table 3.4 displays the estimated gamma coefficients based on the EGARCH investigations 
for each of the included ETFs investigated in this chapter. A more descriptive analysis of the 
results can be found in table AIV of the appendices. The associated commodity market is also 
included, and in situations where there are multiple investments for a single ETF, the date of 
fund initiation is investigated for each of the commodity market components invested. Figure 
3.1 shows the relationship between EGARCH volatility and the size of the total ETF 
investment in each commodity market. There is a clear positive relationship between the two, 
but of particular interest is the fact that we can segregate the futures markets into positive and 
negative volatility estimates. In this situation, markets with a value of ETF investment under 
$2.15 billion are associated with decreased EGARCH volatility post-introduction. This is 
indicative of large funds causing a detrimental volatility effect which has been attributed to 
the rebalancing process of these funds. This has also been pinpointed as problematic by the 
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CTFC63 as ETFs with holdings above this threshold have the capability of dominating these 
commodity markets though size effects.  
Table 3.4: EGARCH(1,1) results for individual commodity ETFs under investigation 
ETF Ticker – Commodity γ coefficient ETF Ticker – Commodity γ coefficient 
SLV – Silver  0.001*** JJG – Wheat 0.029* 
SIVR – Silver -0.006** JJG – Corn 0.019* 
AGQ – Silver -0.007* DBC – WTI -0.007 
ZSL – Silver -0.007*** DBC – Crude Oil -0.008* 
DBS – Silver 0.004** DBC – Gold 0.012* 
GLD – Gold 0.003** DJP – Corn 0.025 
IAU – Gold 0.004* DBC – Corn 0.019* 
SGOL – Gold -0.008* DBC – Natural Gas -0.005* 
UGL – Gold -0.009** DJP – Natural Gas -0.001** 
GLL – Gold -0.009** DBE – Gasoline RBOB -0.005** 
DBP – Gold 0.003** BDG – Aluminium 0.936* 
DGL – Gold  0.004** DBE – Crude Oil -0.005* 
DGP – Gold 0.005* DBE – WTI -0.006* 
UCI – Gold -0.002* DBC – Gasoline RBOB -0.007* 
DZZ – Gold 0.005*** BDG – Zinc 0.006*** 
DGZ – Gold 0.005*** DBC – Soybeans -0.001 
PGM – Platinum 0.021* DBC –Wheat 0.019* 
PTM – Platinum 0.020* DJP – WTI -0.007* 
PPLT – Platinum -0.011*** DJP – Soybeans 0.001 
PALL – Platinum  -0.004*** DJP – Gold 0.012* 
USO – WTI -0.008* DJP – Copper 0.001 
DNO – WTI -0.020* DJP – Live Cattle -0.029* 
USL – WTI -0.004 DJP – Wheat 0.021* 
DBO – WTI -0.006** UGA – Gasoline RBOB 0.003*** 
OIL – Crude Oil -0.006* DBA – Live Cattle -0.033* 
UCO – Crude Oil -0.009* DBA – Coffee 0.013* 
DTO – Crude Oil -0.005** DBA – Soybeans 0.002*** 
SCO – Crude Oil -0.010* DBA – Corn 0.021* 
RJN – WTI -0.004*** DBA – Wheat 0.022* 
DBP – Silver  0.004*** DBA – Cocoa 0.137** 
JJC – Copper -0.001 DBA – Lean Hogs 0.013* 
DBB – Aluminium  0.006* DBA – Sugar  -0.008* 
GAZ – Natural Gas -0.002* DBA – Feeder Cattle -0.033* 
UNG - Natural Gas -0.005* DBA – Cotton -0.001 
UNL - Natural Gas -0.024** BDG – Copper 0.001 
JO – Coffee -0.048*** RJA – Wheat 0.029* 
SGG – Sugar -0.003 RJA – Corn 0.019* 
COW – Live Cattle -0.016* RJA – Soybeans 0.002*** 
COW – Lean Hogs 0.012* JJG – Soybean 0.002*** 
RJA – Cotton 0.002   
 
Note: The above table gives the estimated γ coefficients for each investigated commodity market after the introduction of a 
new Exchange Traded Fund (ETF) based primarily on the investigated commodity market using the discussed 
EGARCH(1,1) methodology to investigate changes in volatility dynamics after ETF introduction. In the cases of multiple 
commodity investments for each ETF, the associated ticker and the commodity market invested are listed above. Robust 
standard errors for each result are marked in parentheses, where ***p<0.01, **p<0.05 and *p<0.10. The full associated 
EGARCH statistics and associated information based on each ETF investigated are found in table AIV of the Appendix. 
 
                                                             
63 An statement made by the CFTC on the 20th of May 2011 specifically stated that the actions of a silver ETF was 
specifically responsible for market manipulation. ‘CFTC signals open-season on silver market manipulation and NYSE:SLV 
ETF: $500 million dollar payday on manipulated silver price takedown on COMEX futures market – CFTC commissioners 
continue their two and a half year ongoing investigation of silver price manipulation and illegal trading practices by the JP 
Morgan Chase and HSBC banks. All the while during the past three weeks, non-commercial traders added 6,000 new 
contracts to their silver short position. Then, utilizing computer automated High-Frequency-Trading (HFT) software, 
proceeded to flood the market with huge day-trading volume, equivalent to the entire annual silver mine production in a 
single day. Repeated daily HFT attacks within the last two weeks have resulted in a takedown of the COMEX spot price of 
silver by over 30 percent. Then, the same non-commercial traders bought back more than 8,300 silver contracts, netting 
$500 million dollars over the last three weeks’. 
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Figure 3.1: EGARCH volatility estimates and ETF investment size 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Figure 3.1 shows the relationship between the EGARCH volatility estimates by commodity market investigated and 
the relative size of the total investment by the ETF. The shaded grey areas represent the 95% confidence intervals of the 
observations fitted values. We can clearly see a positive relationship (correlation coefficient of +0.63). The dashed blue lines 
represent the point at which EGARCH volatility switches from positive to negative, which occurs at a total ETF investment 
size of $2.15 billion. Thus markets under this value are associated with decreased volatility stemming from liquidity benefits 
from ETF investment, whereas those markets above this value are associated with increased EGARCH volatility. 
 
3.4.2. GARCH investigation of the periods prior and post ETF introduction 
The use of dummy variables in the short term EGARCH model caused significant issues 
when investigating low-liquidity commodity markets. One of the best methods to counteract 
this problem was to simply divide the investigation into two sections and investigate changes 
in the GARCH coefficients. This provided two testing periods where the resulting 
coefficients could be compared and analysed. The length of the periods examined offers 
stronger results about the dynamics involved. The same models were run as those used in the 
EGARCH investigation, but this led to significant estimation error, including negative 
coefficients and insignificance of the regressed variables. Investigating the coefficients offers 
interesting results. We can begin by looking at the persistence of shocks from the pre-ETF 
period to the post-ETF period, measured as (ߙଵ + ߙଶ). The second factor we can look at is 
ߚଵ, where a decrease indicates a decrease in the autoregressive effect of returns, indicating 
that the market has increased its efficiency in the weak sense as proposed by Fama (1970). 
Finally we can look at the unconditional variance. We know that when the sum of ߙଵ and	ߙଶ 
is less than one, the model has finite conditional variance h and it can be found by setting 
ܧ[ߝ௧ିଵଶ ] = ℎ௧ = ℎ௧ିଵ = ℎ଴. We can solve: ℎ଴ = ఈబଵିఈభିఈమ . The results of this analysis are 
found below in table 3.5, with a more descriptive analysis located in table AV in the 
appendices.  
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Table 3.5: Efficiency statistics prior and post ETF introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Table 3.5 shows the calculated statistics prior and post ETF introduction as calculated from the GARCH analysis. The 
main coefficients of interest are indicative of market efficiency and persistence (ߙଵ + ߙଶ), the autoregressive effect of 
returns (ߚଵ) and the unconditional variance (ℎ଴). The results are taken from the GARCH models testing market conditions 
both before and after the introduction of ETFs. 
The results can then be investigated and graphed based on market size. There are numerous 
interesting findings from the results. A reduction in persistence indicates a weak form 
increase in market efficiency. We can see that in 9 out of 10 cases, large commodity markets 
showed an increase in persistence between the pre-ETF and post-ETF period, which signifies 
a decrease in market efficiency. Alternatively, this only occurs once in the ten small-sized 
commodity markets investigated. This indicates that smaller commodity markets receive 
efficiency benefits after ETF investment. Larger commodity markets, though the ETF 
investment may not be proportionately as large in terms of total capitalisation levels, may in 
fact be losing efficiency based on a large influx of day traders and speculators, who are 
widely reported to be using ETFs as their investment tool of choice. There appears to be 
some threshold between large and small exchanges where ETF investment actually becomes 
counter-productive. From figure 3.2 below this is found to be in futures markets with a 
notional value of below $4.5 billion. This is based on regressions including both large and 
small commodity markets. Markets below this size threshold appear to benefit from increased 
liquidity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Persistence
 Autoregressive Effect Unconditional Variance 
Exchange Pre-ETF Post-ETF Pre-ETF Post-ETF Pre-ETF Post-ETF 
Silver (L) 0.990177 0.9776873 -0.1056 -0.0411 0.009823 0.022313 
Gold (H) 0.920763 0.9984716 -0.1017 -0.0861 0.079237 0.0015284 
Aluminium (L) 0.979963 0.9708763 -0.0444 -0.0544 0.020037 0.0291237 
Brent Crude (H) 0.950943 0.9880818 -0.01873 -0.000845 0.0490567 0.01119182 
Coffee (L) 0.8945685 0.9678022 -0.046149 -0.147227 0.1054315 0.0321978 
Copper (L) 0.9967066 0.9795159 -0.0247 -0.0121 0.0032934 0.020484 
Corn (H) 0.92132 0.9941834 0.0650166 0.0648505 0.07869 0.000251 
Cotton (L) 0.9844124 0.971771 -0.114247 -0.16584 0.0155869 0.028229 
Feeder Cattle (L) 0.995396 0.9908899 -0.01593 0.009174 0.004604 0.0091101 
Gas. RBOB (H) 0.8892682 0.9813271 0.017513 0.046355 0.1107318 0.0186729 
Lean Hogs (L) 0.9774973 0.9608197 -0.00636 0.063707 0.0225027 0.0391803 
Live Cattle (H) 0.9953964 0.9908899 -0.015193 0.009174 0.004604 0.0091101 
Natural Gas (H) 0.9062887 0.9952412 -0.142345 -0.041229 0.0937113 0.0047588 
Palladium (L) 0.9939881 0.8099065 0.4447 0.0623 0.0060119 0.3900935 
Platinum (L) 0.9924869 0.8632647 0.0190 -0.0301 0.0075131 0.136735 
Soybeans (H) 0.9894918 0.9921701 -0.040481 0.020001 0.0105082 0.0078299 
Sugar (H) 0.9102393 0.9942388 -0.001532 -0.0107760 0.0897607 0.0057612 
Wheat (H) 0.9752514 0.990316 -0.001993 -0.042166 0.0231435 0.009684 
WTI (H) 0.9568565 0.9884695 -0.015908 -0.001428 0.0005748 0.0115305 
Zinc (L) 0.999879 0.9873626 -0.0212 0.0081 0.0007121 0.126374 
69 
 
Figure 3.2: Market size and persistence of volatility changes pre and post ETF introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Figure 3.2 represents the change in the level of persistence in the period prior and post-ETF introduction. We can 
clearly see a positive relationship (correlation of +0.51). This indicates that larger commodity markets are subject to 
increased persistence of volatility after the introduction of ETF investment. Alternatively, smaller markets under a value of 
$4.5 billion approx. are subject to decreased persistence. The continued persistence in high capitalisation commodity 
markets may in fact be associated with the mass ownership of a large proportion of the market by one singular fund. This has 
been referenced as a problem by the CTFC since 2007. 
The next feature investigated was the differences in the autoregressive effects between the 
pre and post-ETF periods. A decrease in ߚଵ post ETF GARCH analysis indicates a decrease 
in the autoregressive effect in returns, thus indicating a weak form improvement in market 
efficiency. In seven of the ten large market cases there was an increase in the autoregressive 
effect. This metric indicates a decrease in market efficiency after the introduction of ETFs. 
On the other hand, only five of the ten small commodity exchanges showed an increase in	ߚଵ. 
The results are difficult to compare, but it appears that smaller commodity exchanges 
benefitted more from the introduction of ETFs. Figure 3.3 shows a positive relationship 
between market size and the autoregressive effect of returns when modelled on all sizes of 
commodity markets. On average, markets under $3 billion in size show increased efficiency 
under this metric. 
The final structural estimate is based on the unconditional variance. We know that when the 
sum of the ߙଵ + ߙଶ coefficient is less than one, the model has finite conditional variance h 
and it can be found by setting ܧ[ߝ௧ିଵଶ ] = ℎ௧ = ℎ௧ିଵ = ℎ଴. Then solving for ℎ଴we can solve: 
ℎ଴ = ఈబଵିఈభିఈమ.  In two of the ten large commodity markets investigated we can see an 
increase in conditional variance. Alternatively, in seven of the ten small commodity markets 
investigated we find an increase in the same metric. Thus, unconditional variance in small 
commodity markets increased more than that of their larger counter-parts. The results are 
found in figure 3.4. 
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Figure 3.3: Market size and autoregressive effect of volatility changes pre and post ETF introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The autoregressive effect of returns operates under the premise that past values will have an effect on current values. 
From figure 3.3, we can see a positive relationship (+0.16) between market size and the chance in the autoregressive effect 
where larger markets have shown more of an increase. Markets below approximately $3 billion in size show a decrease in 
the effect, thus a weak-form improvement in efficiency. This can be linked with the increased liquidity levels found in these 
markets after the introduction of ETFs. Alternatively, larger commodity markets have been associated with increased 
likelihood that current returns have an influence on near term future returns. 
 
Figure 3.4: Market size and unconditional variance changes pre and post ETF introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Unconditional variance quantifies uncertainty about the future observation given everything we have seen so far. This 
is of practical interest when forecasting. From figure 3.4 we can see a negative relationship (-0.48) between market size and 
the change in conditional variance, where commodity markets with a value below $9.5 billion have increased unconditional 
variance indicative of more significant short term uncertainty. Markets above this level have seen a significant increase in 
the same metric indicative of an improvement in liquidity levels from ETF investment.  
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Overall, smaller markets showed an increase in efficiency from the new flow of funds 
originating from ETFs, though the unconditional variance of these same markets increases 
significantly. Larger markets showed a reduction in efficiency but lower unconditional 
variance in returns. This may have stemmed from the increased flow of noise traders that 
entered the market from the new cheap and efficient trading platforms that ETFs provided. 
These findings support the CFTC’s views that large funds are having a dominant effect in 
large commodity markets. Alternatively, smaller markets appear to have benefitted from 
increased liquidity but the negative effects of numerous traders quickly entering and exiting 
positions through ETFs may be increasing volatility through the rebalancing process, thus 
contributing to increased variance. 
 
3.4.3. A four moment analysis of commodity volatility after ETF introduction 
A four moment analysis shows some interesting dynamic shifts in commodity markets from 
the pre-ETF to post-ETF period. The four moments (mean, variance, skewness and excess 
kurtosis) are compared from the pre-ETF and post-ETF period, with the nominal changes 
between the two periods compared with market size to investigate structural difference. We 
then graph the statistics based on the market size of each market to investigate any stylized 
facts available. The results are found in table 3.6. 
Table 3.6: Four moment analysis statistics of the commodity markets investigated 
 Mean Variance Skewness Excess kurtosis 
Exchange Pre-ETF Post-ETF Pre-ETF Post-ETF Pre-ETF Post-ETF Pre-ETF Post-ETF 
Silver (L) -0.0398 -0.0171 0.02411 0.0575 2.4222 1.3743 31.8167 8.6518 
Gold (H) -0.02918 -0.05159 0.00086 0.01975 -0.3577 0.2799 4.77093 4.74098 
Aluminium (L) 0.00249 -0.0322 0.01157 0.03335 -0.6296 -0.2696 5.11555 0.87743 
Brent Crude (H) 0.02980 -0.019676 0.05742 0.076706 -0.79337 -0.10643 4.13313 4.40347 
Coffee (L) -0.00559 -0.000329 0.052246 0.028955 -0.29745 -0.67321 7.14169 3.08034 
Copper (L) 0.034982 -0.071266 0.015964 0.056554 -0.45394 -0.18619 5.59671 1.77962 
Corn (H) -0.04182 0.030754 0.050204 0.051612 -0.39569 -1.00086 3.55113 7.24138 
Cotton (L) -0.01538 -0.35105 0.048804 0.025701 -0.92530 -2.56830 25.8978 91.89338 
Feeder Cattle (L) 0.011068 0.014439 0.005229 0.005762 -0.98981 -0.53229 11.66357 2.500751 
Gas. RBOB (H) 0.059000 -0.01984 0.090541 0.083133 -0.44183 -0.14649 7.331363 2.447162 
Lean Hogs (L) 0.034385 0.000462 0.013738 0.016915 -0.47490 -0.18077 3.296428 2.094797 
Live Cattle (H) 0.011068 0.014439 0.005229 0.005762 -0.98981 -0.53229 11.66357 2.500751 
Natural Gas (H) 0.121986 -0.07963 0.011395 0.017578 0.001662 -0.075787 1.69740 1.46162 
Palladium (L) -0.02721 0.13361 0.05076 0.04952 -0.58186 -1.04613 5.03719 2.81861 
Platinum (L) 0.03591 0.02279 0.02454 0.01466 -0.66818 -1.09715 5.69051 3.80930 
Soybeans (H) 0.005909 0.004571 0.024512 0.038119 -0.75043 -0.48793 14.81891 2.074308 
Sugar (H) 0.012381 -0.001753 0.038932 0.054443 -0.28978 -0.35269 1.481547 1.404812 
Wheat (H) 0.025998 -0.043919 0.033976 0.085467 0.295041 -0.34354 2.086856 2.386291 
WTI (H) 0.031509 -0.02195 0.056799 0.076335 -0.78746 -0.105517 4.116368 4.466692 
Zinc (L) -0.012238 -0.053751 0.014669 0.063684 -0.402122 -0.189758 3.762914 1.218715 
 
Note: Table 3.6 above reports the findings of the four moment analysis comparing volatility dynamics in the period prior and 
post-ETF introduction. The reported coefficients are based on the average introduction, across all ETFs introduced, by 
commodity market investigated.  
It is also possible to investigate the four moment reactions of commodity markets in the 
period before and after the introduction of the ETFs investigated in this chapter. This can be 
found in table 3.7. We can clearly see that there are small differences present between some 
observations given the close proximity of inception dates in some cases. There are also 
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inception dates associated with multiple fund introductions in the same commodity markets. 
These funds are simply joined together for a more simple representation.   
Table 3.7: Four moment analysis statistics before and after specific ETF introduction 
 Mean Variance Skewness Excess kurtosis 
ETF Inception 
date 
Commodity Pre-
ETF 
Post-
ETF 
Pre-
ETF 
Post-
ETF 
Pre-
ETF 
Post-
ETF 
Pre-
ETF 
Post-
ETF 
JO 25/6/2008 Coffee 0.00033 0.00038 0.00058 0.00028 -0.0042 -0.1050 9.6581 1.7459 
JJC 23/10/2007 Copper 0.00080 0.00029 0.00023 0.00049 0.0145 0.0140 5.4745 2.4306 
GLD 18/11/2004 Gold  0.00038 0.00074 0.00007 0.00017 0.4432 -0.3111 6.7789 3.3878 
IAU 28/1/2005 Gold 0.00032 0.00079 0.00007 0.00017 0.3630 -0.3056 6.7492 3.3285 
DBP, DGL 5/1/2007 Gold 0.00045 0.00079 0.00009 0.00018 -0.068 -0.2423 4.9806 3.4318 
DGP, DZZ, DGZ 28/2/2008 Gold 0.00061 0.00056 0.00009 0.00021 -0.1277 -0.1897 4.3834 3.2162 
UCI 1/4/2008 Gold 0.00059 0.00061 0.00010 0.00020 -0.2194 -0.1363 4.7305 3.1355 
UGL,GLL 3/12/2008 Gold 0.00049 0.00088 0.00013 0.00016 -0.2022 -0.1432 5.3352 3.0437 
SGOL 9/9/2009 Gold 0.00056 0.00074 0.00013 0.00013 -0.034 -0.7111 5.0942 2.5674 
UNG 18/4/2007 Natural gas 0.00168 -0.0002 0.00214 0.00153 0.6658 1.44895 5.5630 13.598 
GAZ 23/10/2007 Natural gas 0.00155 -0.00015 0.00209 0.00156 0.6615 1.53824 5.5450 14.478 
UNL 18/11/2009 Natural gas 0.00119 -0.00014 0.00209 0.00107 0.7850 2.03437 6.6612 19.019 
PALL 8/1/2010 Palladium 0.00025 0.000895 0.00054 0.00052 0.1089 -0.38907 5.9703 1.7866 
PTM 9/5/2008 Platinum 0.00081 -0.0002 0.00021 0.00030 -0.7199 -0.6007 13.467 3.4131 
PGM 25/6/2008 Platinum 0.00077 -0.00016 0.00021 0.00035 -0.7403 -0.6167 13.644 3.5061 
PPLT 8/1/2010 Platinum 0.00061 0.00002 0.00026 0.00016 -0.6991 -0.6115 9.0625 2.0287 
SLV 28/4/2006 Silver 0.00065 0.00091 0.00024 0.00072 -0.7596 -0.0569 10.075 6.9315 
DBS 5/1/2007 Silver 0.00064 0.00097 0.00029 0.00072 -0.7229 0.00468 8.5728 7.5886 
AGQ, ZSL 3/12/2008 Silver 0.00044 0.00165 0.00037 0.00075 -0.2941 -0.1161 11.875 6.2868 
SIVR 24/7/2009 Silver 0.00058 0.00144 0.00038 0.00078 -0.2270 -0.1484 10.211 7.1381 
USO 10/4/2006 WTI oil 0.00089 0.00057 0.00061 0.00067 -0.4029 0.3234 2.9562 5.6698 
OIL 15/8/2006 WTI oil 0.00089 0.00053 0.00059 0.00069 -0.3977 0.3289 3.0073 5.5731 
DBO 5/1/2007 WTI oil 0.00072 0.00075 0.00057 0.00072 -0.3839 0.3240 3.0070 5.4717 
USL 6/12/2007 WTI oil 0.00087 0.00049 0.00055 0.00076 -0.3705 0.3469 3.0164 5.1853 
UCO 25/1/2008 WTI oil 0.00087 0.00047 0.00054 0.00081 -0.3625 0.3438 3.0111 5.1261 
DTO 17/6/2008 WTI oil 0.00102 0.00005 0.00054 0.00084 -0.3395 0.3612 2.9549 5.1484 
SCO 25/11/2008 WTI oil 0.00059 0.00109 0.00060 0.00072 -0.2181 0.3701 3.8671 5.3147 
DNO 24/9/2009 WTI oil 0.00074 0.00069 0.00071 0.00037 -0.0246 0.0307 4.1975 2.5109 
 
Note: Table 3.7 above reports the findings of the four moment analysis comparing volatility dynamics in the period prior and 
post-ETF introduction. The reported coefficients are based on the ETFs introduced and the specific commodity market the 
ETF entered. In the case of ETFs with multiple underlying securities, only investments above 40% of the underlying asset 
base of the investigated ETF are included. In some cases, ETFs had the same inception date in the same commodity market, 
therefore, they are combined together to shorten the analysis. 
From figures 3.5 and 3.6, we find that mean volatility is negative after the introduction of 
ETFs and the variance is positive. Smaller markets are associated with smaller means and 
variance of volatility in the same returns indicating reduced effects from ETF investment on 
volatility and market efficiency. The same cannot be said for larger markets, which show 
significantly larger effects in the same metrics. The skewness and excess kurtosis of the same 
markets also show significant differences in the pre and post-ETF periods and are modelled 
in figures 3.7 and 3.8. The results indicate that markets below $12.2 billion in size show 
negative skewness after ETF introduction and below $33.1 billion show negative excess 
kurtosis. Therefore, only the smallest markets appear to be influenced most significantly, but 
it does appear that there is a specific size limit of the commodity markets investigated that 
allows for the efficient absorption of the liquidity flows from these new ETFs. The flight to 
safety in oil and gold markets have significantly contributed to these findings and ETFs were 
a prime platform for all market participants to quickly enter and exit their positions leading to 
73 
 
higher positive values in the skewness and kurtosis of returns. These findings further support 
the view that larger commodity markets have been subjected to increased speculation and 
decreased efficiency since the inception of ETFs.  
Figure 3.5: Market size and mean volatility pre and post ETF introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Though negatively correlated (-0.23), mean volatility as a whole decreased throughout all sized commodity markets in 
the period after ETF introduction. The negative correlation indicates that larger markets are associated with volatility 
decreases than smaller markets after ETF introduction (as measured by the change between the period before and after 
ETFs), again adding more weight to the argument that ETFs may have had more impact stabilising these markets through 
added liquidity.   
 
Figure 3.6: Market size and the variance of return volatility pre and post ETF introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Volatility appears to have increased in the period after ETF introduction across all sized markets, though the positive 
correlation (+0.21) indicates that larger markets experienced more. This indicates that there were more drastic swings in 
intraday volatility in daily large market volatility, though combining this with figure 3.6 shows that on average, the mean of 
this level of return was larger than smaller markets.  
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Figure 3.7: Market size and the skewness of return volatility pre and post ETF introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: There is a slight positive correlation (+0.13) between the change in skewness and commodity market size. From figure 
3.7, we can see that there is more negative skewness associated with smaller markets and higher skewness with larger 
markets. In this case smaller markets are more likely to have negative returns and larger markets have positive returns after 
the introduction of ETFs. The breakeven point in the analysis is approximately markets over $12.2 billion.  
 
Figure 3.8: Market size and the excess kurtosis of return volatility pre and post ETF introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The change in kurtosis of larger markets is also found to increase significantly for those futures markets over 
approximately over $3.1 billion in value. The probability of periods of drastic volatility changes therefore decreases 
significantly in these markets offering evidence towards the view that ETFs stabilised larger markets. Alternatively, smaller 
markets are associated with an increased probability of spurious returns after the initiation of ETF investment, thus offering 
evidence against their investment capabilities in these products.  
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3.5. Conclusions 
Exchange traded funds (ETFs) have grown in recent years to become one of the most 
commonly used investment techniques across international financial markets. The 
diversification, leverage and ease of use have attracted numerous international investors. This 
chapter investigates whether commodity ETFs amplified or influenced volatility in the period 
after their introduction. 
The main findings in this chapter indicate large differences in volatility between large and 
small commodity markets in the period after ETF introduction. Larger ETF investments are 
found to be associated with increased EGARCH volatility. This supports numerous 
regulatory views (CFTC among others) that some ETFs are having dominant effects on the 
markets in which they invest. Smaller commodity markets are found to have increased 
efficiency as measured by weak-form metrics such as persistence and the autoregressive 
effect. This finding supports the view that liquidity benefits appear to be present in markets 
below $4 to $5 billion in size. One downside is the accompanying increase in unconditional 
variance which stems from the increased transaction numbers from the rebalancing process of 
these ETFs. The four moment analysis supports the view that larger markets as a whole 
appear to have decreased in efficiency and increased in risk stemming from the large-scale 
inflow of noise traders. The dummy variable used in the EGARCH model appears 
significantly positive at 55% of the ETF introduction scenarios investigated in this paper. 
28% of the ETFs investigated show significantly negative EGARCH volatility whereas 17% 
of the results were insignificant. Overall, it appears that ETFs have made commodity markets 
more efficient through new trading counterparties, but they are also associated with more 
EGARCH volatility. The potential negative market-dominating impacts associated with ETFs 
and their re-balancing processes cannot be rejected. 
These findings support calls for more intense regulation of the ETF industry and more 
investigation into the investment practices and rebalancing processes of the funds in question. 
The need for regulation of investment size and the imposition of market ownership caps 
cannot be rejected.    
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Chapter 4: Financial market liquidity and its association with episodes of financial 
stress 
 
 
Abstract: Understanding the structural changes in liquidity in Europe is important for 
macroprudential risk assessment, as sudden changes in conditions may be indicative of 
current stress and a signal of future stress. This chapter presents a European-specific 
liquidity measure used by several central banks, with some modifications. The measure is 
constructed by combining numerous facets of liquidity and depth measurement across several 
asset markets. It attempts to incorporate aspects such as market tightness, depth and 
resiliency. The flows and the direction of causality of liquidity can also be inferred using 
vector autoregression, Granger causality and impulse response functions. The time series of 
the liquidity measure over the period 1999-2011 is analysed. It is found that liquidity has 
moved out of traditionally ‘safer’ assets into those of higher-risk due to large volatility 
changes across numerous international exchanges such as sovereign bonds and commodities, 
particularly during the period between 2008 to 2010.  
 
4.1. Introduction 
The creation of the Eurozone in 1999 marked an historic event in monetary history as 
fourteen diverse nations joined together to create a single currency. This chapter investigates 
liquidity in the Eurozone since its establishment and the informational components present in 
its construction, which may be indicative of current stress and signals of future stress. Using a 
model of financial market liquidity measurement in this chapter, it is possible to investigate 
the stylised facts associated with investor behaviour during periods of growth, relative 
stability and crisis.  
Market liquidity is defined as the ease with which an asset can be traded. By further 
investigating this, it may be possible to trace investor flows between assets, as liquidity shifts 
between asset classes based on the trading activity and perceptions of the international 
financial markets. The basic model used in this chapter was developed by the Bank of 
England and was further developed by the European Central Bank. This chapter develops the 
model still further through the addition of commodity market liquidity flows to take account 
of ‘flights to safety’ that occur during periods of crisis in equity and currency markets. The 
indicator can be used to investigate the mass movements of investors during the events of the 
twelve year period since the euro’s inception and to test the behaviour of participants in the 
selected markets. Numerous changes in market structure such as disintegration of trading 
barriers, the reduction of trading costs and the introduction of derivatives have created a new 
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investment environment in Europe. Understanding this behaviour is a key to offering pre-
emptive information regarding oncoming stresses and pressures in European markets.  
Investors choose to move or divide their assets among asset classes based on their risk 
preferences. Investigating the cause and effect dynamics between these markets using vector 
autoregression64 (VAR) offers an insightful picture of the mass movements of investors in 
European markets while simultaneously measuring the risk seeking and avoiding behaviour 
of these investors in differing market situations. Movements between asset classes based on 
the risk perceptions of investors can also be traced using Granger causality65 and impulse 
response function66 (IRF) analysis. 
Section 4.2 reviews a few papers with particular relevance to this chapter. In section 4.3, the 
methodology behind the creation of this version of the European financial market liquidity 
indicator is developed and extended. It includes an indicator based on commodity markets to 
measure ‘flights to safety’ that are found to occur in periods of equity market stress. A 
detailed analysis of the models used to test the dynamics of the integration between the 
variables in the liquidity indicator is also presented in section 4.3. Section 4.4 presents the 
results of the liquidity investigation during the period 1999-2010 and compares the indicator 
developed in this chapter to other metrics of financial stress. The results of the Granger 
analysis, VAR and IRF analysis are also presented while section 4.5 offers the main 
conclusions of the chapter. 
In comparison to European Credit Default Swaps and EBA67 banks’ probabilities of default 
(PD), the indicator is found to compare well, with distinct periods of banking crises occurring 
in tangent with periods of large liquidity falls. It is however overshadowed by data issues, 
such as the lack of information available on bond markets. The correlations of returns 
between the differing channels of investment-methods in Europe are found to have changed 
significantly since the emergence of international crisis. A combination of Granger causality, 
vector autoregression and impulse response functions uncovered strong reactions among 
particular channels of the liquidity indicator. A large movement out of equities and into 
currencies is evident in the period between 2006 and 2010 as investors became sceptical 
about the health of numerous international financial companies.  
                                                             
64 Vector autoregression (VAR) is an econometric model used to capture the evolution and the interdependencies between 
multiple time series, generalizing the univariate AR models. All the variables in a VAR are treated symmetrically by 
including for each variable an equation explaining its evolution based on its own lags and the lags of all the other variables 
in the model. Based on this feature, Christopher Sims advocates the use of VAR models as a theory-free method to estimate 
economic relationships, thus being an alternative to the "incredible identification restrictions" in structural models. 
65 The Granger causality test is a statistical hypothesis test for determining whether one time series is useful in forecasting 
another. Ordinarily, regressions reflect "mere" correlations, but Clive Granger, who won a Nobel Prize in Economics, argued 
that there is an interpretation of a set of tests as revealing something about causality. A time series X is said to Granger-cause 
Y if it can be shown, usually through a series of t-tests and F-tests on lagged values of X (and with lagged values of Y also 
included), that those X values provide statistically significant information about future values of Y. 
66 In signal processing, the impulse response, or impulse response function (IRF), of a dynamic system is its output when 
presented with a brief input signal, called an impulse. More generally, an impulse response refers to the reaction of any 
dynamic system in response to some external change. 
67 The European Banking Authority (EBA) was established by Regulation (EC) No. 1093/2010 of the European Parliament 
and the Council of 24th November 2010. The EBA officially came into being as of the 1st of January 2011 and has taken over 
all the existing and ongoing tasks and responsibilities of the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS). It 
specifically acts as a hub and spoke network of EU and national bodies safeguarding public values such as the stability of the 
financial system, the transparency of markets and financial products and the protection of depositors and investors. 
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4.2. Previous literature 
A liquid asset can be sold rapidly with minimal loss of value at any time. The essential 
characteristic of a liquid market is that there are ready and willing buyers and sellers at all 
times. A market may be considered deeply liquid if there are ready and willing buyers and 
sellers in large quantities. This is related to the concept of market depth that can be measured 
as the number of units that can be sold or bought for a given price impact. A related concept 
is that of market breadth measured as the price impact per unit of liquidity as measured by the 
return to volume ratio. An illiquid asset is an asset which is not readily saleable due to 
uncertainty about its value or the lack of depth in the market in which it is regularly traded.  
Amihud et al. (2005) believe that liquidity can play a role in resolving a number of asset 
pricing puzzles such as the small-firm effect, the equity premium puzzle and the risk free rate 
puzzle. Lo et al. (2004) find that the liquidity premium can be large when the investors have 
high-frequency trading needs. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) relate variations in liquidity 
over time and cross-sectionally to market makers’ capital constraints. Duffie et al. (2003) link 
volatility to liquidity and thus to prices. Weill (2002) and Vayanos and Wang (2002) extend 
the model of Duffie, Garleanu and Pedersen to the case of multiple illiquid securities and 
show, among other things, that search frictions lead to cross-sectional differences in the 
liquidity premium. Amihud (2002) examines the effect of illiquidity on the selected cross-
section of stock returns using an illiquidity measure that is related to the Kyle (1985) price 
impact model. The results show that illiquidity has a positive and significant effect on stock 
returns. 
  
If liquidity affects asset prices, it stands to reason that changes in liquidity should change 
asset prices, which is examined by Amihud et al. (1991). The authors suggest that the stock 
market crash of October 19, 1987 can be partly explained by a decline in investors’ 
perception of the market’s liquidity. They regress cross-sectionally the risk-adjusted returns 
of NYSE stocks that are included in the S&P 500 index on October 19, 1987 on the change in 
liquidity during that day, measured by the average daily bid–ask spread or by depth68. The 
results show that stocks that suffered the greatest decline in liquidity on that day also suffered 
the greatest decline in prices. Further, stocks whose liquidity recovered more by the end of 
the month also enjoyed a greater recovery in price. Amihud et al. (1997) find that their 
trading volume increased significantly relative to the market and their liquidity ratio69 
declined. Consequently, the prices of the equities increased by at least 5% to 6% and 
                                                             
68 The bid–ask spread for securities (such as stocks, futures contracts, options, or currency pairs) is the difference between 
the prices quoted (either by a single market maker or in a limit order book) for an immediate sale (ask) and an immediate 
purchase (bid). The size of the bid-offer spread in a security is one measure of the liquidity of the market and of the size of 
the transaction cost. Market depth is the size of an order needed to move the market by a given amount. If the market is deep, 
a large order is needed to change the price. Market depth closely relates to the notion of liquidity, the ease to find a trading 
partner for a given order: a deep market is also a liquid market. 
69 The reserve requirement is a central bank regulation that sets the minimum reserves each commercial bank must hold of 
customer deposits and notes. It is normally in the form of cash stored physically in a bank vault or deposits made with a 
central bank. The reserve ratio is sometimes used as a tool in the monetary policy, influencing the country's borrowing and 
interest rates by changing the amount of loans available. Western central banks rarely alter the reserve requirements because 
it would cause immediate liquidity problems for banks with low excess reserves; they generally prefer to use open market 
operations to implement their monetary policy.  
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remained high. Similar results are obtained by Muscarella and Piwowar (2001) for the Paris 
Bourse’s transfer of stocks from a call to a continuous market, and by Kalay et al. (2002) for 
a later improvement in the trading system at the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. In a cross-section 
analysis, Berkman and Eleswarapu (1998) found that the decline in prices of Badla stocks 
was significantly associated with the decline in their liquidity. Hedge and McDermott (2003) 
document increases in the liquidity of stocks that are added to the S&P 500 index, with 
liquidity being measured in a number of ways including the bid–ask spread (quoted and 
effective), volume, and trading frequency. The authors find that the price increase of added 
stocks is positively and significantly associated with the improvement in liquidity. Angel et 
al. (2005) examine stocks that are involuntarily delisted from the Nasdaq Stock Market and 
are subsequently traded in the OTC Bulletin Board and in the Pink Sheets. They find a large 
and significant deterioration in liquidity, measured by trading volume, number of quotes per 
day and the bid–ask spread and a large and significant price decline of about 18% around the 
delisting day.   
 
Bessembinder and Seguin (1993) investigated the link between volatility, volume and market 
depth, using data from the futures market. They found that when volume is broken into 
anticipated and unanticipated components, the unanticipated volume shock has a larger effect 
on price volatility. Gervais, Kaniel and Mingelgrin (1998) investigated the ‘high volatility 
return premium’. The main finding in this paper is that stocks experiencing unusually high 
(low) trading volume over a period of one day to a week tend to appreciate (depreciate) over 
the course of the following months. Bollerslev and Jubinski (1999) focused also on equity 
trading volume and volatility, focusing particularly on latent information arrivals and 
common long-run dependencies. The authors found that shocks to both volume and volatility 
processes are persistent and that the same shocks evenly dissipate at the same hyperbolic rate 
of decay. Wu and Guo (2004) investigated the link between asset price volatility and trading 
volume and show a positive relationship between trading volume and the direction of price 
changes. Kaproff (1987) showed that there is a positive relationship between trading volume 
and the direction of price changes, similar to a positive relationship between volume and the 
magnitude of price changes. Brailsford (1996) found the relationship between stock volatility 
in Australia and trading volume to be significantly positive irrespective of the direction of the 
price change. Chan and Fong (1999) using data from the NYSE and NASDAQ confirmed the 
significance of the theory that the size of trades influences the volume-volatility relationship 
more than that of the number of trades. The authors also find that the order imbalance has 
explanatory power in the relationship. Galati (2000) investigated volume, volatility and 
spreads in foreign exchange markets to find that unexpected volume and volatility are 
positively related.  
 
 
 
 
80 
 
4.3. Data, methodology and structure of the models 
The financial market liquidity indicator was first developed by the Bank of England for its 
financial stability review70 and was further developed by the European Central Bank71. The 
main liquidity measures consist of the bid-ask spreads, the return to volume ratio and 
numerous measures of liquidity premia72. To replicate this measure, this chapter includes the 
individual measures included in table 4.1.  
The ECB and BOE produce a liquidity indicator specifically based on equity, bond, currency 
and interest rate markets. The indicator developed here adds the bid-ask spread across an 
average of eight commodity markets in an attempt to measure ‘flights to safety’ out of 
alternative assets. This composite measure is designed to capture the key elements and 
patterns in financial market liquidity. It is constructed by combining information across 
several markets – covering foreign exchange, fixed income, equities, commodities and credit 
across three dimensions of liquidity including tightness, depth and resiliency, as well as 
estimates of liquidity premia. These elements are defined as: 
a) Tightness is the magnitude of the risk premiums required by market makers for 
holding inventories of securities and is usually gauged by the width of the bid-ask 
spreads 
b) Depth and resiliency are the degree to which trading affects asset prices which can be 
gauged using ratios of price movements to transactions in the relative markets 
c) Liquidity risk premia are the compensation required by investors for the risk present 
when they attempt to exit their positions. It can be measured using various spreads 
between securities which are known to have varying degrees of liquidity. 
 
Table 4.1: Liquidity measure components included in the creation of this indicator 
Bid-ask spreads - Exchange Rates (EUR/USD, EUR/JPY, EUR/GBP) 
- Eurostoxx 50 (The average spread of the individual exchange components) 
- EONIA 1 month and 3 month swap rates 
Return to volume 
ratio 
- Equity market return to volume ratio 
- The Euro bonds market return to volume ratio 
- The equity options market (S&P 500 options used as a proxy)   
Liquidity premia - Spreads on euro area high yield bonds 
- Euro area spreads between interbank deposit and repo interest rates 
Commodities - Bid-ask spreads averaged on the markets for WTI oil, crude oil, gold, silver, 
copper, platinum, aluminium and palladium 
Note: The above variables combined together as an unweighted average represent the European financial market liquidity 
indicator. The data used to attain this indicator was extracted from Bloomberg and Thompson Reuters DataStream. 
 
                                                             
70 Bank of England Financial Stability Review, April 2007, Box 2, Page 18 
71 European Central Bank Financial Stability Review, June 2007, Box 9, Page 81 
72 The liquidity premium is a term used to explain a difference between two types of financial securities that have all the 
same qualities except liquidity. 
81 
 
The indicator initially used by the ECB and BOE simply uses the un-weighted average of 
these individual indicators. Some caveats apply. The first is the availability of data. Some 
data used previously in the indicators are publicly unavailable at the time of writing this 
chapter. Some proxies have to be used as estimators of the original dataset. The data need to 
be standardised to take into account differing trends across the time period investigated and 
also to deal with the problem of the averaging of different nominal values throughout the 
indicator.  
According to the European Central Bank, there are numerous factors that have increased 
financial market liquidity. One factor, supported by ECB research is that the growth in 
monetary aggregates exceeding that of  nominal economic growth for some time may have 
bid asset prices upwards. Another factor is based on the reserve accumulation of the Asian 
central banks and oil producing countries has raised the number of and the diversity among 
market participants in mature-economy financial markets. There has also been an increase in 
the risk appetite of market agents after the creation of the Eurozone, which appears to have 
been built on the confidence that the union would successfully integrate. Another positive 
influence on liquidity stemmed from the structural changes which have been taking place in 
financial markets. These have included the liberalisation of international capital flows, the 
securitisation of loans and the development of new financial products (for example, credit 
derivatives). Simultaneously, the emergence and growing presence of highly active 
participants such as investment funds and hedge funds in financial markets has provided 
enhanced market liquidity. These developments appear to have affected the greater degree of 
heterogeneity of investors that trade European financial products, as the withdrawal of 
trading barriers, efficiency improvements and increased confidence in European markets has 
attracted new investors from both inside and outside Europe.  
The European financial market liquidity indicator is based on nine individual components 
representing market liquidity. It covers the tightness, depth, resiliency and liquidity risk 
premiums associated with a market. The first investigated component is the bid-ask spread, 
which is associated with the tightness of the market. The spread itself is divided by the 
midpoint of the product’s price to take account of differences in the nominal price of the 
products under investigation. The spread is: 
ܤ݅݀ − ܽݏ݇	ݏ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀ = ෍ܣݏ݇	ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ − ܤ݅݀	ܲݎ݅ܿ݁
ܯ݅݀݌݋݅݊ݐ
ேୀ௡
௜
	 
The total bid-ask indicator (BAI) for the three different individual elements included in the 
indicator can be calculated as: 
																																ܤܣܫ = 	෍ ܣ௖௜ − ܤ஼௜
ܣ௖௜
ேୀଷ
௜
+ 	 ෍ ܣாௌ்௑ହ଴௜ − ܤாௌ்௑ହ଴௜
ܣாௌ்௑ହ଴௜
ேୀହ଴
௜
+ 	
⎝
⎛
ܣாைேூ஺(ଵ௠௧௛)௜ −	ܤாைேூ஺(ଵ௠௧௛)௜
ܯாைேூ஺(ଵ௠௧௛)௜ + ܣாைேூ஺(ଷ௠௧௛)௜ −	ܤாைேூ஺(ଷ௠௧௛)௜ܯாைேூ஺(ଷ௠௧௛)௜2
⎠
⎞ 
where A represents the ask price, B is the bid price and M is the midpoint price at time t. C is 
the average of the currency markets investigated which are the markets for Euro-Dollar, 
Euro-Sterling and Euro-Yen cross currency values.. The middle term above is the average 
bid-ask spreads for all elements of the Eurostoxx 50, while finally we look at the average bid-
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ask spread of the 1 and 3 month EONIA swap rates. The average of the bid-ask spreads on 
the Eurostoxx 50 represents European equity market tightness, while the inclusion of bid-ask 
spreads on the EONIA 1 and 3 month swap rates focus on the tightness of European interest 
rate markets.  
The second component is based on the depth and resiliency of the market and focuses on the 
return to volume ratios for the Eurostoxx 50 as a measure of European equities, the European 
bond markets and the equity options market. Though some markets do not have an active 
options market, the implied volatility of the exchanges serves as a good proxy. It is defined 
as:  
     ܫܮܮܫܳ୕ = หୖ౟౯ౚห୚୓୐ୈ౟౯ౚ 
where หR୧୷ୢห is the return on stock i on day d of year y and VOLD୧୷ୢ is the respective daily 
volume after being converted from US dollars ($) to euros (€). The ratio gives the absolute 
percentage price change per euro of daily trading volume, or the daily price impact of order 
flow. The return to volume ratio (RtoV) in this indicator can be defined as the combination of 
the listed factors above: 
ܴ	ݐ݋	ܸ = ൮෍ ܴ௧ିଵ − ܴ௧ܴ௧ିଵ
ܸ݋݈ݑ݉݁ாௌ்௑ହ଴௜
	
ேୀହ଴
௜
൲+ 	൮෍ ܴ௧ିଵ −ܴ௧ܴ௧ିଵ
ܸ݋݈ݑ݉݁஽௘௨௧௦௖௛௘	஻௢௘௥௦௘௜
ேୀଶ
௜
൲+ ൬ ߪாௌ்௑ହ଴௜ − ߪ௏ூ௑௜log	(ܸ݋݈ݑ݉݁ாௌ்௑ହ଴௜)൰ 
where R is the return at time t and time t-1, and ߪ the implied volatility of both the Eurostoxx 
50 and the VIX73 in the United States. The VIX is subtracted to give an estimate of European 
specific implied volatility. ܸ݋݈ݑ݉݁ாௌ்௑ହ଴ is representative of the volumes traded on the 
Eurostoxx and ܸ݋݈ݑ݉݁஽௘௨௧௦௖௛௘	஻௢௘௥௦௘ is used as a proxy for bond data as traded on the 
Deutsche Boerse. In situations where liquidity flows outwards, the market is deemed to lose 
efficiency – which is measured as a reduction of the individual components of the indicator. 
Alternatively, when liquidity flows inwards, the market is said to gain efficiency, thus 
measures such as the bid-ask spreads for example, become smaller. Even though the nominal 
value of volumes traded may not be available, a proxy for this figure may be inferred from 
the efficiency of the market as a whole. The liquidity premia (LP) element is based on the 
indicators of the spreads on European high yield bonds and the spreads between the European 
interbank deposit rate and repo interest rates.  Liquidity	Premia	(LP) = (High	yield	Euro. Corp. Bonds− Low	Yield	Euro. Corp. Bonds) +(EURIBOR୲ − EUREPO୲) 
Commodity liquidity is added as an additional liquidity variable in this liquidity indicator 
model. When a crisis disrupts markets such as equity and currency markets, investors have 
traditionally moved to commodity markets as a method of hedging risk. The commodity 
indicator is developed based on the average bid-ask spread of the spot market prices for all 
the commodities listed in table 4.1. Commodity market liquidity is included to indicate a 
                                                             
73 VIX is the ticker symbol for the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index, a popular measure of the 
implied volatility of S&P 500 index options. Often referred to as the fear index or the fear gauge, it represents one measure 
of the market's expectation of stock market volatility over the next 30 day period. The VIX Index was introduced by Prof. 
Robert Whaley in 1993. 
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phenomenon known as a ‘flight to safety’. This occurs when crises and panic occur in 
financial markets, therefore investors tend to invest in commodity markets for shelter from 
this increased risk. In the financial crises since 2007, gold prices increased over 600% and oil 
prices over 500%. This also occurred with a simultaneous large increase in trading volumes 
on both the spot and futures markets for these same products. Commodity markets are also 
viewed as a barometer of equity market stress, thus the inclusion of commodity bid-ask 
spreads add an extra dimension of liquidity measurement not available in other versions of 
liquidity measurement. 
The final indicator is based on the average of these four terms: 
Euro Liquidity Indicator = ቀ(஻஺ூ	ା	ோ௧௢௏	ା	௅௉)
ଽ
ቁ(−1) 		+ 	 ቀ	(஼௢௠௠௢ௗ௜௧௬	௟௜௤௨௜ௗ௜௧௬)
ଽ
ቁ 
The standardisation process is based on the period of 1999 until October 2010 to take account 
of the crisis that has occurred since 2007. The standardisation method consists of subtracting 
the mean (ߤ) from each daily observation to attain the demeaned values and then dividing by 
the standard deviation (ߤ) to obtain: 
ܵݐܽ݊݀ܽݎ݀݅ݏ݁݀	ܦܽݐܽ = 	෍ (ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎ) + 	ߤ௜(ଵଽଽଽିଶ଴ଵ଴)
ߪ௜(ଵଽଽଽିଶ଴ଵ଴)
ேୀଽ
௜
 
To test the informational benefits of the indicator, the flow of funds between the individual 
asset classes used in its preparation must be investigated in-depth. The models selected for 
this analysis are broken down into individual case studies with different structures added 
together to improve the explanatory significance of the models. The investigation begins with 
a correlation investigation between the individual components of the indicator attempting to 
identify the strong co-movements of investors. The next stage is the Granger Causality tests 
which attempt to identify the direction of the flows from one market to the next. Based on 
these flows, we can then use vector autoregression (VAR) techniques to ‘shock’ the markets 
based on the channels discovered. This is used to test some of the hypothetical events that 
may occur in the future based on the data available since January 1999. From this analysis, 
we can test the impact results of the response variables when one other variable in this 
environment is shocked using impulse response functions. Results and predictions are then 
inferred from these standard models. 
In this chapter, the European liquidity indicator is expressed as an un-weighted average of 
eight individual components. The individual investment products include equities, 
commodities, currencies, bonds, options and interest rate markets. The data itself is taken 
from a combination of Bloomberg and Thompson Reuters DataStream. The data used in the 
correlation and Granger Causality tests are annual.  
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4.4. Results 
This section focuses on the aggregation of the individual components to form the final 
aggregate indicator. It then uses vector autoregression and impulse response functions to test 
the movements between the financial markets investigated to uncover any significant 
information. The final section discusses specific benefits that may arise from use of the 
indicator.  
 
4.4.1. The aggregate European financial market liquidity indicator  
The final indicator is an average of these individual components standardised on the 1999-
2007 period as discussed in section 4.3. Alternative weighting systems were also 
investigated, but none outperformed the un-weighted average. The next step was to divide the 
standardised data by the standard deviation to smooth the results. Some of the datasets were 
incomplete in the years after the creation of the euro. From 2002 onwards, the indicator is 
operating with a minimum of six components. Otherwise the indicator is comprised of the 
total number of components available at that particular point in time. A 30 day moving 
average was selected as the most adequate window which is indicated by the blue line in 
figure 4.1.  
Figure 4.1: The European financial market liquidity indicator (1999-2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: This graph is based on the 30 day moving average of the final liquidity indicator. The early stage between 1999 and 
2003 shows extreme volatility based on the evolution of the euro combined with improving market expectations about 
Europe. From 2007-2009 we can see the depth of the recent crises. Though liquidity as a whole has improved since, this may 
be due to shorters74 entering the market to profit from Europe’s period of strife. 
The individual components of the European liquidity indicator are also shown in figures 4.2 
(aggregate bid-ask spread), 4.3 (aggregate return to volume ratio) and 4.4 (aggregate liquidity 
premia measure). The combination of these three sub-indices results in the aggregate measure 
                                                             
74 A ‘shorter’ is a term given to a market agent in possession of a position where he/she gains from a downward movement 
in the assets price 
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of European financial market liquidity. Some striking trends emerge upon comparison. The 
first is the development of the bid-ask and return to volume indicators after the introduction 
of the euro in January 1999. The return to volume measure shows a significant drop in overall 
volatility. The fall in liquidity premia is slightly unexpected in 1999 but is strongly associated 
with the evolution of the technology bubble and the events of September 11, 2001 in the 
United States. Overall, we see an increasing trend in all three measures in the time leading 
into the current international crisis. The scale of the return to volume measure appears to 
dominate the measure in the early stages of Eurozone growth, but this stabilises in early 
2003. The liquidity premia indicator becomes the most dominant element in the recent crises, 
stemming from the incredible fall-off in bond and interest markets created by the current 
uncertainty.  
Figure 4.2: The aggregate bid-ask measure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: This is a combination of indicators 1, 2 and 3 (defined in table 4.1) and is indicative of the average tightness of the 
markets investigated. This is the magnitude of the risk premiums required by the market makers for holding inventories of 
securities. The bid-ask indicator is simply the average of the bid-ask spreads across currency, bond and equity markets. 
Similarly to the individual markets investigated, there is a clear improvement in liquidity after the establishment of the euro, 
but this quickly dissipates as market confidence diminishes after the onset of the current financial crisis. Numerous 
hypotheses have been put forward to explain the increase in greater financial market liquidity and risk taking activity. We 
can see from figure 4.2, that there were drastic improvements and less volatility in the aggregate bid-ask spread from 2003 to 
early 2007. But this efficiency collapsed completely until early 2010 where market confidence appears to have slightly 
improved to early 2004 levels. Investor confidence is directly related to the bid-ask spread. If investors rush en mass to 
purchase financial market products, the bid-ask spread falls due to increased liquidity.  
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Figure 4.3: The aggregate return to volume ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The aggregate return to volume measure is a combination of indicator components 4, 5 and 6 (defined in table 4.1) and 
is indicative of the average depth and resiliency of the markets included. This is the degree to which trading impacts on asset 
prices. The aggregate return to volume measures the depth and resiliency of European financial markets as a whole. 
Unfortunately, the aggregate measure comprises of three individual measures that begin at three different periods since the 
origination of the euro. The measure does not become an average of all three measures until January 2006. We can clearly 
see the large dispersion in the results up to early 2003 as the measure is based solely on the equity return to turnover ratio up 
to this point. One point that the aggregate measure picks up is the increase in the return to turnover ratio from 2007 onwards. 
This indicates that the prices of components in the measure are reacting substantially to the changes in the volumes traded.  
Figure 4.4: The aggregate liquidity premia measure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The aggregate liquidity premia measure us a combination of indicator components 7 and 8 (defined in table 4.1) and is 
indicative of the average liquidity risk premiums required by the markets. This is the compensation required by investors as 
they attempt to exit their chosen positions which is affected by uncertain market conditions. From figure 4.4, we find the 
trends with the liquidity premia indicator. Being strongly associated with the normally liquid and efficient interest rate 
markets, a significant downward shift in liquidity is highly indicative of very high sovereign risk. The depth of the crisis is 
deemed to be most severe when a liquidity shift such as this occurs in bond markets. It is indicative of the average liquidity 
risk premiums required by the markets. This is the compensation required by investors as they attempt to exit their chosen 
positions and it is affected by uncertain market conditions.   
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Figure 4.5: The European liquidity indicator compared with commodity market liquidity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The commodity component of the liquidity indicator was added as a method of controlling for a ‘flight to safety’. We 
can clearly see in figure 4.5 that there is a strong negative correlation between the two metrics. As liquidity collapsed in 
European markets in early 2007, a simultaneous upsurge in liquidity occurred in commodity markets. Commodity liquidity 
peaked during the $147 WTI oil price spike of 2008, but fell sharply as gold began to increase substantially in line with large 
sovereign default threats. As the commodity liquidity element is added to the overall indicator, it acts as a further metric of 
measuring reduced liquidity in the Eurozone as it increases. 
The model in this chapter differs from the indicators of liquidity provided by the European 
Central Bank and the Bank of England through the inclusion of commodities. If liquidity 
measurement is based on the main European financial markets, it must also include 
commodities as a source for investors’ funds in periods of international financial stress. The 
comparison of the European financial market liquidity indicator and the commodity liquidity 
indicator can be seen in figure 3.5. The inverse relationship suggests that the increased risk in 
2007 financial markets shifted liquidity towards commodity markets. Also, in 2008 when oil 
markets reached their all-time highs, the increased volatility in commodity markets caused 
risk-averse investors to exit and return to the other products included in the indicator. There 
appears to have been a reversal of the theoretical ‘flight to safety’ in this period as 
commodity markets began to oscillate. Risk-averse investors would have been forced to exit 
altogether as there was no relatively ‘calm’ market available during this period.  
Comparing the results of the expanded indicator to previous European Central Bank and 
Bank of England results, we see a similar trend in the period 1999-2007. Initially there was a 
period of growth as the Eurozone was established. This improvement is clearly visible up to 
mid-2007. When the financial crisis first developed, stemming from the subprime collapse 
and instigation of international financial market chaos, we can see a collapse in liquidity in 
line with market confidence. This was caused by the withdrawal of agents from numerous 
markets and the increased risk premia sought by market makers. The comparison is seen in 
figure 4.6.  
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Overall, after the introduction of the euro, financial markets benefited from the influx of a 
large number of highly active participants who appear to have had a stabilising influence on 
market dynamics as the probability of finding market participants in such markets with 
opposing buy/sell positions became higher. From mid-2007 until late-2009, European 
markets suffered dramatically from the mass withdrawal of traders, leading to increased 
volatility in most European markets and increased uncertainty in individual Eurozone nations. 
Investors began to doubt whether they would be capable of executing transactions involving 
risky assets without suffering large losses. If the increase in liquidity during the early years of 
the Eurozone was largely associated with the increased risk appetite of market agents, this 
same liquidity could disappear quickly based on rational market beliefs such as seen in the 
collapse in liquidity in mid-2007. The financial market liquidity indicator appears to be a 
barometer of European market confidence. Some analysts have been sceptical of the depth in 
the collapse of liquidity. 
Figure 4.6: ECB indicator and this replication compared 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: This figure compares the indicator provided in this chapter with the indicator created by the ECB. From this, it can be 
inferred that there is a strong correlation between the two and any difference may be due to data differentials and differing 
standardisation process selection. Note that the last replication of the indicator appeared in 2007, thus the 2008-2010 
experience is a new finding. The red line indicates the official ECB liquidity indicator, while the blue line indicates the 
replication developed in this chapter inclusive of commodity liquidity.  
One of the major issues associated with the measurement of the liquidity indicator is the 
period in which the data is standardised. The period 2003-2006 shows the growth of the 
Eurozone in terms of liquidity. Using both these periods together as the standardisation 
period leaves an upward trend. Alternatively, using the whole period of 1999-2010 includes 
the drastic fall-off in liquidity and leaves a downwards trend. The problem with this choice is 
that none of these standardisation periods are ‘normal’ thus the choice has a significant 
impact on the nominal values of the liquidity indicator. In figure 4.7, we can see that the 
shorter estimate without the most recent crisis included is ‘shocked’ thus showing an 
amplification of the crisis in terms of the previous period. Alternatively, including the 2007-
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2011 crises, underestimates the growth of the Eurozone after the introduction of the euro, and 
thus moderates the crisis more effectively.  
Figure 4.7: Depth of the liquidity crises based on the normalisation of the data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The standardisation process is relevant when estimating the depth of the crisis. We can see that when the crisis is 
estimated by standardising during a period of normality, the depth increases dramatically. Crises have become more frequent 
and it may be more efficient to include periods of market chaos in the standardisation procedure. 
 
4.4.2. Where did the recent liquidity crisis originate and how did the liquidity indicator 
compare with other metrics of financial stress?  
Based on the liquidity indicator developed in section 4.3, it is possible to represent the origins 
of the episodes of crisis that have occurred since the introduction of the euro in terms of 
liquidity. Heat-maps are an excellent method of displaying information regarding the flow of 
funds in the Eurozone. If a warning system regarding liquidity could be established, market 
makers could impose short term market freezing restrictions based on liquidity rather than 
volatility. This has been seen in the United States, where large movements in prices have 
caused markets to close for a set period of time to encourage stability75. It is possible to track 
the flows in and out of the markets in the liquidity indicator in terms of their deviations from 
normal trends.   
A heat-map is a tool used to graphically represent periods of extreme risk using colour 
codes.Using the combined indicator and a heat-map allows the user to easily view the 
indicator as a chart and then focus on the heat-map to view the development of a point of 
interest on the chart directly from the source component. Heat-maps show some interesting 
                                                             
75 When financial markets move drastically in one day, a forced period of closure occurs to encourage stability. This is 
known as limit up and limit down. Some markets close trading of these contracts when the limit up is reached; others allow 
trading to resume if the price moves away from the day's limit.  If there is a major event affecting the market's sentiment 
toward a particular commodity, it may take several trading days before the contract price fully reflects this change. On 
each trading day, the trading limit will be reached before the market's equilibrium contract price is met. The alternative 
movement is known as limit down. 
90 
 
facts from where shocks to liquidity in the overall market originated. These are shown in 
figure 4.8. From the heat-map, the green regions are representative of the 0-80% low nominal 
value observations, the yellow regions are the 81-87%, the orange regions are the 88-95% 
range of observations and finally the red regions indicated the highest risk 96-100% of 
observations. 
Figure 4.8: Heat-map of the European financial market liquidity indicator (Normalised pre-crisis) 
 
Note: (1) Exchange rate bid-ask spread, (2) Eurostoxx 50 bid-ask spread, (3) EONIA 50 bid-ask spread, (4) Equity market 
return to volume ratio (5) Euro bond market return to volume ratio, (6) Equity options market return to volume ratio, (7) 
Spreads on euro high yield bonds, (8) Euro area interest rate spreads. From the heat-maps, the green regions are 
representative of the 0-80% low nominal value observations, the yellow regions are the 81-87%, the orange regions are the 
88-95% range of observations and finally the red regions indicated the highest risk 96-100% of observations. 
We can clearly view periods of high volatility prior to the first significant signal of crisis in 
mid-2007. These periods of volatility stemmed specifically from equity and options markets 
through bid-ask spreads, return to turnover ratios, whose measures significantly increased. 
Strong movements in the same markets were the first major signal of the crisis. Interest rate 
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liquidity premia were next to show signs of stress in November 2007 and this was closely 
followed by strong euro denominated currency volatility until November 2008, with euro 
bond return to volume ratios reacting at the same time. Interest rate bid-ask spreads were the 
last component to show signs of crisis in May 2009 which is associated with the freezing of 
the credit markets that occurred when financial companies became so pessimistic about the 
long term outlook and futures of other financials, that they saw the associated risk as too high 
and refused to lend to each other. 
It is also of interest to compare the performance of the liquidity indicator with other measures 
of financial market stress. In Europe some of the main stress metrics include the probability 
of default (PD) of the main financial institutions. The Kamakura76 implied PD’s offer a 
measure of the potential for default of a bank within a specified time frame. It stands to 
reason that market stresses such as the probability of default and contagion effects should 
affect the market enough to cause liquidity to fall sharply. The relationship between the 
median EBA77 (formerly CEBS) bank PD’s and liquidity is investigated in figure 4.9 below. 
There is clearly a strong negative relationship between the two variables, which can be 
explained by the market fear associated with a sharp increase in the probability of default of a 
European bank. Though outliers are present, European liquidity is much lower than normal in 
periods where there is substantial financial risk.  
Figure 4.9: The relationship between European liquidity and EU banking probability of default 
 
 
Note: The left-hand figure above shows the relationship between the European liquidity indicator and the median EBA bank 
5 year probability of default. A negative correlation is clearly present with periods of dramatic falls in liquidity clearly 
associated with periods of large increases in potential bank default. The right-hand figure shows a scatterplot of the same 
variables. The negative relationship can clearly be identified through a linear inclusion, with the tight confidence bands 
(95%) adding to the clarity of the results.  
 
                                                             
76 Kamakura provides default probability measures for public firms, non-public firms and sovereign counterparties which 
can be used to access credit worthiness of an entire credit portfolio. The models use solid analytical foundation with six yield 
smoothing methods and five different term structure models for valuation, hedging and pricing of a wide range of products.  
77 European Banking Authority (EBA) chose a panel of banks from which to conduct representative European stress tests. 
The same tranche of banks is used in this chapter to find the median probability of default of the European banking sector 
and is compared with the European liquidity indicator in figure 5.5. 
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There is also significant crisis identification in Credit Default Swap (CDS78) prices. The 
iTraxx Senior CDS indices79 offer a representation of a weighted basket of senior European 
CDS prices. The relationship can be seen with the liquidity indicator in figure 4.10 above. 
There is again a strong negative relationship between the European liquidity indicator and the 
iTraxx senior European financial CDS which is representative of corporate financials in the 
Eurozone. The fund is based on the average equally-weighted CDS value which is 
representative of the demand for insurance against the potential default of one of the 
companies selected. This is further evidence that panic in this market repels investors, thus 
they exit. In a scatterplot of the two variables there is again a clear negative correlation. Of 
particular interest is a potential structural change in the log of the CDS values in periods of 
high and low liquidity. This is more likely to be explained by the speed and scale by which 
CDS prices increased. CDS prices of some European banks would have been relatively 
illiquid, with their basis point spreads not moving for large periods of time. In fact most data 
sources only have clean CDS data available since January 2007. In mid-2007, the iTraxx 
index increased substantially from 10bps to 50bps in less than three months. Liquidity would 
theoretically take longer to react, thus leaving the arced, two-sectional scatterplot evident on 
the right-hand side of figure 4.10. 
Figure 4.10: The relationship between European liquidity and the iTraxx senior European financial CDS  
 
 
Note: The left-hand figure above shows the relationship between the liquidity indicator and the iTraxx senior European 
financial CDS between January 2007 and November 2011. The iTraxx index is viewed as representative of the average 
European financial CDS which is based on the market for insurance against the default of the selected 126 financial 
institutions in the fund. The scatterplot between the two series on the right-hand side shows evidence of a multi-sectional 
effect which may be caused by the speed at which CDS prices exploded in Europe over the last four years. 
 
Investigating the correlation results and above charts shows that the liquidity indicator in this 
chapter adequately represented the scale of the recent international crisis in line with other 
metrics of financial stress used by numerous central banks. The correlation of the indicator is 
                                                             
78 A Credit Default Swap (CDS) is a product where the buyer of the credit swap receives credit protection, whereas the seller 
of the swap guarantees the credit worthiness of the product. By doing this, the risk of default is transferred from the holder of 
the fixed income security to the seller of the swap. For example, the buyer of a credit swap will be entitled to the par value of 
the bond by the seller of the swap, should the bond default in its coupon payments. 
79 The benchmark Markit iTraxx Senior European indices comprises 125 equally-weighted European financial institutions 
and trade 3, 5, 7 and 10 year maturities and a new series is determined on the basis of liquidity every six months. It offers 
information on the perceived risk on the banks in the sample based on the amount of insurance withdrawn to protect from 
any potential default.  
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above 0.50 with the main series compared. As the data used in the composition of the 
indicator is sometimes proxied, the real-time analytical benefits may be deemed 
inappropriate. It is often with some delay that the alternative metrics of liquidity used in the 
composition move drastically based on market panic. 
 
4.4.3. Liquidity correlations and Granger causality analysis 
The first test based on the liquidity indicator investigates the co-movement of liquidity based 
on investment product type. This is investigated using correlation tests on a year by year basis 
between the selected investment channels in this analysis80. As some of the individual 
indicators were unavailable prior to 2002, this investigation is based solely on the recent 
period of crisis from January 2006 to December 2010. From these results, we will be able to 
decompose what investment channels were subjected to the largest mass movements of 
liquidity.  
The results for the correlations between products are found in table 4.2 below. From here we 
can see the co-movement of liquidity into the paired investment products, which provides 
some interesting results in the lead-up to the crisis. The correlation statistics provide evidence 
supporting a risk loving appetite of the European market. In periods prior to the increase in 
commodity and equity volatility, we see an increase in the correlation of liquidity between all 
assets in the indicator and commodities, indicative of a combined movement towards 
commodities which is also called a ‘flight to safety’. But when the volatility of these products 
calmed in comparison to the other markets included, there is a negative relationship in the 
same correlations indicative of contra-flows between these markets. This would indicate that 
investors believed that markets had calmed either before or during the event and were 
therefore seeking opportunities in other investment products. 
Table 4.2: Correlations between investment products during the crisis (Jan 2006 - Dec2010) 
Product 1 Product 2 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
Equities Currencies 0.0421 0.0702 0.1042 -0.0406 0.2501 0.0677 
Equities Options -0.0203 0.0283 0.0383 -0.0102 -0.1048 -0.0055 
Equities Int. Rates 0.0931 -0.057 0.138 -0.0068 -0.0162 0.0036 
Equities Bonds 0.0171 -0.0935 -0.0325 0.0169 -0.1041 -0.034 
Equities Commodities 0.0586 0.0513 0.13 -0.0212 0.0974 0.0602 
Currencies Options -0.082 -0.0186 -0.0124 -0.0757 -0.0572 -0.039 
Currencies Int. Rates -0.0374 -0.0742 0.0325 -0.054 0.0741 -0.0065 
Currencies Bonds -0.0368 0.037 -0.0193 -0.0091 -0.1096 -0.0236 
Currencies Commodities 0.0282 -0.1778 0.1044 0.1301 0.2493 0.0866 
Options Int. Rates -0.0588 0.01 -0.1437 0.1412 -0.0315 -0.0121 
Options Bonds -0.0519 -0.0199 -0.0654 0.0357 -0.06 -0.0273 
Options Commodities 0.0132 0.0201 -0.0991 0.0627 -0.0077 -0.0118 
Int. Rates Bonds 0.0873 -0.0409 -0.0491 0.0333 -0.0417 -0.0144 
Int. Rates Commodities 0.0745 -0.0736 0.1069 -0.036 0.056 0.0338 
Bonds Commodities 0.0665 -0.0735 0.2953 -0.0551 0.0994 0.1283 
 
Note: The above table shows the correlation between the investigated investment brackets by year from 2006-2010 and also 
over the total period which is found in the final column. 
                                                             
80 Equities, currencies, options, bonds, interest rates and commodities are the major investment products used in this 
analysis. 
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Some particular outliers in correlations deserve individual focus also. These statistics are 
marked in red in table 4.2. In 2007, there was a negative relationship between currencies and 
commodities (-0.18). This is indicative of currency hedging based on commodity investment. 
This is particularly interesting because it occurs in the year before the all-time highs of West 
Texas Intermediate and Brent Crude oil (figures 4.11 and 4.12 below). Investors were starting 
to enter these markets 12-18 months before the price spike and were mitigating their US 
dollar ($) commodity exposure through currency investment. This high correlation continues 
into 2008, 2009 and 2010. In 2010, this relationship is at its strongest (0.25) and is positive.  
Figure 4.11: West Texas Intermediate price (per barrel) 
 
Note: The price of oil has also shown dramatic volatility during the period of investigation. The market for West Texas 
Intermediate oil provides one of the most dramatic spikes seen in market history. Similarly to gold, the subprime crisis did 
not begin until early 2007, but from 2004 until 2007, the price of WTI more than doubled from below $30 per barrel to over 
$70. The onset of the crisis in the United States caused dramatic chaos and uncertainty leading to a severe ‘flight to safety’ to 
commodity markets.  
Figure 4.12:  Gold prices (per Troy ounce) 
 
Note: The price of gold has increased dramatically in recent years. Since late 2004, the price of gold has increased from just 
under $400 per troy ounce to over $1400 (250% increases). Though the subprime crisis did not start to affect markets until 
2007 onwards, there was strong upward pressure on the price of gold between mid-2005 and early 2007, where the price of 
gold increased from $400 to $700.   
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As the price of oil started to fall in 2009 and 2010, currency values also changed direction, 
but the market appears to have been net short81, leaving the market makers net long and 
indicating a reversal in hedging tactics from those seen in the previous years. Bonds and 
commodities also had a correlation of 0.3 in 2008 which indicates that investors with more 
risk-averse tendencies exited the market due to the large increase in volatility during the year. 
Commodity movements are synchronised with that of sovereign bonds, which were seen as 
one of the least risky and most stable products throughout 2008. Of particular interest is the 
fact that products in the lower risk category show negative values indicating that liquidity 
also flowed out of high risk markets, which supports the movements of risk-averse investors. 
Thus, higher risk products appear to have net inflows of funds in co-ordination with other 
products (indicative of risk loving behaviour) while low risk products show the opposite 
trend (indicative of risk aversion behaviour). Investigating the correlations between 
investment channels supports the evidence of significant shifts in asset co-movement. These 
correlations have strengthened which diminishes the hedging practices used by traders. The 
correlation changes are also explained by the shifting dynamics of investment patterns. As 
panic spread across numerous international markets, the threat of sovereign default and the 
spread of contagion in the international banking system became more likely, there is evidence 
of a large move from the traditionally low risk classes of bonds and commodities. Risk-
averse investors appear to have been in such a dilemma, that not only could they not identify 
markets of ‘least’ risk, but their best option may have been to withdraw from investment 
completely for the short term or at least until a period of calm ensued.  
Figure 4.13: The proportion of annual risk provided by each asset class included in the indicator 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The associated figure shows the proportion of annual volatility associated by year with each of the investment 
channels in this liquidity indicator. From this we can see the shifting scales of volatility across different assets. Using this 
data in co-ordination with the flow charts of significant Granger causal movements offers information on the trading 
environment and reasons to why traders may have entered and exited the same markets. 
                                                             
81 Net short is indicative of a position that profits more from a downward movement in an asset class than an upward 
movement. 
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The next stage of the analysis was to investigate the net flow of funds in terms of Granger 
Causality as explained in section 4.3. This provides statistical support to the direction of the 
associated causality, which can then provide evidence whether one investment channel’s 
liquidity move was responsible for the co-movement or counter-movement of another 
investment product. Figure 4.13 above shows the proportion of annual volatility associated 
with each asset channel included in the liquidity indicator developed in this chapter. Figure 
4.14 shows the flow of liquidity identified by Granger significant relationships over the 
period investigated from 2006 to 2010. Investigating the main relationships on a year by year 
basis shows that the main flows that are accepted by the Granger Causality tests are based on 
the commodity, equity and bond markets. Equities and commodities over the whole period 
are associated with currency hedging; therefore we see dual flows as investors move in and 
out of their selected positions. Equities in Europe are associated with currency risk through 
numerous channels, one of which being the link between the prices of companies such as 
financials across borders. Similarly, these channels remain open because of the risk 
preferences of investors. In 2006, it is found that there were significant flows of liquidity 
from options markets to commodity markets. Given the situation that followed in 2008 in the 
major commodity markets, this proves to be an interesting finding and may indicate the 
movement of the typical risk tolerant options trader into the commodity markets.  
Figure 4.14: Flow Chart 2006-2010 
 
Note: Figure 5.14 visually represents the flow of funds between the investigated investment brackets. Results of the Granger 
Causality analysis with the associated Chiଶstatistic below 10% are marked with an arrow signifying the direction of the 
move in the period from 2006 until 2010. It is important to note that the above figure does not imply that there was no 
movement whatsoever between the assets with no Granger significance. Only the connection found with 1, 5 or 10% 
significance are shown.   
 
In 2007, the main financial developments included the evolution of a commodity price spike 
and the beginning of the financial crises in equities and bonds. It appears as though a flight to 
Equities
Currencies
OptionsBonds
Commodities
Total Period (2006-2010) 
Note: ܥℎ݅ଶ in parentheses. *, **, ***signify 
1%, 5% and 10% levels of confidence 
11.487* 
9.009* 
4.768*** 
7.477* 
4.648*** 
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safety occurred during this period which is evident in the flows out of increasingly risky 
equity and bond markets. Risk adverse investors appear to have left these markets during this 
time. The year 2008 saw a link from commodities back to bonds, as the same investors may 
have found the volatility in commodities to be outside the thresholds of what they found 
acceptable for their portfolios. From figure 4.13 we can clearly see the increase in commodity 
volatility being associated with oil market price increases and uncertainty. Currency risk 
became more important due to the high nominal values of commodities, thus this currency 
risk created a net-outflow of commodity liquidity into currencies. As the commodity market 
stabilised in 2009, funds began to flow back from bonds as the beginning of the sovereign 
crises evolved in Europe. Interest rate markets also showed high volatility. Banks stopped 
lending to each other, thus freezing the credit markets. This finding is supported by interbank 
lending markets such as TARGET2 in the Eurozone82 that show clear evidence of a freeze-
out in lending. 
 
2010 shows evidence of a very interesting flow change. As commodity markets begin to 
increase once again, the memory of investors in the market remains extremely cautious about 
the short-term. As bond risk remains high, speculators appear to be once again entering the 
commodity markets from options (a channel that opened one year before the lifetime highs of 
oil), and risk averse investors appear to be exiting commodity markets back into European 
equities where there may be some value from a potential revival of international financials. 
The flow from currencies to commodities is also interesting based on strong Euro/US dollar 
($) movements in the previous twelve months. The flow of option investors sends a strong 
signal that those most risk-loving (hence speculative) in nature are focusing strongly on 
currencies.  
 
4.4.4. Vector Autoregression (VAR) and Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) 
This section investigates the specific inter-market linkages found in figure 4.14. The 
significant relationships are analysed further using vector autoregression, to test for dynamics 
with other facets of European investment channels. As commodity and equity markets 
became extremely volatile, risk adverse investors appear to exit their positions in these 
markets in search of alternative, safer investment assets. There are five significant links based 
on the Granger causality analysis in section 4.4.3, but only those significant at the 1% level 
will be further tested by the VAR and IRF analysis. The significant links are: 
a) Commodity liquidity shifting to equity markets 
b) Currency liquidity shifting to commodity markets 
c) Options liquidity shifting to commodity markets 
The objective of this analysis is to uncover liquidity movements in the investigated markets. 
These results are based on the data available in Europe since January 2006. From these three 
                                                             
82 TARGET2 (Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System) is the joint gross clearing 
system of the ESCB (European System of Central Banks) that unifies the technical infrastructure of the 26 central note-
issuing banks of the European Union. It went live on the 19th of November 2007. 
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linkages listed, we can see that commodity market liquidity shifts appear to have been the 
most substantial investment channels to which investors flocked during the equity and bond 
crises since 2007. 
First, we look at the relationship between commodity and equity markets. In 2009 and 2010, 
commodity prices rebounded from the highs of 2008 (figures 4.11 and 4.12). Traditionally, 
the link between commodities and equities was associated with a ‘flight to safety’ from 
volatile equity markets. Based on the results in this chapter, it appears as though equity 
traders did seek refuge in commodity markets. But in the chaos that followed this mass-shift, 
some traders invested in a combination of equities, currencies and options. In the non-
traditional sense, there was a dual ‘flight to safety’ based on the risk preferences of the trader. 
To further analyse the impacts of liquidity movements between these markets, vector 
autoregression is used. Monthly data were used from January 2006 to December 2010. The 
summary statistics can be found in tables AVIa to AVIe of the Appendix. The IRF results can 
be found in figure 4.15. 
Figure 4.15: Impulse response functions - relationship between commodity and equity liquidity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The top right quadrant shows a one unit increase in commodity volatility and its impact on equity volatility. The 
bottom left shows the impacts of a one unit increase of equity liquidity on commodity liquidity. The top left and bottom right 
quadrants show the shocks on the variables themselves. The shaded grey area shows the confidence intervals.   
The VAR model linking commodities and equities can be written as: 
ܥ݋݉௧ = ଵܾ଴ − ଵܾଶܧܳ௧ + ߛଵଵܥ݋݉௧ିଵ + 	… . +ߛଵହܥ݋݉௧ିହ + ߝ஼௢௠௧  
ܧܳ௧ = ܾଶ଴ − ܾଶଵܥ݋݉௧ + ߛହଵܧܳ௧ିଵ + 	… . +ߛହହܧܳ௧ିହ + ߝாொ௧  
The results of the VAR models for the relationship can be found in tables AVIIa to AVIIe of 
the appendix, along with the associated summary statistics, lag order selection criteria, 
Lagrange multiplier tests and joint significance tests. From the tables we can see that the lags 
are strongly jointly significant at the 5% and 10% levels, but when separated, some of the 
individual lags are not significant. The effects of liquidity increases in one of the variables 
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causes a similar increase in the liquidity of the other variable in both cases, with the effects of 
commodity liquidity on equity liquidity petering out in two to three months. Equity markets, 
though possessing large confidence intervals, appear to have little reaction in the first two to 
five months after the increase in commodity liquidity. There is a theoretical and statistical 
link still present in European equities and international commodity markets and it appears to 
have held throughout the recent international crisis, through the traditional commodity to 
equity channel has been counteracted by a simultaneous equity to commodity market link. 
The strength of the relationship would be expected to be correlated with the volatility of the 
markets at a point in time, along with the risk preferences of investors. 
The second significant link is based on currency and commodity market liquidity. Currencies 
and commodities are found to have a strong relationship, given the pricing of major 
commodity markets in US dollars. Therefore, European investors must monitor their euro to 
dollar exposures effectively or undertake unnecessary or unwanted currency risk. From the 
earlier analysis, it appears as the commodity price movements were associated with 
simultaneous currency investments from Europe (perhaps hedging risk). Granger causality 
tests for 2010 found a movement from currency markets back into commodity markets. This 
appears to be associated with de-leveraging and de-hedging strategies as commodity markets 
calmed, while simultaneous volatility increases occurred in currency markets linked with 
increased sovereign risk. From the lag order selection criteria, two lags are found to be the 
optimal specification. The VAR model linking commodities and equities can therefore be 
written as: 
ܥ݋݉௧ = ଵܾ଴ − ଵܾଶܥݑݎ௧ + ߛଵଵܥ݋݉௧ିଵ + ߛଵଶܥ݋݉௧ିଶ + ߝ஼௢௠௧  
 
ܥݑݎ௧ = ܾଶ଴ − ܾଶଵܥ݋݉௧ + ߛଶଵܥݑݎ௧ିଵ + ߛଶଶܥݑݎ௧ିଶ + ߝ஼௨௥௧  
The impulse response functions are graphically represented in figure 4.16 and the main test 
statistics of the relationship are found in table AVIIIa in the Appendix.  
The results indicate that there was initially a strong negative correlation between commodity 
and currency liquidity. This is supported by the correlation results which indicate switching 
directions between the correlations between 2006 and 2010. In 2007 there was negative 
correlation of -0.18, whereas in 2010 this had switched to 0.25. This change in direction is 
associated with changing conditions in commodity markets and foreign exchange hedging to 
mitigate risk. Similarly, with the sovereign debt crisis established in 2009, increased risk in 
currency markets appears to have deterred investment in safer commodity markets. The 
volatility of the EUR/USD market also had implications as hedging practices increased based 
on the strength of each currency and the demand for oil. 
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Figure 4.16: Impulse response functions - relationship between Commodity and Currency liquidity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The top right quadrant shows a one unit increase in commodity volatility and its impact on currency volatility. The 
bottom left shows the impacts of a one unit increase of currency liquidity on commodity liquidity. The top left and bottom 
right quadrants show the shocks on the variables themselves. The shaded grey area shows the confidence intervals.  
From figure 4.16, we see the impulse response function for the impact of commodities on 
currency liquidity and vice versa. The Granger causality results indicate that the flow of 
funds appear to move from currencies to commodities. This is investigated in the bottom-left 
hand quadrant of the figure above. From this we can see that a one unit increase in currency 
liquidity leads to over a 0.5 unit increase in the liquidity of commodities. The confidence 
bands around this estimate are very large, which reduce the benefits of these findings. What 
is surprising is the drastic decrease in liquidity after one month, with a half unit increase in 
the first month, being countered by a matching full unit decrease in the second month. This 
may be associated with reversals of short term hedging strategies, or perhaps even speculators 
investing in spreads based on the commodity and currency hedging relationship. The 
influence of commodity liquidity on that of currencies is very mild and shows only a 
moderate increase up to the second month (0.10) before falling off before the third month. 
There is still a significant link, but the flow from currency markets to commodities appears to 
be much more dominant. Given the risk increases in commodity markets, this would give 
power to the argument that more risk tolerant (hence more speculative) investors may be 
moving to more volatile markets, hence the migration in recent years from traditionally risky 
currency markets to increasingly risky commodity markets. Also, non-US traders may have 
increased currency transactions to hedge dollar related exposure, a risk that would have 
warranted added attention as commodity prices increased. 
The main summary statistics of the relationship between equities and commodities can be 
found in table AVIIIb in the Appendix. The Lagrange-multiplier test, investigates the 
relationship for autocorrelation. Evidence of the presence of autocorrelation may indicate that 
a greater number of lags are needed. The null hypothesis of no autocorrelation is not rejected 
at the 5% level since the P-value exceeds 0.05. 
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The final significant link is based on the relationship between options and commodity 
liquidity. Options are traditionally one of the most commonly used speculative investment 
tools in international markets. Of particular interest is the scenario in 2007, compared to the 
scenario in 2010. There was a significant link in Granger causality tests from liquidity 
flowing from options markets to commodity markets. Though the risk expectation of the 
options markets is significantly higher than commodities markets, the movement of liquidity 
in this channel is indicative of a mass movement of risk-loving speculators. From the lag 
order selection criteria, two lags are found to be the optimal specification. The VAR model 
linking commodities and equities can therefore be written as: 
ܱ݌ݐ௧ = ଵܾ଴ − ଵܾଶܥݑݎ௧ + ߛଵଵܱ݌ݐ௧ିଵ + ߛଵଶܱ݌ݐ௧ିଶ + ߝ஼௢௠௧  
 
ܥݑݎ௧ = ܾଶ଴ − ܾଶଵܱ݌ݐ௧ + ߛଶଵܥݑݎ௧ିଵ + ߛଶଶܥݑݎ௧ିଶ + ߝ஼௨௥௧  
The summary statistics representing the relationship between commodities and option is 
found in tables AVIIIa to AVIIIe of the appendix. The results of this VAR analysis can be 
found in figure 4.17.  
Figure 4.17: Impulse response functions - relationship between Commodity and Options liquidity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The top right quadrant shows a one unit increase in commodity volatility and its impact on options volatility. The 
bottom left shows the impacts of a one unit increase of options liquidity on commodity liquidity. The top left and bottom 
right quadrants show the shocks on the variables themselves. The shaded grey area shows the confidence intervals.  
In figure 4.17, we see the impulse response function for the VAR tests based on commodities 
and options. There is significant interest in this link as the same flow of liquidity was present 
in the year before the commodity price spikes in 2008. In 2010, the same channel has re-
opened and is a prime access point for options traders who are traditionally risk loving to 
enter the ever increasing volatile commodity markets. Granger causality supports this link, 
but the IRF in the bottom-left quadrant shows a contra-flow between the two markets. Again 
the extremely large confidence bands reduce the value of these results, but still there is a 
reduction in commodity liquidity as options liquidity increases.  
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4.5. Benefits of the European Financial Market Liquidity Indicator  
The presence of illiquidity in financial markets acts as a barrier to efficient trading. This 
arises through the additional cost of purchase (or loss when selling) that arises when a trading 
partner cannot be quickly found at a price close to that of the current market value. 
Commodity market liquidity is included as a component in this version of the European 
Financial Market Liquidity Indicator, aimed at capturing a phenomenon known as the ‘flight 
to safety’. This component strategically focuses on the effects of international crises on 
European liquidity, to which commodity liquidity has been found to act as an excellent 
natural barometer of perceived financial market crises as identified as a phenomenon known 
as a ‘flight to safety’ where investors have been found to invest in commodity markets in 
periods of extreme financial stress or panic.  
Central Banks and other policy-making institutions can use the liquidity indicator to gauge 
daily levels of European liquidity. This can be used to monitor large movements of investors’ 
funds that may be used as a signal of strengthening or weakening crises conditions. Another 
use for the indicator occurs when there is a shortage of liquidity in a market causing 
inefficiency. This indicator can act as a gauge, when synchronised with area-specific crisis 
identifying characteristics, therefore signalling the need for intervention. The indicator can 
also be used to signal specific movements between different markets, and in particular, which 
market is acting as the source of any problems. The use of a standardisation period of 1999 to 
present is also useful, as the selection of a period of normality between 1999 and 2011 has 
proven difficult due to ongoing crises periods. Other replications assume that financial 
markets have acted normally between 1999 and 2007, but this simply is not the case. Periods 
of crises have been ever present and withdrawal of this information may cause the current 
liquidity crises since 2007 to be overstated. This indicator finds liquidity crises in this period 
have been present as much as it has not. The use of the longer-term standardisation period 
also allows for the comparison of crises within this period, offering a more reflective 
overview of current conditions.  In comparison to BOE and ECB replications, this indicator 
does not appear to overstate particular events and the inclusion of commodity markets allows 
for the monitoring of one of the largest crises influenced contagion channels available to 
investors in the form of oil and gold markets. 
The addition of commodity liquidity also provides an alternatve channel for European 
investors, which is found to be regularly used in periods of crises as an alternative market.  
Other versions of the indicator do not have this channel of liquidity movement, thus cannot 
show where liquidity has moved. This version of the indicator is shown to be more accurate 
due to the inclusion of this channel. Regulatory institutions may also find informational 
benefits from the liquidity indicator to monitor signs of market malpractice.  
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4.6. Conclusions 
Market liquidity is defined as the ease with which an asset can be traded. When there is little 
in the way of fear or indeed, obstructions to finding counterparties, liquidity is plentiful. The 
indicator developed in this chapter provides evidence of a strong reaction of liquidity to the 
major events in Europe and across the world over the last twelve years. The movement of 
liquidity can act as a barometer of the strength and depth of a particular crisis. 
This chapter aimed at developing and adding a new investigative dimension to a liquidity 
indicator that can be used for macroprudential risk assessment. In comparison to European 
Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and Probabilities of Default (PDs), the liquidity indicator shows 
strong analytical benefits. It is however affected by data issues, such as the lack of 
information available to regulators and investors alike based on the liquidity of bond markets. 
These data sources are extremely expensive and may easily exceed budgetary allowances for 
use as only part of this liquidity indicator. There are however proxies available to mitigate 
these issues, but one hundred percent confidence is unattainable.  
The correlations of returns between the channels of investment products in Europe are found 
to have changed significantly since the emergence of the international crisis. The commodity 
volatility evident throughout the last decade has changed the structure of investment in 
products such as equities, currencies and corporate bonds. These investment products have all 
become highly correlated to what were seen as ‘safe haven’ products such as commodities. A 
combination of Granger causality, vector autoregression and impulse response functions 
uncovered strong reactions among particular channels of the liquidity indicator. A large 
exodus of investment out of equities and into currencies is evident in the period between 
2006 and 2010 as investors became sceptical about the health of numerous international 
financial companies. But the onset of chaos seems to have influenced the results in this 
chapter that show dual liquidity shifts between bonds and commodities and commodities and 
currencies.  
Much more work must be completed on the inclusion of other assets such as CDS products 
into the indicator. This current indicator does support use for macroprudential risk assessment 
in terms of measuring the depth of a crisis and does offer predictive support of oncoming 
trouble (at the asset class level), but only moderately adds to the predictive power available 
from other metrics of market stress already available. The heat-maps developed in this 
chapter in conjunction with this liquidity indicator show that the first signals of international 
crisis were evident in mid-2006 in the equity options market. Used in conjunction with these 
other metrics, the liquidity indicator offers information on the health of European markets 
that is not available through investigation of individual facets of financial market metrics 
alone. 
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Concluding remarks 
 
This thesis focuses on three topical issues in international finance, undertaking a thorough 
investigation of the impact of Contracts for Difference (CFDs) on international equity 
markets, the impact of Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) on commodity markets and the 
measurement of the crisis identification properties available from liquidity analysis in the 
Eurozone. International finance is an ever-expanding area and the recent subprime and 
international sovereign debt crises have created an urgency to better understand new 
investment products and their potential knock-on effects across international markets.  
In this thesis, we have examined the effects of CFDs on international equity markets around 
the world. We have explored whether ETFs really had a role to play in the extreme 
commodity market environment of the mid to late 2000’s. Finally, we have investigated 
whether there are crisis identification properties available when investigating investor 
movement across asset-classes in the Eurozone. As the thesis is predominantly an empirical 
analysis of these areas, we adopt and employ a range of modern time-series econometric 
techniques that capture the dynamics of volatility, efficiency and liquidity across a range of 
international financial markets.  
Chapter one assesses the primary investigated hypotheses of the thesis in detail. It provides 
foundations on which the reader can obtain understanding of the investment tools and 
hypotheses investigated, along with an overview of the numerous channels of investigation 
available based on the topics investigated.  
Chapter two assesses the link between Contracts for Difference (CFDs) and their potential 
influence on volatility in international equity markets. To investigate this link we utilise 
GARCH and EGARCH techniques to analyse changes in the structure, volatility and 
efficiency of these markets in the pre and post-CFD eras. The research provides a number of 
interesting points. While investigating the special case Australian (ASX) decision to 
segregate CFDs from the main exchange, a decrease in long-term volatility is uncovered in 
association with decreased CFD trading. Evaluating each exchange on an equity by equity 
level shows similar significant results in the case of 90% of those equities investigated. An 
analysis of major international equity markets echoes this sentiment, while also providing 
evidence of dramatic improvements in market efficiency. The results suggest that CFDs 
appear to have helped the markets they have been introduced in. CFDs also appear to have 
reduced equity market volatility, while simultaneously offering a new tradable product. But 
these benefits are also found to be associated with the caveat of increased short-term 
volatility. 
Chapter three investigates the potential causal relationship between Exchange Traded Funds 
(ETFs) and increased volatility present in international commodity markets in recent years. 
We employ GARCH and EGARCH techniques to test the changes in volatility after ETF 
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introduction and analyse the results in terms of the size of the commodity markets 
investigated. The main findings in this chapter include significant differences in volatility 
changes between large and small commodity markets in terms of size. Larger ETF 
investments are found to be associated with increased EGARCH volatility, thus supporting 
numerous regulatory views that some ETFs are having dominant effects on the markets in 
which they invest. This finding supports the need for caps in terms of nominal investment 
sizes stemming from ETFs. Smaller commodity markets are found to have increased 
efficiency as measured by weak-form metrics such as persistence and the autoregressive 
effect. This finding supports the view that liquidity benefits appear to be present in markets 
below $4 and $5 billion market capitalisation. The findings in this chapter support the calls 
for more intense regulation of the ETF industry and more investigation into the investment 
practices and rebalancing processes of the funds investigated. 
After investigating the role that CFDs and ETFs are having upon financial markets (as these 
tools are  used for margin trading and shorting financial markets) led this thesis to investigate 
market liquidity and in particular, what information is contained in European liquidity 
analysis. Given the large structural changes across financial markets in recent decades and the 
implementation of new trading tools such as CFDs and ETFs, monitoring the flows of 
liquidity between assets may offer a substantial amount of information with regards to the 
depth and magnitude of a crisis along with potential crisis identification benefits.  
Chapter four investigates liquidity in European financial markets given the introduction of 
new investment tools such as CFDs and ETFs. Building on the liquidity model created by the 
Bank of England and further developed by the European Central Bank through the inclusion 
of commodities to take account of ‘flights to safety’ in periods of financial crisis. Using this 
measure of liquidity, the flows between investment products and the direction of causality 
can be inferred from Granger causality and vector autoregression (VAR) tests. These 
variables can also be manipulated using impulse response functions (IRFs) to test the 
responses of related variables. The mass movements of investors during periods of stability 
and crisis offer a valuable barometer of market sentiment while potentially offering signals of 
oncoming crisis. Some of the main findings presented in this chapter are associated with 
liquidity flows. Market risk thresholds are found to have inverted in recent years with 
traditionally low risk markets becoming high risk. Correlation and Granger causality tests 
showed that the flow of funds throughout the recent crisis show that there are strong 
movements of liquidity flowing into commodity and equity markets. The main channels for 
liquidity flows are operating as expected, but hedging strategies and speculation in 
commodity markets appear strong throughout this period. The VAR tests also show strong 
reactions of the tested variables to liquidity shocks in the markets under observation. There is 
also strong evidence of market agents exiting particular markets to find ‘safer havens’ and 
sheltering from the additional risk that these speculators contribute. Strong correlation results 
with other metrics of financial market stress offer significant support for the use of the 
liquidity indicator developed in chapter four for measuring and identifying crisis in the 
production of macroprudential risk assessments. 
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Appendices 
Table AI: EGARCH (1, 1) results for the individual components of the ASX CFD exchange 
Company ߚ଴ ߚଵ ߚଶ ߚଷ Ω α δ β Γ Log-like. 
           
Alumina 0.173 -0.058 1.213* 0.479* 0.149** 0.043 0.293* 0.939* +0.121** -1071.061 
           
Amcor 0.174 -0.073*** 0.277* 0.387* 0.194*** -0.058 0.025 0.886* +0.157*** -927.058 
           
AMP 0.036 -0.064*** 0.657* 0.319* 0.009 -0.102* 0.149* 1.000* -0.017** -1019.106 
           
ANZ 0.082 -0.094** 0.777* 0.255* 0.734* -0.107** 0.430* 0.463* +0.919* -881.6477 
           
AXA 0.171 -0.099* 0.637* 0.533* 3.58* 0.292* -0.076 -0.712* +2.447* -1011.237 
           
BHP Billiton 0.332** -0.158* 1.007* 0.266* 0.046 0.002 0.217* 0.980* +0.011 -990.1682 
           
Boral 0.001 -0.026 0.832* 0.319* 0.112** -0.088* 0.064 0.949* +0.071** -1006.355 
           
Coca Cola 0.242** -0.144* 0.282* 0.07 0.01 -0.051** 0.101* 0.998* -0.016*** -895.8409 
           
CSR 0.087 -0.165* 1.346* 0.245** 0.006 0.196* 0.094* 1.007* -0.039* -1142.148 
           
CBA 0.096 -0.063*** 0.524* 0.263* 0.264* -0.096** 0.294* 0.763* +0.416** -832.3569 
           
CSL 0.442** -0.055 0.248* 0.405* 0.853* -0.213* 0.04 0.686* +0.042 -1053.984 
           
Fosters 0.042 -0.129* 0.446* 0.116*** 3.066* -0.092* 0.141** -0.757* +0.932* -894.04 
           
IAG 0.076 -0.032 0.376* 0.451* 3.182* -0.095** 0.186** -0.577* +0.719* -940.0816 
           
Fairfax 0.012 -0.073** 0.651* 0.244* 3.724* 0.034*** -0.073*** -0.947* +2.583* -973.3437 
 
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses, where ***p<0.01, **p<0.05 and *p<0.10.  γ represents the EGARCH calculated volatility change after CFD introduction for the specific Australian equity 
traded on the ASX CFD exchange. 
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Table AI: EGARCH (1, 1) results for the individual components of the ASX CFD exchange (continued) 
Company ߚ଴ ߚଵ ߚଶ ߚଷ Ω α δ β Γ Log-like. 
           
Lihir Gold 0.11 -0.074*** 0.878* -0.026 0.259*** -0.044 0.213* 0.923* +0.035 -1185.768 
           
Newcrest 0.361*** 0.03 0.618* 0.058 0.181 -0.043 0.159* 0.944* +0.199 -1142.906 
           
News Corp. 0.997* 0.453* 0.065 0.038 3.003* 1.236* 0.856* 0.007 +1.396* -1147.787 
           
Origin 0.417** -0.041 0.371* 0.376* 1.097*** 0.158** -0.075 0.493*** +0.487*** -998.9267 
           
Oil Search 0.724* -0.155* 0.521** 0.848* 3.231* -0.082 -0.194** -0.111 +1.223* -1145.716 
           
Orica 0.191 -0.145* 0.707* 0.407* 1.348* 0.038 0.311* 0.473** +0.196*** -1027.581 
           
Onesteel 0.23 0.037 0.713* 0.388* 0.152*** -0.018 0.139** 0.94* +0.056 -1061.864 
           
QBE 0.353** -0.116* 0.726* 0.094** 3.299* 0.062*** 0.052 -0.751* +2.285* -963.9783 
           
Qantas 0.009 -0.098* 0.442* 0.45* 4.259* 0.038** -0.056*** -0.947* +2.022* -1001.531 
           
Rio Tinto 0.305*** -0.055 0.752* 0.205* 0.06*** 0.017 0.167* 0.981* +0.018 -1062.44 
           
Santos 0.202 -0.089** 0.619* 0.09* 1.237* -0.108** 0.347* 0.495* +0.4** -1036.621 
           
Suncorp 0.042 -0.11** 0.705* 0.16** 1.422* 0.1*** 0.211** 0.204 +1.346* -963.2643 
           
Tabcorp 0.004 -0.088** 0.911* 0.286* 1.91* 0.179* 0.307* -0.249 +1.324* -877.8366 
           
Toll Holdings 0.071 0.012 0.748* 0.297* 3.165* 0.091 1.051* -0.131** +0.592* -1078.936 
 
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses, where ***p<0.01, **p<0.05 and *p<0.10.  γ represents the EGARCH calculated volatility change after CFD introduction for the specific Australian equity 
traded on the ASX CFD exchange. 
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Table AI: EGARCH (1, 1) results for the individual components of the ASX CFD exchange (continued) 
Company ߚ଴ ߚଵ ߚଶ ߚଷ ω α δ β γ Log-like. 
           
Transurban 0.142 -0.096*** 0.252* 0.154** 0.193** -0.007 0.196* 0.893* +0.183* -961.4159 
           
Telecom NZ 0.192*** -0.118* 0.62* 0.218* 0.052* -0.126* -0.02 0.975* -0.009*** -919.5852 
           
Westpac 0.062 -0.12* 0.621* 0.176* 0.982* -0.235* 0.035 0.234 +1.328* -872.9993 
           
Westfield 0.014 -0.187* 0.436* 0.146** 0.099** -0.025 0.348* 0.927* +0.106*** -886.4733 
           
Woolworth 0.225** -0.162* 0.365* 0.187* 2.864* -0.045 -0.009 -0.769* +1.197* -880.8205 
           
Woodside 0.274*** -0.043 0.826* 0.298* 0.529** -0.052 0.389* 0.777* +0.158*** -1018.801 
           
Wesfarmers 0.185* -0.075*** 0.602* 0.277* 0.185* 0.041 0.181* 0.907* +0.128** -974.5435 
 
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses, where ***p<0.01, **p<0.05 and *p<0.10.  γ represents the EGARCH calculated volatility change after CFD introduction for the specific Australian equity 
traded on the ASX CFD exchange. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
115 
 
Table AII: EGARCH (1, 1) results for the international exchanges under investigation 
Country ߚ଴ ߚଵ ߚଶ ߚଷ ω α δ β γ Log-like. 
           
Dow Jones 0.009 -0.126* 0.334*  0.001 -0.083* 0.140* 0.982* -0.006* -6327.740 
           
S&P 500 0.005 -0.134* 0.428*  0.001*** -0.087* 0.129* 0.984* -0.003*** -6428.531 
           
FTSE 100 0.006 -0.042* 0.534*  0.001 -0.048* 0.151* 0.990* -0.005** -5404.856 
           
Germany 0.020** 0.006 0.984*  0.002 -0.033* 0.169* 0.991* -0.003 -3993.507 
           
Canada 0.021*** 0.013 0.622*  0.003*** -0.037* 0.148* 0.991* -0.001*** -4064.86 
           
Spain 0.004 0.019* 0.449* 0.437* 0.002 -0.015* 0.172* 0.993* +0.002 -3456.841 
           
China 0.011 0.014 0.068* 0.058* 0.022* -0.033* 0.150* 0.975* +0.018* -5810.724 
           
Japan 0.034** -0.029** 0.059* 0.358* 0.015* -0.063* 0.151* 0.980* -0.008** -5200.813 
           
Ireland 0.007 0.075* 0.587* 0.117* 0.013* -0.036* 0.127* 0.987* -0.006* -4776.872 
           
South Africa 0.042* -0.018 0.126* 0.407* 0.013* -0.056* 0.141* 0.982* -0.008** -4888.518 
           
Italy 0.013*** -0.007 0.705*  0.001*** -0.029* 0.235* 0.984* -0.003** -3415.462 
           
Thailand 0.048** 0.029** 0.237* 0.341* 0.094* -0.051* 0.295* 0.922* -0.012** -6132.744 
           
Korea 0.065* -0.003 0.057* 0.637* 0.013* -0.013** 0.144* 0.994* -0.009* -5852.682 
           
Norway 0.034** 0.027** 0.231* 0.514* 0.005** -0.034* 0.169* 0.978* +0.009* -4889.706 
           
New Zealand 0.006 0.079* 0.321*  0.007* -0.036* 0.108* 0.987* -0.003** -3179.332 
 
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses, where ***p<0.01, **p<0.05 and *p<0.10.  γ represents the EGARCH calculated volatility change after CFD introduction for the specific international 
indices under investigation. 
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Table AIII: GARCH (1, 1) results for the international exchanges under investigation pre and post CFD introduction 
Country ߚ଴ ߚଵ ߚଶ ߚଷ ߙ଴ ߙଵ ߙଶ Log-like. 
         
Dow Jones Pre 0.045* -0.062* 0.229*  0.011* 0.927* 0.059* -3379.141 
Dow Jones Post 0.015 -0.147* 0.424*  0.012* 0.879* 0.111* -2922.186 
         
S&P500 Pre 0.039* -0.067* 0.339*  0.006* 0.932* 0.062* -3291.323 
S&P500 Post 0.021*** -0.191* 0.548*  0.011* 0.897* 0.094* -3141.381 
         
FTSE Pre 0.024** -0.011 0.343*  0.016* 0.900* 0.0692* -2133.743 
FTSE Post 0.002** -0.027* 0.629*  0.002* 0.921* 0.0790* -3146.676 
         
TSX Pre 0.019 0.032*** 0.571*  0.004* 0.942* 0.056* -2302.706 
TSX Post 0.029*** 0.004 0.727*  0.011* 0.895* 0.096* -1753.512 
         
Spain Pre 0.013 0.016 0.427* 0.405* 0.001** 0.952* 0.047* -1620.654 
Spain Post 0.005 0.029* 0.554* 0.394* 0.005* 0.831* 0.160* -1062.098 
         
DAX Pre 0.006 -0.024** 1.082*  0.002** 0.948* 0.050* -2219.850 
DAX Post 0.039** 0.019*** 0.964*  0.011* 0.857* 0.125* -976.9168 
         
SSE Pre 0.008 0.031 0.017 0.034* 0.246* 0.695* 0.246* -2958.668 
SSE Post 0.050*** 0.005 0.219* 0.126* 0.035* 0.931* 0.060* -2827.919 
         
NIKKEI Pre 0.016** -0.031 0.051* 0.239* 0.056* 0.908* 0.062* -3062.714 
NIKKEI Post 0.027 -0.006 0.034* 0.627* 0.019* 0.897* 0.089* -2040.987 
 
Note: The above table represents the estimated coefficients of the GARCH models based on exchange dynamics prior and post CFD introduction in the respective investigated exchanges. T-
statistics are in parentheses, where ***p<0.01, **p<0.05 and *p<0.10.   
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Table AIII: GARCH (1, 1) results for the international exchanges under investigation pre and post CFD introduction (continued) 
Country ߚ଴ ߚଵ ߚଶ ߚଷ ߙ଴ ߙଵ ߙଶ Log-like. 
Ireland Pre 0.027 0.137* 0.061* 0.510* 0.110* 0.848* 0.075* -1924.402 
Ireland Post 0.013 0.067* 0.133* 0.692* 0.013* 0.926* 0.065* -2825.231 
         
South Africa Pre 0.044** 0.119* 0.096* 0.388* 0.007* 0.923* 0.076* -1895.811 
South Africa Post 0.058* -0.052* 0.129* 0.411* 0.023* 0.905* 0.080* -3687.66 
         
Italy Pre 0.015 0.004 0.625*  0.003 0.901* 0.092* -2291.596 
Italy Post 0.047* 0.014 0.879*  0.013* 0.806* 0.187* -1021.029 
         
Thailand Pre 0.011 0.043** 0.205* 0.302* 0.053* 0.898* 0.076* -3025.875 
Thailand Post 0.032 -0.022 0.314* 0.240* 0.087* 0.879* 0.091* -1311.244 
         
South Korea Pre 0.041 -0.003 0.037*** 0.675* 0.0053** 0.964* 0.034* -2994.880 
South Korea Post 0.081* -0.016 0.075* 0.637* 0.029* 0.839* 0.141* -1534.367 
         
Norway Pre 0.063* 0.079* 0.408* 0.163* 0.032* 0.887* 0.081* -1934.824 
Norway Post 0.024 -0.003 0.775* 0.322* 0.021* 0.991* 0.079* -2049.972 
         
New Zealand Pre 0.018 0.037*** 0.343*  0.008* 0.909* 0.071* -1257.481 
New Zealand Post 0.002 0.099* 0.291*  0.015* 0.886* 0.081* -1257.231 
 
Note: The above table represents the estimated coefficients of the GARCH models based on exchange dynamics prior and post CFD introduction in the respective investigated exchanges. T-
statistics are in parentheses, where ***p<0.01, **p<0.05 and *p<0.10.   
 
 
 
 
 
118 
 
 
Table AIV: EGARCH (1, 1) results for the commodity markets under investigation at ETF introduction  
ETF name Ticker ߚ଴ ߚଵ ߚଶ ߚଷ ω α δ β γ Log-like. 
            
iShares Silver Trust SLV 0.046** -0.079* -0.020 -0.676* 0.012* -0.024* 0.112* 0.995* +0.001*** -5339.1 
            
ETFS Silver Trust SIVR 0.047** -0.079* -0.018 -0.678* 0.012* -0.024* 0.110* 0.996* -0.006** -5338.3 
            
Proshares Ultra Silver AGQ 0.047** -0.079* -0.019 -0.677* 0.011* -0.024* 0.108* 0.997* -0.007* -5337.4 
            
Powershares DB Silver Fund DBS 0.047** -0.079* -0.021 -0.677* 0.011* -0.025* 0.111* 0.995* +0.004*** -5338.5 
            
SPDR Gold Trust GLD 0.048* 0.010 0.438* 0.991* 0.002*** 0.062* 0.089* 0.990* +0.003** -3672.2 
            
iShares COMEX Gold Trust IAU 0.047* 0.009 0.044* 0.991* 0.002 0.062* 0.089* 0.989* +0.004** -3671.9 
            
ETFS Physical Swiss Gold SGOL 0.052* 0.021 0.062* 1.074* 0.005* 0.057* 0.073* 0.996* -0.008* -3079.7 
            
Proshares Ultra Gold UGL 0.052* 0.022 0.062* 1.073* 0.005* 0.058* 0.065* 0.998* -0.009* -3075.6 
            
Powers DB Gold DGL 0.048* 0.010 0.044* 0.992* 0.004** 0.063* 0.089* 0.990* +0.003** -3672.5 
            
Powershares DB Gold Double Long DGP 0.048* 0.009 0.044* 0.991* 0.003** 0.064* 0.091* 0.989* +0.005** -3671.9 
            
E-TRACS UBS Bloomberg Gold UCI 0.050* 0.023 0.063* 1.073* 0.005* 0.054* 0.077* 0.997* -0.003** -3081.7 
            
Powers DB Gold  Short DGZ 0.048* 0.009 0.044* 0.991* 0.003** 0.064* 0.091* 0.989* +0.005** -3671.9 
            
iPath Dow Jones – UBS Platinum PGM 0.102* 0.003 -0.033** 0.545* 0.029* 0.050* 0.239* 0.980* +0.021* -4795.4 
 
Note: The above table represents the estimated coefficients of the EGARCH models based on exchange dynamics prior and post ETF introduction in the respective investigated exchanges. T-
statistics are in parentheses, where ***p<0.01, **p<0.05 and *p<0.10.   
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Table AIV: EGARCH (1, 1) results for the commodity markets under investigation at ETF introduction (continued) 
ETF name Ticker ߚ଴ ߚଵ ߚଶ ߚଷ ω α δ β γ Log-like. 
            
E-TRACS UBS Bloomberg Platinum PTM 0.102* 0.003 -0.033** 0.545* 0.029* 0.051* 0.241* 0.979* +0.021* -4795.5 
            
ETFS Physical Platinum PPLT 0.109* -0.005 -0.044** 0.578* 0.023* 0.054* 0.201* 0.992* -0.011*** -3815.6 
            
ETFS Physical Palladium PALL 0.019 0.055* -0.152* 1.206* 0.050* 0.018** 0.202* 0.977* -0.004*** -4325.2 
            
United States Oil Fund USO 0.006 -0.023*** -0.112* 1.167* 0.028* -0.036* 0.101* 0.988* -0.008* -6317.5 
            
United States Oil Fund (Short) DNO 0.007 -0.023 -0.116* 1.157* 0.031* -0.038* 0.099* 0.985* -0.020* -6315.0 
            
United States 12 Month USL 0.006 -0.023 -0.111* 1.163* 0.022* -0.034* 0.101* 0.989* -0.004 -6320.9 
            
Powershares DB Oil Fund SBO 0.009 -0.023 -0.111* 1.166* 0.025* -0.033* 0.103* 0.989* -0.006** -6319.5 
            
iPath S&P GSCI Crude Oil OIL 0.008 -0.023*** -0.111* 1.167* 0.026* -0.035* 0.103* 0.989* -0.006* -6319.2 
            
Powershares Ultra DJ-UBS Crude Oil UCO 0.003 -0.023*** -0.115* 1.163* 0.018* -0.034* 0.085* 0.992* -0.009* -6316.7 
            
Powershares DB Crude Oil Double Short DTO 0.002 -0.023 -0.113* 1.166* 0.021* -0.034* 0.097* 0.991* -0.005** -6320.3 
 
Note: The above table represents the estimated coefficients of the EGARCH models based on exchange dynamics prior and post ETF introduction in the respective investigated exchanges. T-
statistics are in parentheses, where ***p<0.01, **p<0.05 and *p<0.10.   
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Table AIV: EGARCH (1, 1) results for the commodity markets under investigation at ETF introduction (continued) 
ETF name Ticker ߚ଴ ߚଵ ߚଶ ߚଷ ω α δ β γ Log-like. 
            
Powershares ultrashort crude oil SCO 0.003 -0.023 -0.115* 1.163* 0.018* -0.034* 0.085* 0.992* -0.010* -6316.7 
            
RICI Energy ETN RJN 0.006 -0.023 -0.111* 1.164* 0.022* -0.033* 0.102* 0.990* -0.004*** -6320.9 
            
Powershares precious metals DBP 0.048** -0.079* -0.021 -0.678* 0.011* -0.024* 0.111* 0.995* +0.004*** -5338.4 
            
iPath Dow Jones JJC 0.031 -0.041** -0.234* 0.726* 0.012 -0.002 0.106 0.992* -0.001 -5170.5 
            
Powershares base metal DBB 0.000 -0.050* -0.187* 0.795* 0.817* 0.027* 0.020* 0.936* +0.937* -4798.9 
            
Powershares commodity index DBC 0.001 -0.045* -0.177* 0.671* 0.008* 0.036* 0.096* 0.972* +0.024* -4668.9 
            
iPath Dow Jones DJP 0.001 -0.046* -0.178* 0.669* 0.009* 0.034* 0.100* 0.981* +0.014* -4673.8 
            
Powershares base metal DBB 0.004 -0.018 -0.178* 0.600* 0.009* 0.013** 0.091* 0.994* +0.006** -5458.3 
            
iPath Dow Jones (gas) GAZ 0.029*** 0.014** 0.017*** 0.243** 0.089* 0.035* 0.236* 0.974* -0.002*** -7688.2 
            
US natural gas UNG 0.031*** 0.014** 0.016*** 0.244** 0.092* 0.034* 0.237* 0.973* -0.005 -7687.9 
            
US 12M natural gas UNL 0.032 0.015** 0.014*** 0.231** 0.094* 0.036* 0.234* 0.973* -0.024* -7685.8 
            
 
Note: The above table represents the estimated coefficients of the EGARCH models based on exchange dynamics prior and post ETF introduction in the respective investigated exchanges. T-
statistics are in parentheses, where ***p<0.01, **p<0.05 and *p<0.10.   
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Table AIV: EGARCH (1, 1) results for the commodity markets under investigation at ETF introduction (continued) 
ETF name Ticker ߚ଴ ߚଵ ߚଶ ߚଷ ω α δ β γ Log-like. 
            
iPath DJ Coffee JO 0.068* -0.021 0.045** 0.073** 0.064* 0.045* 0.159* 0.9648* -0.048* -5546.3 
            
iPath DJ Sugar  SGG 0.056 -0.068* 0.143* 0.131*** 0.033* 0.021* 0.085* 0.985* -0.003 -4391.4 
            
iPath DJ Live Cattle COW 0.033* 0.146* 0.009*** -0.024*** 0.014* -0.023* 0.246* 0.977* -0.016* -2821.5 
            
iPath DJ Lean Hogs COW 0.129** -0.104* -0.108* 0.092 0.221* -0.020* 0.197* 0.935* +0.012* -7519.8 
            
RICI Cotton RJA 0.012*** -0.036** -0.138* 0.576* 0.018* -0.007 0.081* 0.989* +0.002 -5775.7 
            
RICI Wheat RJA 0.022*** -0.060* -0.071** 0.647* 0.045* 0.014** 0.126* 0.973* +0.029* -6346.9 
            
RICI Corn  RJA 0.042*** 0.003 -0.105* 0.482* 0.026* -0.002 0.119* 0.979* +0.019* -5614.4 
            
RICI Soybeans  RJA 0.060** -0.038** -0.119* 0.568* 0.010* 0.029* 0.109* 0.996* +0.002** -5197.8 
            
iPath DJ Soybeans JJG 0.060** -0.038** -0.119* 0.568* 0.010* 0.029* 0.109* 0.996* +0.002** -5197.8 
            
iPath DJ Wheat JJG 0.017*** -0.061* -0.066** 0.670* 0.045* 0.014** 0.126* 0.973* +0.028* -6347.0 
            
iPath DJ Corn JJG 0.043*** 0.003 -0.105* 0.482* 0.026* -0.002 0.120* 0.979* +0.019* -5614.2 
            
Powershares WTI DBC 0.006 -0.024*** -0.112* 1.164* 0.028* -0.036* 0.101* 0.988* -0.008* -6317.6 
            
Powershares Brent DBC 0.019*** -0.028*** -0.075* 1.257* 0.026* -0.034* 0.082* 0.986* -0.008* -6074.0 
            
Powershares Gold DBC 0.048* 0.010** 0.043* 0.995* 0.001 0.066* 0.100* 0.984* +0.012* -3669.1 
            
iPath DJ Corn  DBC 0.032** -0.008 -0.131* 0.581* 0.034* -0.011*** 0.121* 0.969* +0.025* -4679.3 
 
Note: The above table represents the estimated coefficients of the EGARCH models based on exchange dynamics prior and post ETF introduction in the respective investigated exchanges. T-
statistics are in parentheses, where ***p<0.01, **p<0.05 and *p<0.10.   
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Table AIV: EGARCH (1, 1) results for the commodity markets under investigation at ETF introduction (continued) 
ETF name Ticker ߚ଴ ߚଵ ߚଶ ߚଷ ω α δ β γ Log-like. 
            
Powershares Corn DBC 0.034** -0.009 -0.131* 0.582* 0.030* -0.010 0.118* 0.973* +0.020* -4681.5 
            
Powershares Natural Gas DBC 0.031*** 0.014** 0.016*** 0.245** 0.091* 0.034* 0.237* 0.974* -0.005 -7687.8 
            
iPath DJ Natural Gas DJP 0.117*** -0.006 0.014 0.514* 0.052* -0.004 0.184* 0.985* -0.001*** -4753.6 
            
Powershares RBOB DBE 0.004 0.014** -0.365* 1.177* 0.040* 0.022** 0.171* 0.987* -0.005*** -3986.3 
            
Powershares Aluminium BDG 0.000 -0.050* -0.187* 0.795* 0.817* 0.027* 0.020* 0.936* +0.093* -4798.9 
            
Powershares Brent DBE 0.022* -0.028*** -0.075* 1.254* 0.022* -0.032* 0.085* 0.988* -0.005** -6076.7 
            
Powershares WTI DBE 0.009 -0.023 -0.111* 1.166* 0.025* -0.033* 0.103* 0.989* -0.006** -6319.5 
            
Powershares Index Track DBC 0.005 0.015** -0.362* 1.187* 0.043* 0.020** 0.172* 0.987* -0.007*** -3986.1 
            
Powershares Zinc BDG 0.004 -0.018 -0.178* 0.600* 0.009* 0.013** 0.091* 0.994* +0.006** -5458.3 
            
Powershares Soybean DBC 0.080* -0.027 -0.176* 0.636* 0.017* 0.025* 0.134* 0.992* -0.001*** -4360.9 
            
Powershares Wheat DBC 0.012*** -0.060* -0.065** 0.668* 0.034 0.007 0.126* 0.979* +0.019* -6348.6 
            
iPath DJ WTI DJP 0.007 -0.023*** -0.111* 1.168* 0.027* -0.036* 0.103* 0.988* -0.007* -6318.3 
            
iPath DJ Soybeans  DJP 0.060** -0.038** -0.119* 0.568* 0.010* 0.029* 0.109* 0.996* +0.001** -5197.8 
            
iPath DJ Gold  DJP 0.048* 0.010*** 0.043* 0.995* 0.001*** 0.066* 0.100* 0.984* +0.012* -3669.1 
 
Note: The above table represents the estimated coefficients of the EGARCH models based on exchange dynamics prior and post ETF introduction in the respective investigated exchanges. T-
statistics are in parentheses, where ***p<0.01, **p<0.05 and *p<0.10.   
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Table AIV: EGARCH (1, 1) results for the commodity markets under investigation at ETF introduction (continued) 
ETF name Ticker ߚ଴ ߚଵ ߚଶ ߚଷ ω α δ β γ Log-like. 
            
iPath DJ Copper DJP 0.032 -0.041** -0.234* 0.728* 0.012* -0.001 0.106* 0.991* +0.001 -5170.4 
            
iPath DJ Live Cattle DJP 0.003* 0.140* 0.008 -0.024*** 0.018* -0.026* 0.243* 0.974* -0.029* -2814.0 
            
iPath DJ Wheat DJP 0.015 -0.061* -0.071** 0.640* 0.040* 0.008** 0.130* 0.976* +0.021* -6349.5 
            
US Gasoline Fund UGA 0.065 0.031 -0.424* 1.319* 0.011** -0.008 0.122* 0.997* +0.003** -2978.3 
            
Powershares Ag. Live Cattle DBA 0.022** 0.272* 0.005 -0.026*** 0.046* -0.044* 0.278* 0.929* -0.033* -1712.2 
            
PowerS Ag. Coffee  DBA 0.129* -0.103* -0.109* 0.091 0.222* -0.021* 0.197* 0.934* +0.013* -7519.1 
            
Powers Ag. Soybeans DBA 0.060** -0.038** -0.119* 0.569* 0.010* 0.029* 0.109* 0.996* +0.002** -5197.7 
            
Powershares Ag Corn DBA 0.041*** 0.003 -0.105* 0.483* 0.028* -0.002* 0.119* 0.975* +0.021* -5613.2 
            
PowerS Ag. Wheat DBA 0.010 -0.062* -0.066** 0.676* 0.039* 0.010 0.127* 0.977* +0.022* -6349.0 
            
PowerS Ag. Cocoa DBA 0.015 0.020 0.060* 0.162** 0.200*** -0.045* 0.040* 0.709* +0.137** -4605.8 
            
PowerS Ag. Lean Hogs DBA 0.129* -0.103* -0.109* 0.091 0.222* -0.021* 0.197* 0.934* +0.013* -7519.1 
            
PowerS Ag. Sugar DBA 0.054 -0.091* 0.116* 0.116 0.043* 0.012* 0.048* 0.979* -0.008* -6271.3 
            
PowerS Ag. Cotton DBA 0.031 -0.041** -0.234* 0.727* 0.012* -0.002 0.106* 0.992* +0.000 -5170.5 
            
Powershares DB Base Metals Copper DBA 0.003 -0.023*** -0.115* 1.163* 0.018* -0.034* 0.085* 0.992* -0.010* -6316.7 
 
Note: The above table represents the estimated coefficients of the EGARCH models based on exchange dynamics prior and post ETF introduction in the respective investigated exchanges. T-
statistics are in parentheses, where ***p<0.01, **p<0.05 and *p<0.10.   
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Table AV: GARCH (1, 1) results for the major international commodity markets under investigation pre and post ETF introduction  
Country ߚ଴ ߚଵ ߚଶ ߚଷ ߙ଴ ߙଵ ߙଶ Log-like. 
         
Silver         
Pre - SLV 0.000 -0.106* -0.047* -1.374* 0.000*** 0.954* 0.037* 3623.1 
Post - SLV 0.000** -0.041*** 0.255* -2.832* 0.000* 0.876* 0.102* 2974.7 
         
Gold         
Pre – GLD 0.000** -0.102* -0.116* -1.699* 0.000** 0.898* 0.023* 4328.4 
Post - GLD 0.000*** -0.086* 0.003 -1.543* 0.000* 0.933* 0.065* 4808.8 
         
Aluminium                 
Pre – DBC 0.000 -0.044** -0.134* 0.681* 0.000* 0.949* 0.031* 4971.3 
Post – DBC 0.000** -0.054** -0.162* 2.199* 0.000* 0.907* 0.064* 3379.9 
         
Brent Crude                 
Pre - DBC 0.001 -0.019 -0.042 0.433** 0.000* 0.899* 0.052* 3700.3 
Post – DBC 0.001 -0.001 0.215* 0.617* 0.000** 0.918* 0.070* 2928.8 
         
Coffee                  
Pre – DBA 0.000** -0.046** -0.061*** -0.201 0.000* 0.789* 0.105* 4463.2 
Post – DBA 0.000 -0.147* -0.001 -0.016 0.000* 0.914* 0.054* 2896.5 
         
Copper                 
Pre – BDG 0.000 -0.025 -0.171* 0.833* 0.000* 0.964* 0.033* 6282.6 
Post – DBG 0.000*** -0.012 -0.157* 1.532* 0.000* 0.894* 0.085* 3079.3 
         
Corn                  
Pre – DBA 0.000 0.065* 0.019 -0.087 0.000* 0.780* 0.141* 4459.5 
Post – DBA 0.001*** 0.065** -0.039 0.079 0.000*** 0.920* 0.074* 2505.1 
 
Note: The above table represents the estimated coefficients of the GARCH models based on exchange dynamics prior and post ETF introduction in the respective investigated exchanges. T-
statistics are in parentheses, where ***p<0.01, **p<0.05 and *p<0.10.   
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Table AV: GARCH (1, 1) results for the major international commodity markets under investigation pre and post ETF introduction (continued) 
Country ߚ଴ ߚଵ ߚଶ ߚଷ ߙ଴ ߙଵ ߙଶ Log-like. 
         
Cotton         
Pre – DBA 0.000 -0.114* -0.012 0.129 0.000* 0.842* 0.142* 4656.6 
Post – DBA 0.001*** -0.166* -0.049 0.141 0.000* 0.813* 0.158* 1057.9 
         
Feeder Cattle         
Pre – DBA 0.000** -0.015 -0.011 -0.080 0.000* 0.943* 0.053* 6542.8 
Post – DBA 0.000 0.009 0.028** 0.014 0.000** 0.950* 0.041* 3528.8 
         
Gasoline RBOB         
Pre – DBC 0.001 0.018 0.050 0.305 0.000* 0.775* 0.115* 1256.4 
Post – DBC 0.000 0.046*** 0.071 0.170 0.000* 0.920* 0.061* 2751.1 
         
Lean Hogs         
Pre – DBA 0.001* -0.006 0.006 -0.026 0.000* 0.898* 0.079* 5676.9 
Post – DBA 0.000 0.064** 0.055* -0.043 0.000* 0.841* 0.120* 2983.4 
         
Live Cattle         
Pre – DBA 0.000** -0.015 -0.011 -0.080 0.000* 0.943* 0.053* 6542.8 
Post – DBA 0.000 0.009 0.028** 0.014 0.000** 0.950* 0.041* 3528.8 
         
Natural Gas         
Pre – DJP 0.002* -0.014 0.042 0.326*** 0.000** 0.804* 0.103* 1237.2 
Post - DJP 0.000 -0.041*** 0.009 -0.091 0.000** 0.923* 0.072* 3403.0 
         
         
Palladium         
Pre – PALL 0.000*** 0.445* -0.184* 1.726* 0.000* 0.915* 0.079* 6550.1 
Post – PALL 0.001 0.062 -0.642* 2.722* 0.000*** 0.405*** 0.205** 571.6 
 
Note: The above table represents the estimated coefficients of the GARCH models based on exchange dynamics prior and post ETF introduction in the respective investigated exchanges. T-
statistics are in parentheses, where ***p<0.01, **p<0.05 and *p<0.10.   
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Table AV: GARCH (1, 1) results for the major international commodity markets under investigation pre and post ETF introduction (continued) 
Country ߚ଴ ߚଵ ߚଶ ߚଷ ߙ଴ ߙଵ ߙଶ Log-like. 
         
Soybeans         
Pre – DBA 0.000 -0.040*** 0.003 0.061 0.000* 0.948* 0.042* 5099.7 
Post – DBA 0.000 0.020 0.044 0.123 0.000* 0.942* 0.050* 2962.4 
         
Sugar         
Pre – DBA 0.000 -0.002 0.076** 0.037 0.000* 0.724 0.186* 4611.4 
Post – DBA 0.000 -0.011 -0.020 -0.064 0.000** 0.937* 0.057* 2371.7 
         
Wheat         
Pre – DBA 0.000 -0.002 -0.016 -0.100 0.000* 0.941* 0.034* 4721.7 
Post – DBA 0.001 -0.042*** -0.054 0.086 0.000* 0.930* 0.060* 2511.9 
         
West Texas Intermediate         
Pre – USO 0.001 -0.016 -0.044 0.475** 0.000* 0.908* 0.048* 3814.9 
Post – USO 0.001 -0.001 0.218* 0.595* 0.000** 0.916* 0.073* 2813.3 
         
Zinc         
Pre – BDG 0.000** -0.021 -0.136* 0.838* 0.000* 0.969* 0.030* 6129.7 
Post – BDG 0.000 0.008*** -0.076** 1.283* 0.000* 0.930* 0.057* 2920 
 
Note: The above table represents the estimated coefficients of the GARCH models based on exchange dynamics prior and post ETF introduction in the respective investigated exchanges. T-
statistics are in parentheses, where ***p<0.01, **p<0.05 and *p<0.10.   
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Table AVIa: Vector autoregression testing the impact of commodity liquidity on equity liquidity 
Dependent Commodities  Equities  
Independents Comm/Equities  Comm/Equities  
 Coefficient  Probability > |z| Coefficient Probability > |z| 
Constant -0.2881259 0.822 0.9174515 0.199 
Commodities     
L1 0.2896138 0.022 0.0911572 0.195 
L2 0.2256709 0.090 0.1611211 0.030 
L3 0.1390145 0.317 0.868032 0.263 
L4 -0.1852711 0.182 -0.0602609 0.437 
L5 -0.3739972 0.006 0.0923992 0.220 
Equities     
L1 -0.0479434 0.844 0.1093184 0.422 
L2 0.800436 0.722 -0.3251877 0.010 
L3 0.3038912 0.184 0.0977486 0.444 
L4 0.2707822 0.227 0.3161173 0.012 
L5 -0.0082398 0.972 -0.1149553 0.376 
     
No. Of Obs. 55    
AIC 14.09164    
HQIC 14.40214    
SBIC 14.89458    
Log Likelihood -365.5202    
FPE 4567.951    
Optimal No. Of Lags  2030.201    
     
Variable Commodities Equities   
Parameters 11 11   
RMSE 10.0728 5.62219   
R-square 0.3441 0.4569   
Chi-square 28.8593 46.26258   
Prob>Chi-square 0.0013 0.0000   
 
Note: The table above shows the Vector Autoregression (VAR) statistics from the analysis completed in section 4.3.1. This 
analysis was based on the most significant relationships between investment brackets chosen by significant ܋ܐܑ૛ statistics 
under 1% from the Granger Causality analysis. The VAR was completed to test the magnitude of a potential shock to one 
investment medium on another. With a significant Granger Causality statistic, we can infer that a flow from one medium to 
another may be linked – whereas the VAR analysis indicates how much of an impact sudden ‘shocks’ may have on the other. 
 
Table AVIb: Summary statistics for the VAR analysis testing the impact of commodity liquidity on equity 
liquidity 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Commodities 60 0.049558 10.93051 -22.90755 48.41469 
Equities 60 0.784596 6.66441 -11.62489 22.97283 
 
Note: The above statistics represent those used in the monthly liquidity analysis. They are representative of the flow of fund 
in and out of the investigated asset class in question 
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Table AVIc: Lag order selection criteria for the vector autoregression (VAR) analysis between commodity 
liquidity and equity liquidity 
Lag LL LR Df P FPE AIC 
0 -386.239    6032.84 14.3807 
1 -378.974 14.611 4 0.006 5338.88 14.2583 
2 -372.976 11.997 4 0.017 4962.15 14.1843 
3 -369.232 7.4867 4 0.112 5018.92 14.1938 
4 -363.995 10.475 4 0.033 4810.11 14.1480 
5 -359.285 9.4203 4 0.051 *4710.05* *14.1216* 
6 -375.220 4.1296 4 0.389 5099.24 14.1933 
 
Note: The above table represents the selection statistics used to select the number of lags included in the VAR analysis 
between commodities and equities. LL represents log likelihood, LR is the likelihood ratio, df is the degrees of freedom and 
p is the probability. The two metrics used to select the number of lags are the FPE (Final prediction error) and AIC (Akaike’s 
Information Criterion) are used. From this, the lowest value represents the optimal lag value; that is the lag order estimate 
that does not sacrifice the precision of the model for accuracy. In the case between commodities and equities, the model 
finds this is the 5th lag. 
 
Table AVId: Lagrange multiplier test for the variables in the VAR analysis between commodity liquidity and 
equity liquidity 
Lag ܥℎ݅ଶ Df Probability > ܥℎ݅ଶ 
1 4.0655 4 0.39722 
2 3.3427 4 0.50220 
ܪ଴:ܰ݋	ܽݑݐ݋ܿ݋ݎݎ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊	ܽݐ	݈ܽ݃	݋ݎ݀݁ݎ 
 
Note: The Lagrange multiplier test is derived from a constrained maximisation principal. Maximising the log-likelihood 
subject to the constraint that ߠ = ߠ଴ yields a set of Lagrange multipliers which measure the shadow price of the constraint. If 
the price is high, the constraint should be rejected as inconsistent with the data. Letting H be the Lagrangian, H = L(ߠ,ݕ) − 
λ(ߠ − ߠ଴), where the first order constraints are ఋ௅
ఋఏ
= λ; ߠ = ߠ଴, so that λ = s(ߠ଴ ,ݕ). 
 
Table AVIe: Joint significance tests for VAR analysis between commodity liquidity and equity liquidity 
Equation Commodities Equities All 
Lag ܥℎ݅ଶ Df Prob>ܥℎ݅ଶ ܥℎ݅ଶ Df Prob>ܥℎ݅ଶ ܥℎ݅ଶ Df Prob>ܥℎ݅ଶ 
1 5.286668 4 0.071 2.410809 4 0.300 7.17304 4 * 
2 3.084533 4 0.214 10.84043 4 0.004 13.53607 4 0.009 
3 3.324533 4 0.190 2.200094 4 0.333 5.036204 4 * 
4 2.692568 4 0.260 6.4543346 4 0.040 8.540142 4 0.074 
5 8.04734 4 0.018 1.92476 4 0.382 10.71393 4 0.030 
 
Note: The Wald test is a parametric statistical test named after Abraham Wald with a great variety of uses. Whenever a 
relationship within or between data items can be expressed as a statistical model with parameters to be estimated from a 
sample, the Wald test can be used to test the true value of the parameter based on the sample estimate 
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Table AVIIa: Vector autoregression testing the impact of currency liquidity on commodity liquidity 
Dependent Currency  Comm  
Independents Curr/Comm  Comm/Curr  
 Coefficient  Probability > |z| Coefficient Probability > |z| 
Constant -0.081039 0.979 -0.0020699 0.999 
Currencies     
L1 -0.2784958 0.012 0.5443957 0.202 
L2 -0.4266523 0.000 -1.064377 0.015 
Commodities     
L1 0.0547578 0.093 0.4074553 0.001 
L2 0.1475837 0.000 0.1464679 0.231 
     
No. Of Obs. 58    
AIC 12.15326    
HQIC 12.29164    
SBIC 12.50851    
Log Likelihood -343.4447    
FPE 650.9079    
Optimal No. Of Lags  460.6703    
     
     
Variable Currencies Commodities   
Parameters 5 5   
RMSE 2.46631 9.5476   
R-square 0.3883 0.2973   
Chi-square 36.81003 24.54037   
Prob>Chi-square 0.0000 0.0001   
 
Note: The table above shows the Vector Autoregression (VAR) statistics from the analysis completed in section 4.3. This 
analysis was based on the most significant relationships between investment brackets chosen by significant ࢉࢎ࢏૛ statistics 
under 1% from the Granger Causality analysis. The VAR was completed to test the magnitude of a potential shock to one 
investment medium on another. With a significant Granger Causality statistic, we can infer that a flow from one medium to 
another may be linked – whereas the VAR analysis indicates how much of an impact sudden ‘shocks’ may have on the other. 
 
Table AVIIb: Lag order selection criteria for the vector autoregression (VAR) analysis between commodity 
liquidity and currency liquidity 
Lag LL LR Df P FPE AIC 
0 -386.239    6032.84 14.3807 
1 -378.974 14.611 4 0.006 5338.88 14.2583 
2 -372.976 11.997 4 0.017 *4962.15* *14.1843* 
3 -369.232 7.4867 4 0.112 5018.92 14.1938 
 
Note: The above table represents the selection statistics used to select the number of lags included in the VAR analysis 
between commodities and equities. LL represents log likelihood, LR is the likelihood ratio, df is the degrees of freedom and 
p is the probability. The two metrics used to select the number of lags are the FPE (Final prediction error) and AIC (Akaike’s 
Information Criterion) are used. From this, the lowest value represents the optimal lag value; that is the lag order estimate 
that does not sacrifice the precision of the model for accuracy. In the case between commodities and currency, the model 
finds this is the 2nd lag. 
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Table AVIIc: Summary statistics for the VAR analysis testing the impact commodity liquidity on equity liquidity 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Equities 60 0.020663 2.991978 -9.808066 9.34632 
Commodities 60 0.049558 10.93051 -22.90755 48.41469 
 
Note: The above statistics represent those used in the monthly liquidity analysis. They are representative of the flow of fund 
in and out of the investigated asset class in question 
 
Table AVIId: Lagrange multiplier test for the variables in the VAR analysis between commodity liquidity and 
currency liquidity 
Lag ܥℎ݅ଶ Df Probability > ܥℎ݅ଶ 
1 0.2383 4 0.99344 
2 2.4157 4 0.65979 
ܪ଴:ܰ݋	ܽݑݐ݋ܿ݋ݎݎ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊	ܽݐ	݈ܽ݃	݋ݎ݀݁ݎ 
 
Note: The Lagrange multiplier test is derived from a constrained maximisation principal. Maximising the log-likelihood 
subject to the constraint that ߠ = ߠ଴ yields a set of Lagrange multipliers which measure the shadow price of the constraint. If 
the price is high, the constraint should be rejected as inconsistent with the data. Letting H be the Lagrangian, H = L(ߠ,ݕ) − 
λ(ߠ − ߠ଴), where the first order constraints are ఋ௅
ఋఏ
= λ; ߠ = ߠ଴, so that λ = s(ߠ଴ ,ݕ). 
 
Table AVIIe: Joint significance tests for VAR analysis between commodity liquidity and currency liquidity 
Equation Commodities Currencies All 
Lag ܥℎ݅ଶ Df Prob>ܥℎ݅ଶ ܥℎ݅ଶ Df Prob>ܥℎ݅ଶ ܥℎ݅ଶ Df Prob>ܥℎ݅ଶ 
1 7.674377 2 0.022 14.62548 2 0.001 22.28513 2 0.000 
2 30.81868 2 0.000 6.570124 2 0.037 35.81029 2 0.000 
 
Note:  The Wald test is a parametric statistical test named after Abraham Wald with a great variety of uses. Whenever a 
relationship within or between data items can be expressed as a statistical model with parameters to be estimated from a 
sample, the Wald test can be used to test the true value of the parameter based on the sample estimate 
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Table AVIIIa: Vector autoregression testing the impact of options on commodity liquidity 
Dependent Options  Comm  
Independents Options/Comm  Comm/Options  
 Coefficient  Probability > |z| Coefficient Probability > |z| 
Constant 0.8540892 0.256 0.1752854 0.892 
Options     
L1 0.093876 0.450 -0.2135971 0.315 
L2 -0.2847872 0.018 -0.272463 0.895 
Commodities     
L1 0.1166248 0.122 0.3797617 0.003 
L2 0.153779 0.049 0.1597123 0.232 
     
No. Of Obs. 58    
AIC 14.03749    
HQIC 14.17586    
SBIC 14.39274    
Log Likelihood -397.0871    
FPE 4283.779    
Optimal No. Of Lags  3031.780    
     
     
Variable Options Commodities   
Parameters 5 5   
RMSE 5.94390 10.17960   
R-square 0.2202 0.2012   
Chi-square 16.38065 14.60994   
Prob>Chi-square 0.0025 0.0056   
 
Note: The table above shows the Vector Autoregression (VAR) statistics from the analysis completed in section 4.3.3. This 
analysis was based on the most significant relationships between investment brackets chosen by significant ࢉࢎ࢏૛ statistics 
under 1% from the Granger Causality analysis. The VAR was completed to test the magnitude of a potential shock to one 
investment medium on another. With a significant Granger Causality statistic, we can infer that a flow from one medium to 
another may be linked – whereas the VAR analysis indicates how much of an impact sudden ‘shocks’ may have on the other. 
 
Table AVIIb: Summary statistics for the VAR analysis testing the impact commodity liquidity on equity 
liquidity 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Commodities 60 0.49558 10.93051 -22.90755 48.41469 
Options 60 0.6169003 6.417474 -11.6939 17.52119 
 
Note: The above statistics represent those used in the monthly liquidity analysis. They are representative of the flow of fund 
in and out of the investigated asset class in question 
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Table AVIIIc: Lag order selection criteria for the vector autoregression (VAR) analysis between commodity 
liquidity and option liquidity 
Lag LL LR Df P FPE AIC 
0 -386.239    6032.84 14.3807 
1 -378.974 14.611 4 0.006 5338.88 14.2583 
2 -372.976 11.997 4 0.017 *4962.15* *14.1843* 
3 -369.232 7.4867 4 0.112 5018.92 14.1938 
 
Note: The above table represents the selection statistics used to select the number of lags included in the VAR analysis 
between commodities and equities. LL represents log likelihood, LR is the likelihood ratio, df is the degrees of freedom and 
p is the probability. The two metrics used to select the number of lags are the FPE (Final prediction error) and AIC (Akaike’s 
Information Criterion) are used. From this, the lowest value represents the optimal lag value; that is the lag order estimate 
that does not sacrifice the precision of the model for accuracy. In the case between commodities and options, the model finds 
this is the 2nd lag. 
 
Table AVIIId: Lagrange multiplier test for the variables in the VAR analysis between commodity liquidity and 
option liquidity 
Lag ܥℎ݅ଶ Df Probability > ܥℎ݅ଶ 
1 5.0103 4 0.28624 
2 1.7136 4 0.78825 
ܪ଴:ܰ݋	ܽݑݐ݋ܿ݋ݎݎ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊	ܽݐ	݈ܽ݃	݋ݎ݀݁ݎ 
 
Note: The Lagrange multiplier test is derived from a constrained maximisation principal. Maximising the log-likelihood 
subject to the constraint that ߠ = ߠ଴ yields a set of Lagrange multipliers which measure the shadow price of the constraint. If 
the price is high, the constraint should be rejected as inconsistent with the data. Letting H be the Lagrangian, H = L(ߠ,ݕ) − 
λ(ߠ − ߠ଴), where the first order constraints are ఋ௅
ఋఏ
= λ; ߠ = ߠ଴, so that λ = s(ߠ଴ ,ݕ). 
 
Table AVIIIe: Joint significance tests for VAR analysis between commodity liquidity and option liquidity 
Equation Commodities Options All 
Lag ܥℎ݅ଶ Df Prob>ܥℎ݅ଶ ܥℎ݅ଶ Df Prob>ܥℎ݅ଶ ܥℎ݅ଶ Df Prob>ܥℎ݅ଶ 
1 3.330712 2 0.189 9.03792 2 0.011 11.74837 2 0.019 
2 8.00772 2 0.018 1.434849 2 0.488 9.126015 2 0.058 
 
Note: The Wald test is a parametric statistical test named after Abraham Wald with a great variety of uses. Whenever a 
relationship within or between data items can be expressed as a statistical model with parameters to be estimated from a 
sample, the Wald test can be used to test the true value of the parameter based on the sample estimate 
 
 
